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Abstract 
 
Food insecurity is an important global problem severely affecting developing countries, 
particularly those in Asia and Africa. Agricultural research in developing countries is 
characterised by the following tension: the private sector has plenty of applied research skills 
and experience but these are primarily used for commercial gain; the public sector has 
excellent research but the research is often not applied. Agricultural public private 
partnerships are currently acclaimed as a means of redressing this tension through optimising 
the complementary synergies between the two sectors in order to address food security.   
 
Private sector involvement in agriculture, including public private partnerships (PPPs) has 
increased in the past two decades as has the use of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in 
agriculture research. The two sectors have differing and sometimes conflicting perspectives 
on IP as a concept and in the strategies used to manage intellectual property. IPRs have the 
potential to enhance or hinder the achievement of a partnership’s objectives.  
 
This thesis investigates whether, to what extent and in what ways IP is relevant to food 
security oriented PPPs. It uses two case studies in India and Kenya involving two centres in 
the Consultative Group on International Agriculture Research (CGIAR) to locate the role that 
IP plays in the formation and execution of food security oriented PPPs in the context of 
development. It argues for a bespoke analysis of PPPs as the preferred means through which 
the impact and effect of factors such as IPRs can be meaningfully examined. It finds that the 
relevance of IP to food security oriented PPPs in developing countries is determined by two 
factors: the nature of the technology used in the partnership and the stage of the partnership.   
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction and overview 
 
1.0 The problem 
 
Agricultural development needs, including the attainment of food security are characterised 
by the following tension: the public sector has excellent research but the research is often not 
applied; the private sector has plenty of applied research skills and experience but these are 
primarily used for commercial gain. In developing countries, funding is available from 
donors although recipients are increasingly required to demonstrate impact.  
 
Figure 1.1: Tension in agricultural research  
      
 
While most agricultural research in developing countries continues to be done by the public 
sector, recent years have seen a growth in private sector engagement. The number of private 
companies involved in agriculture and related activities and the amount of investment from 
the private sector has increased in the last two decades.1  
                                               
1
 Pray, C. & Fuglie, K., ‘The private sector and international technology transfer in agriculture’ in Fuglie, K. & 
Schimmelpfennig, D. (eds.) Public-Private collaboration in agricultural research (Ames: Iowa State University 
 2 
The increasing private sector presence and privatisation of knowledge in agriculture 
potentially reinforces the tension between public and private agricultural research in ways 
that may undermine food security. Public private partnerships (PPPs) are hailed as important 
institutional strategies to address this tension. PPPs have immense potential to contribute to 
the attainment of food security. There is increasing evidence suggesting that PPPs are 
growing in popularity in development policy and practice as a means of addressing global 
issues as diverse as agriculture, health and finance.2 
 
PPPs take many forms some of which include private distribution of public goods, private 
purchase of public technology or services, and public private collaborative research.3  Some 
of these collaborations may involve proprietary technology. Successful pro-poor agricultural 
PPPs are constrained by different incentives structures4 of which intellectual property (IP) is 
a subset.  
 
With the increasing privatisation of knowledge in agriculture research, there are indications 
that intellectual property rights (IPRs) are increasingly in use in food security oriented PPPs.5 
Indeed, research tools and products used in agricultural research are now more likely than 
ever to be protected by IPRs, which has now become a major concern.6   
 
On the one hand, IP can play a beneficial role in PPPs with food security objectives as it 
enhances a partnership’s ability to achieve its pro poor food security goals. On the other 
hand, such rights can also reinforce the conflict of interest between the public and private 
sector parties. As a concept, IPRs are structured towards the attainment of private rights. This 
                                                                                                                                                  
Press, 2000); Beintema, M. & Stads, G., ‘Agricultural R&D in sub-Saharan Africa: an era of stagnation’ ASTI 
background report (Washington DC: International Food Policy Research Institute, 2006) 
2
 For example, Buse, K. & Walt, G., Global public-private partnerships: part II- What are the health issues for 
global governance? Bulletin of the World Health Organisation 78/5 (2000) 699  
3
 Hall, A., Sulaiman, R., Clark, N., Sivamohan, M. & Yoganand, B., ‘Public-private sector interaction in the 
Indian agricultural research system: an innovation systems perspective on institutional reform’ in Byerlee, D. & 
Echeverría, R., (eds.) Agricultural research policy in an era of privatization (Oxon: CABI Publishing, 2002) 
4
 Spielman, D. & Grebmer K., Public-private partnerships in international agricultural research: an analysis of 
constraints, Journal of Technology Transfer 31/2 (2006) 291  
5
 Spielman, D., Hartwich, F. & Grebmer, K., ‘Sharing science, building bridges, and enhancing impact’ IFPRI 
Discussion Paper 00708 (2007) 
6
 Reifschneider, F., Mobilising resources for agricultural innovation public and private partnerships: an 
invitation to a dialogue, paper presented at ‘The International Workshop on Transforming Tropical Agriculture: 
An Assessment of Major Technological, Institutional and Policy Innovations’ Brasilia, 17-19 July (2006); von 
Braun, J. & Ferroni, M., Public-private partnerships in agricultural research: Towards best practice and 
replicable models, presented at the conference ‘Scaling up public-private partnerships in agricultural research to 
benefit the poor’ The World Bank,  30 October (2008) 
 3 
is more consonant with the private sector than with the public sector.7 There are concerns 
about the application and management of IPRs by the public sector in the provision of public 
goods8 and particularly in food security oriented research.   
 
1.1 Hypothesis and main research question  
 
Food security oriented PPPs increasingly involve the use of privatised knowledge. The public 
and private sectors approach IP from different ideologies, perspectives, practices and 
capacities. These differences have the potential to enhance or hinder a PPP’s food security 
goals. This thesis hypothesises that intellectual property (IP) is relevant to food security 
oriented public private partnerships (PPPs) in developing countries and that it affects their 
formation and execution. The main research question is whether, to what extent and in what 
ways is IP relevant to food security oriented PPPs in developing countries? 
   
 1.2 Conceptual framework 
 
This research finds its theoretical basis on the apparent gap between the concepts of IP and 
PPPs.9 The theory,10 origin and development,11 and the economic,12  legal and philosophical13 
                                               
7
 Mugabe, J., ‘Intellectual property protection and traditional knowledge: an exploration of international policy 
discourse’ a paper prepared for WIPO (1998) available at http://www.acts.or.ke/paper%20-
%20intellectual%20property.htm 
8
 Maredia, K.  Application of intellectual property rights in developing countries: implications for public policy 
and agricultural research institutes (Geneva: WIPO, 2001); Atkinson, R. et al. Intellectual property rights: 
Public sector collaboration for agricultural IP management Science 301/5630 (2003) 174; Cohen, J., ‘Managing 
intellectual property: Challenges and responses for agricultural research institutes’ in Persley, G. & Latin, M., 
(eds.) Agricultural Biotechnology and the Poor: Proceedings of an International Conference 21-22 October 
1999 (Washington DC: CGIAR, 2000) and also Mahoney, R. & Krattiger, A., ‘The role of IP management in 
health and agricultural innovation’ in Krattiger, A. et al., (eds.) Intellectual property management in health and 
agricultural innovation: a handbook of best practices (Oxford: MIHR & Davis: PIPRA, 2007) 
9
 The references in this section are not meant to be exhaustive but rather serve to demonstrate that this area of IP 
is well researched and documented.  
10
 Moore, A., A Lockean theory of intellectual property, Hamline L. Rev. 21/65 (1997); MacCormick, N., On the 
very idea of intellectual property: an essay according to the institutionalist theory of law, IP Quarterly 3 (2002) 
227; Sell, S., Power and ideas: north-south politics of intellectual property and antitrust (Albany: State 
University Press of New York, 1998) 
11
 Bouckaert, B., What is property? Harv. J. L.&  Pub. Pol’y 13 (1990) 775; May, C. & Sell, S., Intellectual 
property rights: a critical history (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006)   
12
 Besen, S. & Raskind, L., An introduction to the law and economics of intellectual property, Journal of 
economic perspectives 5/1 (1991) 3; David, P., ‘Intellectual Property institutions and the panda’s thumb: 
patents, copyrights, and trade secrets in economic theory and history’ in Wallerstein, M., Mogee, M. & Schoen, 
R., (eds.) Global dimensions of intellectual property rights in science and technology (Washington DC: 
National Academy Press, 1993); Primo Braga, C., Fink, C. & Sepulveda, C., ‘Intellectual property rights and 
economic development’ World Bank Discussion Paper No. 412 (Washington DC: World Bank, 2000); Maskus, 
K., Intellectual property rights in the global economy (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 
2000); Sherwood, R., Intellectual property and economic development (Oxford: Westview Press, 1990)   
 4 
justifications of IP is well documented. IP within the context of the global political economy 
is also widely debated and researched.14 Similarly, a substantial amount of literature mainly 
drawn from innovation theory elucidates the theory,15 rationale,16 constraints17 and various 
models18 of PPPs. Although concepts of IP and PPPs have sympathy, they have hitherto 
assumed separateness on a conceptual level. The thesis addresses this theoretical separateness 
and tests it against the empirical case studies. This thesis stands on three pillars: IP, PPPs and 
agriculture in the context of food security in developing countries.   
 
1.2.1 Increasing privatisation in agricultural research  
 
The environment in which food security oriented agricultural research is conducted has 
changed over the past four decades. The public sector’s focus changed from cash crops in the 
                                                                                                                                                  
13
 Palmer, T., Intellectual property: a non-Posnerian law and economics approach, Hamline L. Rev. 12/2 (1989) 
261; Correa, C., Intellectual property rights, the WTO and developing countries (London: Zed Books & Third 
World Network, 2000); Boyle, J., Shamans, software, and spleens: law and construction of the information 
society (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996); Drahos, P., A philosophy of intellectual property 
(Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1996); Merges, P., Menell, P. & Lemley, M., (eds.) Intellectual 
property in the new technological age (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2003); Palmer, T., Are patents and 
copyrights morally justified? The philosophy of property rights and ideal objects, Harvard Journal of Law & 
Public Policy 13/3 (1990) 817; Nance, D., Owning ideas, Harv. J. L.&  Pub. Pol’y 13 (1990) 757; May, C., A 
global political economy of intellectual property rights: the new enclosures? (London & New York: Routledge, 
2000); 
14
 Dutfield, G. ‘Intellectual property in the global economy: high stakes and propaganda warfare’ in Dutfield, 
G., (ed.) Intellectual property rights and the life science industries: a 20th century history (Aldershot: Ashgate 
Publishing Limited, 2003); Richards, D., Intellectual property rights and global capitalism: the political 
economy of the TRIPs Agreement (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2004); Matthews, D., Globalising intellectual 
property rights: the TRIPs Agreement (London: Routledge, 2002) 
15
 O’Neil, D., Performance measurement in public-private partnerships: learning from praxis, constructing a 
conceptual model, paper presented at the ‘American Society for Public Administration 65th National 
Conference’ Portland, 27-30 March (2004); Besley, T. & Ghatak, M., Public-private partnerships for the 
provision of public goods: theory and an application to NGOs, paper presented for the Development Economics 
Discussion Paper Series, London School of Economics (1999); Pongsiri, N., ‘Regulation and public private 
partnerships’ Centre on Regulation and Competition working paper series, Paper no. 12 (2001); Osbourne, S., 
Public-private partnerships: theory and practice in international perspective (New York: Routledge Press, 
2000) 
16
 Fiszbein, A. & Lowden, P., Working together for a change: government, civic and business partnerships for 
poverty reduction in Latin America and the Caribbean (Washington DC: Economic Development Institute of 
the World Bank, 1999); James, C., Agricultural research and development: the need for public-private sector 
partnerships, Issues in Agriculture 9 (1996) 
17
 Spielman, D., Agricultural sector investment and the role of public-private partnerships, paper presented at 
‘The African development and poverty reduction: the macro-micro linkage forum’ South Africa, 13-15 October 
(2004a); Spielman & Grebmer (2006) supra note 4; Spielman, D. & Grebmer, K. ‘Public-private partnerships in 
international agricultural research: an analysis of challenges facing industry and the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research’ EPTD Discussion Paper 113 (Washington DC: IFPRI, 2004b) 
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 Pray, C., Public-private sector linkages in research and development: biotechnology and the seed industry in 
Brazil, China and India, Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 83/3 (2001); also Hall et al. (2002) supra note 3 to name a few 
 5 
1970s to food crops in the 1980s following the food crisis.19  The public sector’s research 
agenda has since diversified as a result of factors such as declining public funds and the need 
to demonstrate more impact. Agricultural public research institutes in developing countries 
are mostly commodity oriented and have adopted a supply driven research agenda although 
there are indications that some may be engaging in demand led research.  
 
Traditionally, agricultural R&D was within the public sector ambit and was usually 
conducted under a government department with funding from the central, federal or state 
government. Although agricultural research in developing countries is still predominantly 
public sector-led, the agricultural scene is increasingly characterised by private sector 
presence. 20 This can be attributed to a number of factors. The budgetary austerity period of 
the 1980s and the incident privatisation of public research entities was a major catalyst in 
promoting the increase of private sector actors in agricultural research.    
 
Since then, certain factors have acted to promote private sector interest in the agricultural 
sector. It has been argued that private sector investment in the agricultural sector crucially 
depends on the protection of IP and that appropriation of benefits through IPRs, including 
trade secrets, are a main deciding factor on private sector investment in agriculture.21 The 
potential appropriation of benefits from agricultural research offered by IPRs may have 
helped increase private sector engagement in agriculture. Manicad lists other deciding factors 
such as the availability of the public sector to provide knowledge and competent human 
resources to the private sector.22 A large actual or potential market, for example India, has 
also been cited as a consideration for private investment in agriculture.23 The general business 
                                               
19
 For an account on how the public sector has evolved, see Byerlee, D., Alex, G. & Echeverria, G., ‘The 
evolution of public research systems in developing countries: Facing new challenges’ in Byerlee, D. & 
Echeverría, R., (eds.) Agricultural Research Policy in an Era of Privatization (Oxon: CABI Publishing, 2002) 
20
 Pardey, P. & Beintema, N., ‘Slow magic: agricultural R&D a century after Mendel’ IFPRI Food Policy 
Statement (Washington DC: IFPRI, 2001); see also Beintema, N. & Stads, G., ‘Investing in sub-Saharan African 
agricultural research: Recent trends’ 2020 Africa Conference Brief 8 (Washington DC: IFPRI, 2004); and Hall 
et al. (2002) supra note 3; Huffman, W., Public-private research and development relationships: discussion, 
Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 83/3 (2001) shows that in the US, the private sector is the main source of funds for 
agriculture R&D and its share is growing  
21
 Lele, U., Lesser, W. & Horstkotte-Wesseler, G. (eds.) Intellectual property rights in agriculture, the World 
Bank’s role in assisting borrower and member countries (Washington DC: World Bank, 2000)  
22
 Manicad, G., CGIAR and the private sector: Public good versus proprietary technology in agricultural 
research, Biotechnology and Development Monitor 37 (1999) 8  
23
 Binenbaum, E., Pardey, P. and Wright, B. Public-private research relationships: The Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 83/3 (2001) 748 
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climate in a country is likewise a major consideration. Pray24 summarises the conditions for 
growth in private research in developing countries as liberalisation of polices and regulation 
on input industries, strong IPRs, rapid growth in markets for agricultural inputs and public 
research to keep private research costs down.  
 
It is critical that food security oriented agricultural research is driven by the public sector 
especially in vulnerable agricultural economies not in the least because of the dangers posed 
by private sector-driven research agendas. Given the private sectors’ ultimate objective of 
profit acquisition, private sector-driven research may distort research priorities, such as when 
private companies choose to invest in commercial crops and neglect subsistence crops 
including ‘pro-poor orphan crops’ i.e. food crops grown by the poor for their subsistence.   
Growing literature on private sector investment in developing countries shows that private 
firms typically invest in agriculture R&D for those crops, traits and technologies that benefit 
farming systems that are organised along lines similar to those in developed countries.25  
 
Chapter two examines the evidence of increasing private sector engagement in Kenya and 
India and attempts to locate the role of IPRs in private sector investment in agriculture in the 
context of development.  It looks at the potential impact of the changing agricultural research 
scene in developing countries on efforts aimed at the attainment of food security. 
 
1.2.2 Increasing use of IPRs in food security agricultural research  
 
The traditional classification of goods as being either public or private is based largely on 
neo-classical economics.26 This posits that there is a natural division of labour between the 
public sector which mainly is responsible for the provision of public goods, and the private 
sector, which mostly engages in the provision of private goods. In addition, a good is 
classified as either public or private based on two main factors: excludability and rivalry. 
Goods or services are said to be non-excludable if non payers cannot be excluded from the 
benefits of the good or service. Non-rivalrous goods and services are those whose marginal 
cost of an additional person consuming them, once they have been produced, is zero.  Pure 
                                               
24
 Pray, C., ‘The growing role of the private sector in agricultural research’ in Byerlee, D. & Echeverría, R., 
(eds.) Agricultural research policy in an era of privatization (Oxon: CABI Publishing, 2002) 
25
 Spielman (2004b) supra note 17 
26
 Granstrand, O., (ed.) Economics, law and intellectual property: seeking strategies for research and teaching 
in a developing field (London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003) 
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public goods are said to be non-rivalrous and non-excludable while private goods have high 
excludability and high rivalry. Hybrid or mixed goods are located along the public goods – 
private goods continuum; these contain elements of excludability and rivalry.  
 
There is an abundance of literature on IPRs as an economic concept27 whose rationale is to 
enable the inventor to recoup costs and to encourage and reward invention by granting the 
inventor a monopoly over his creation for a stipulated period. This rationale reinforces the 
argument that IP is modelled on private gains and is therefore more compatible with private 
sector research. The application of IPRs introduces excludability to goods in the classical 
distinction between private goods and public goods on the basis of Samuelson’s28 rivalry and 
Musgrave’s29 excludability criteria. This excludability renders the goods so protected to move 
from the realm of free availability to that of exclusivity. The central postulation of public 
sector mandate is the provision of goods that are equally available and accessible to all. In 
theory therefore, there is an inherent conflict in the use of intellectual property rights in the 
provision of public goods. Chapter three critically examines this theoretical conflict in the 
context of the Consultative Group of International Agricultural Research (CGIAR or CG). 
The Centres in the CG conduct food security oriented agricultural research for the benefit of 
the poor in developing countries. The CG’s primary mandate is the provision of global public 
goods.  
 
This theoretical conflict is the basis of the concern over the use of IPRs by public research 
institutions with food security and other social welfare goals. Public research institutions 
including the CG Centres are increasingly exposed to working with the private sector. There 
have been fears that by collaborating with the private sector, a public research organisation 
may be impeded from fulfilling its mandate to deliver public goods.30  
 
On the other hand, there have been arguments by the public sector that, in some cases, 
collaboration with the private sector is in fact vital to fulfilling its mandate. This is usually in 
                                               
27
 For example Granstrand, O., The economics and management of intellectual property: towards intellectual 
capitalism (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1999)   
28
 Samuelson, P., The pure theory of public expenditure, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 36/4 (1954) 
387 
29
 Musgrave, R., The theory of public finance (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959). 
30
 This has been expressed in numerous publications on the challenges the public sector face in PPPs. See 
Manicad (1999) supra note 22; on the role of IP in public research, see Fischer, K. & Byerlee, D., ‘Managing 
intellectual property and income generation in public research organisations’ in Byerlee, D. & Echeverría, R., 
(eds.) Agricultural research policy in an era of privatization (Oxon: CABI Publishing, 2002)  
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the distribution of hybrid seed. Seed companies have comparative advantage in the 
deployment of such technologies and collaboration with them is considered crucial by 
sections of the public sector.31 In some cases, seed companies have been unwilling to deploy 
technologies developed by the public sector without assurance that such arrangements are 
exclusive to the partnership.  
 
In developed countries, IP management is now a major focus in public research institutions 
especially those that are in PPPs or are involved in developing technologies that have some 
proprietary value.32 Lack of public sector capacity in IP has been cited as a setback in 
effective PPPs in developing countries.33 
  
Chapters three and four distinguish between the existence of IPRs and the exercise of IPRs 
and argue that it is the latter rather than the former that determines the effect IPRs have on the 
achievement of food security related objectives in public research institutions and in PPPs. 
Capacity in IP is vital in the exercise of IPRs to balance competing interests in PPPs, and 
especially in relation to the public good mandates within the CG Centres. In particular, 
chapter four looks at ways in which CG Centres can use IPRs without compromising their 
food security public goods mandates.  
 
1.2.3 PPPs in food security agricultural research   
 
Partnerships are not new to the field of agriculture; traditionally, public agriculture research 
institutes conducted research in partnership with farmers mainly through agriculture research 
extension programs. PPPs in agriculture, particularly in plant breeding and in biotechnology, 
are currently critically acclaimed. Research economists, policy makers and scholars 
increasingly highlight the food security related benefits to be gained by collaboration between 
                                               
31
 Tripp, R., New seed and old laws: regulatory reform and the diversification of national seed systems 
(London: ODI, 1997) 
32
 In the US, many universities and Public Research Organisations have established technology transfer offices 
(TTOs). See Graff G., Roland-Holst, D. & Zilberman, D., Agricultural biotechnology and globalisation: the role 
of public and private sector research, paper presented at the ‘Workshop on Environmental Costs and Benefits of 
Transgenic Crops in Europe’ 2-4 June (2003). Universities in developing countries are catching on; in Kenya, 
all the main public universities have or are in the process of formulating IP policies virtually all of which 
address technology transfer through some form of IP office (pers. comm.)  
33
 Kameri-Mbote, P., Wafula, D. & Clark, N., Public private partnerships for biotechnology in Africa (Nairobi: 
ACTS Press, 2001)  
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the public and private sectors.34 This is mainly borne out of the recognition of the synergy 
existing between the public and private sectors.  
 
The term PPPs is amorphous and invites a myriad of interpretations. Various academics, 
scholars, policy makers and practitioners have adopted diverse definitions. In its report, the 
Commission on PPPs termed ‘public’, ‘private’ and ‘partnership’ as ‘three of the most 
slippery terms in the modern political dictionary. Putting them together is almost an invitation 
to muddled thinking and confusion.’35 
 
Very generally, most attempts at defining PPPs can be classified into two groups: those that 
attempt to define PPPs by what they do and those that define PPPs by a deconstruction of the 
constituent terms. Most definitions seem to fall within the former perhaps demonstrating the 
inadequacy and ambiguity of the welter of meanings invited by the individual terms which 
render inadequate the latter method of definition.  
 
Adopting Brinkerhoff’s36 perspective of PPPs as lying along a continuum of relationship 
types, in this work PPPs will be used in a broad sense encompassing relationships between 
the public sector and both the private and voluntary and charitable sectors. This work 
includes institutional relationships which are a little more than contractual relationships and 
does not go as far as those definitions which demand a relationship ‘over and above’ 
contractual relations. This deliberate attempt aims at including simple technology transfer 
relationships which dominate a significant number of interactions between the public and 
private sectors in pro-poor agricultural R&D. 
 
The welter of meanings of the term ‘PPPs’ is indicative of differing theories and perspectives 
that influence the definitions. Partly because of the amorphous way in which partnerships are 
defined, there is little agreement about how best to analyse such arrangements. There are 
                                               
34
 Hall, A., Sivamohan, M., Clark, N., Taylor, S. & Bockett, G., Institutional developments in Indian agricultural 
R&D systems: emerging patterns of public and private sector activity, Science, technology and development 
16/3 (1998); Hall, A., Sivamohan, M., Clark, N., Taylor, S. & Bockett, G., Why research partnerships really 
matter: innovation theory, institutional arrangements and implications for developing new technology for the 
poor, World Development 29/5 (2001); Spielman & Grebmer (2006) supra note 4; Kameri-Mbote et al. (2001) 
supra note 33  
35
 Commission on Public Private Partnerships, Building better partnerships (London: IPPR, 2001) at p38  
36
 Brinkerhoff, D. & Brinkerhoff, M. Partnerships between international donors and non-governmental 
development organisations: opportunities and constraints, International Review of Administrative Sciences 70/2 
(2004) 253 
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numerous competing as well as complementary theoretical perspectives that assist (or do not) 
in understanding the motives, nature and effects of partnerships. There is no one rationale for 
PPPs; institutions and organisations have many reasons for adopting a partnership approach 
to the delivery of public goods or services. From the existing literature, six rationales for 
PPPs can be identified.  
 
Table 1.1: Rationales for PPPs 
Economic rationale PPPs as a response to market failure – based on traditional 
division of labour between the public and private sector 
Wider participation PPPs constitute a ‘Third Way’ between ‘privatisers’ and 
‘monopolists’ 
Complexity of modern problems PPPs provide multi-actor integrated solutions required by the 
wide scope and complex nature of today’s problems 
Synergy and complementarity PPPs achieve more than the individual agents can independently 
Accessing new resources & skills PPPs are an important tool for acquisition of new resources 
including information, technical and management skills 
Saving costs PPPs increase the financial base of the parties 
 
PPPs in the agricultural scene take different forms and may be formal or informal. Although 
there is no blueprint for PPPs, certain pre-existing conditions are presumed to exist, one of 
which is that parties have mutual interest in achieving a named goal. It is presumed that they 
have overlapping complementary interests37 as well as sufficient capacity. The collaboration 
or partnership invariably involves a search for synergy in the partners and the direction of this 
towards achieving a common goal.38  
 
In his account on India, Hall39 identifies three forms of PPPs: the private distribution of 
public goods, the private sector purchase of public technology and services and thirdly, 
public private collaborative research. In the first category, the private sector multiplies and 
distributes technology derived from the public sector. Hybrid technology is a ready example 
of this form of PPP and is prevalent in most developing countries. In cases where the public 
sector has technologies with potential commercial significance, it may sell these technologies 
to the private sector and in other cases engage in adaptive research services or routine testing 
commissioned by the private sector. Corporate funding of public research is likely to run into 
                                               
37
 Byerlee, D., Alex, G. & Echeverría, R., ‘The evolution of public research systems in developing countries: 
facing new challenges’ in Byerlee, D. & Echeverría, R., (eds.) Agricultural research policy in an era of 
privatization (Oxon: CABI Publishing, 2002) 
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 Kameri-Mbote et al. (2001) supra note 33 
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 Hall et al. (2002) supra note 3 
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difficulties when issues of undue corporate influence on public research agendas are raised.40 
A third category involves a more complex relationship where both sectors pool resources to 
take advantage of complementary skills, infrastructure and proprietary science. Differing 
perspectives on IP are more likely to have the most impact on this category of PPPs. Through 
the use of the case studies, chapters six and seven look at the impact of IP on food security 
oriented PPPs and attempt to map IP on the range of concerns between partners. 
 
Conventional analysis of the roles of the public and private sectors in agricultural research 
has focused on the nature of technology products and the extent to which private 
organisations will be able to appropriate benefits from investment in R&D.41 Similarly high 
rates of return to investments in public sector agricultural research are cited as evidence of 
‘market failure’ and persistent underinvestment by the private sector.42  Taken together, this 
type of analysis suggests that there is a natural division between the areas of research that are 
in the public as opposed to the private domain. The implication is that the boundary between 
public and private sectors relates primarily to the extent of incentives that encourage the 
private sector to invest in research and that these incentives can be manipulated through 
economic policy, intellectual property regimes, tax incentives and funding arrangements. 
 
The motivation for private sector investment in agriculture provides an insight into possible 
incentives for the sector to collaborate with the public sector. In forming a partnership, 
partners usually seek to achieve some net gain which they cannot achieve as cheaply, rapidly 
or effectively on their own. The private sector in many cases hopes to gain from the public 
sector’s wide range of expertise and background research on the technology. In an analysis of 
partnerships between the private sector and the Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research (CGIAR or CG), Manicad43 states that the public sector’s credibility 
and the fact that it enjoys more goodwill than the private sector are factors that encourage the 
private sector to form partnerships with the public sector. In doing so, the former raises its 
profile and improves its public image. Besides, because of the latter’s wide presence (global 
in the case of the CG), the private sector can expand its scope and clientele while 
simultaneously enhance its access to technologies held by the public sector. Collaboration 
                                               
40
 Binenbaum et al. (2001) supra note 23 
41
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World Development 26 (1998) 1127 for a comprehensive discussion 
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could potentially lead to the development of a new market for the private sector – those 
small-scale farmers who are in transition to fuller participation in the market economy. The 
public sector on the other hand may be motivated by reducing research expenditure and 
improving its capacity to develop new products. In some cases, collaborating with the private 
sector may be crucial to the fulfilment of the public sector’s mandate where the public sector 
might not have the comparative advantage to distribute its technologies.44 The public sector 
could also benefit from the private sector’s management principle of organisational 
efficiency.45 
 
Chapters six and seven examine two case studies: hybrid seed consortia in the International 
Centre for Research in Semi Arid Tropics (henceforth ICRISAT) and a project on East Coast 
Fever (ECF) vaccine research at the International Livestock Research Institute (henceforth 
ILRI). The chapters analyse the motivations behind the respective partners’ decisions to form 
the PPPs. 
 
1.2.4 IP and food security oriented PPPs  
 
Food security oriented PPPs would appear to be constrained by factors such as fundamentally 
different incentive structures, prohibitive costs and mutually negative perceptions between 
the sectors.46  IP directly or indirectly relates to all of these. In addition to having different 
organisational and operational cultures, the public and private sector have differing 
perspectives relating to the concept of IP, the ideology behind IPRs, and IP management and 
strategies. The theoretical conflict between IPRs and the provision of public goods influences 
the IP policies of public agriculture research institutions including the CG Centres. This 
theoretical conflict forms the basis of the public sectors’ perspective and attitude towards 
IPRs. The private sector on the other hand finds no conflict in the application of IPRs to 
achieve its profit objectives. The two sectors’ IP policy objectives, management and 
strategies are generally diametric. These differing perspectives could potentially buttress the 
conflict of interest between the parties in a PPP and could undermine the achievement of food 
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security related objectives. However, IP could potentially be exercised in ways that satisfy 
the needs and concerns of each party in the pursuit of enhanced food security.  
 
Chapter five addresses the public and private sectors’ differing perspectives on IP and their 
potential impact on a food security oriented PPP and advocates for finding the middle ground 
between the divergent perspectives. Chapter seven looks at how the differing IP perspectives 
are manifested in the two aforementioned case studies.   
 
One of the main determinants of attitudes and practices towards IPRs is an institution’s IP 
related policies. For the CG Centres, these are informed by international treaties and 
agreements that are of direct relevance to the Centres. Chapter four examines the main IP 
related international treaties and agreements and how these influence IP policies at the CG 
system level. Chapter six conducts a detailed analysis of ICRISAT’s and ILRI’s IP policies 
and explores the link between these and the CG system wide IP guidelines and related policy 
documents while chapter seven looks at how the respective Centres’ IP policies are 
implemented in the context of the case studies.  
 
Since the advent of the international IPR regime, IP law is often assumed to be pervasive and 
ubiquitous in all research whose results are potentially proprietary. Chapter five tests this 
assumption by examining the effect that national and international IP law have on the 
execution of the case studies. It argues that national IP law per se is of limited significance to 
the conduct of research in food security oriented PPPs and that the partnership contract is of 
more relevance to a PPP. This underscores the need to increase capacity in contract 
negotiation and IP management especially on the part of public research institutions engaging 
in food security oriented agricultural research in partnership with the private sector. 
 
1.3 The thesis’ contribution 
 
This thesis looks at the hitherto unexplored links between IP and food security oriented PPPs 
in developing countries. Possible reasons why this has not previously been explored include 
the fact that such partnerships are few, relatively recent and still ongoing. Literature 
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tangential to the interface between these three areas has mostly centred on management 
issues such as the freedom to operate (FTO).47  
 
To the author’s knowledge, only two studies come close to addressing IP in the context of 
food security public private partnerships. The first was a Freedom-To-Operate (FTO) analysis 
of GoldenRice™ (a product of a public private partnership aimed at fortifying rice with 
Vitamin A) whose objective was to review the IP components associated with GoldenRice™ 
and provide the relevant institutions with the information needed to develop options for 
handling the IP in the product and for alternative strategies for managing the IP constraints. 48  
The study was essentially a technical risk management opinion with specific terms of 
reference. It made no attempt to address the relevant institutions’ policies or the wider 
context of the public private partnership. The study was part of the PPP’s activities and was 
aimed at developing a strategy for handling IP. As would be expected of a technical FTO 
review, its findings are necessarily limited and do not present the overall picture on the links, 
opportunities and challenges relating to the use of IP in food security oriented PPPs in 
developing countries. Its findings mainly related to the practical aspects of management of 
the IP relating to GoldenRice™. The content, analysis and findings of this thesis go further 
than the FTO review.  
 
The second study examined the role of PPPs in international agricultural research with the 
aim of providing an understanding of how such partnerships operate and how they potentially 
contribute to food security and poverty reduction in developing countries. It looked at 75 
PPPs in the CGIAR in light of ‘persistent market failure, institutional constraints, and 
systemic weaknesses, which impede the exchange of potentially pro-poor knowledge and 
technology.’49 IP was a peripheral issue and was only addressed in the context of the 
constraints faced by the CGIAR Centres in forming partnerships with foreign companies.  
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The study found that IPRs pose a challenge for the CG Centres; about 51% of the PPPs in 
their sample involved the use or exchange of proprietary knowledge thereby suggesting that 
IPR ‘is an important issue for consideration in the design and implementation of PPP 
projects.’50 This thesis uses this finding and others as the motivation for research. It builds on 
the results of this second study by analysing the nature of this relevance and the factors that 
determine the relationship of IP to food security oriented PPPs in developing countries.    
 
This thesis contributes to the field of research in three ways. Theoretically, the thesis: 
(i) provides an analysis of private rights and public goods and locates the genesis of the 
concern over the use of IPRs in the provision of public goods;  
(ii) further distinguishes between the existence and exercise of IPRs and suggests ways in 
which IPRs can be exercised without compromising the public good mandate 
characterising research in public institutions; and 
(iii) develops a typology of differing perspectives on the concept, ideology and management 
of IP held by the public and private sectors.  
 
Empirically, the thesis: 
(i) analyses the national IP legislation in Kenya and India and its relevance to the 
execution of food security oriented PPPs; and  
(ii) furthers the understanding on the role and relevance of IP to food security oriented 
PPPs through the lens of the case studies.  
The case studies are typical PPPs in food security oriented agricultural research (chapter six); 
the thesis’ findings therefore are instructive to other PPPs with food security objectives in 
developing countries.  
 
This research finds that IP’s significance to a food security oriented PPP is determined by 
two factors: the nature of the technology used in the partnership and the stage of the 
partnership. For partnerships with non-proprietary research products, IP is mostly significant 
at the partnership formation stage and hardly plays a role in the negotiation and execution of 
the partnership. But of partnerships whose research is potentially proprietary, IP is mostly 
significant at the negotiation and execution stages and less so at the PPP formation stage. In 
all cases, other factors such as mutual trust, communication and research competence are 
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 Id at p38 
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crucial to a partnership’s success in achieving its objective. The research also finds that 
parties’ attitudes to IP are influenced by their respective IP policies and their institutional and 
research cultures. 
 
1.4 Methodology 
 
The nature of developing countries’ inexperience with IPRs generally - and more specifically 
in the agriculture sector - precludes most possibilities for a quantitative evaluation of impacts. 
In many cases the possible effects of IPRs are compounded with other factors such as 
national policies and issues relating to trade. As such, the methodology adopted is necessarily 
qualitative.  
In developing countries, differences in the application of IP and variations in the presence of 
PPPs in the agriculture sector demand that a case study approach be employed. The range of 
different models of collaboration as well as the variation in national IP regimes, local public 
institutions, public agriculture policies and presence and type of private sector involvement 
further advocate for an examination of relatively few cases. A bespoke qualitative analysis of 
a few PPPs is the preferred method that ensures the influence of factors such as IPRs on a 
PPP are captured. The thesis examines the PPPs in this specific context.  
 
1.4.1 Research design 
 
This research is based on two case studies found in two developing countries. The first 
consists of three hybrid parent seed consortia under the International Crop Research Institute 
for Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) based in Hyderabad, India while the second is the East 
Coast Fever (ECF) vaccine research project under the International Livestock Research 
Institute (ILRI) based in Nairobi, Kenya.  
 
1.4.1.1  India and Kenya 
 
Kenya and India have been chosen as the focus of study for this research because of a number 
of cognate factors. Apart from the fact that both are developing countries, language is an 
obvious determining factor. Both countries have well developed agriculture systems which 
are discussed in chapter two. India has advanced research capacity in plant breeding while 
Kenya is one of the leaders in agricultural biotechnology in sub-Saharan Africa. India is one 
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of the largest developing countries with a large and growing market for inter alia improved 
seed; India provides an opportunity to assess the likely impact of a large potential market on 
private sector investment in agriculture.  
 
PPPs enjoy a significant and growing presence in both countries. An analysis of the case 
studies will offer useful insights that may be extrapolated to the extent that such qualitative 
research assists our understanding of the situation in other jurisdictions of the developing 
world. Kenya has ‘comparative advantage’ in PPPs in agricultural biotechnology while public 
private collaboration in plant breeding and in seed systems generally is a common feature in 
the Indian agricultural system. 
 
The IP regimes in the two countries have evolved though different stages. Although IP 
protection in Kenya was a colonial heritage (in so far as legislation on IP was inherited from 
the British after becoming a British colony in 1897) the situation has changed incrementally 
so that the current legislation on IP is relatively modern having all been enacted (and some 
amended several times) after independence.51 Similarly, IP law in India was a British legacy. 
Revisions to the first law on domestic patent rights were based on the British Patent Act of 
1852. Subsequently, the Indian Patents and Design Act of 1911 replaced all previous 
legislation.52 On gaining independence, the Indian patent system was reviewed and adapted to 
conform to national goals. This resulted in a significant weakening of the IP system. The 
reasons for this apparently unusual act are embedded in the broader economic and ideological 
environment that prevailed in the post independence period.53 In January 2005, Indian IP law 
was amended to conform to requirements set by the TRIPs Agreement. The resulting 
legislation offers more IP protection and has potential to radically change the agricultural 
scene.  Differences in the evolution and development of India's and Kenya’s IP environment 
would help to answer the question of whether certain IP regimes are more favourable to the 
formation and sustenance of successful PPPs than others.  
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1.4.1.2  The Consultative Group on International Agriculture Research (CGIAR) 
 
With the possible exception of the Brazilian national agriculture research organisation 
(EMBRAPA), the CGIAR is currently the largest public investor in agriculture R&D in 
developing countries. For 2005, the CGIAR received US$450m from contributions of 
members and non-members and US$10 from income from the CG centres. Its actual 
expenditure was US$452m.54 This has made the CG an obvious partner for collaboration 
from the private sector perspective.55  
 
1.4.1.3  ICRISAT, ILRI and the respective PPPs 
 
Within the CG, two institutions stand out: the International Crop Research Institute for Semi 
Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) in India and International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) in 
Kenya. These have been primarily chosen due to their ground breaking initiatives in 
collaborative research. The partnership model adopted by the ICRISAT parent hybrid seed 
consortia is pioneering. The ILRI project on development of an East Coast Fever (ECF) 
Vaccine is likewise the first initiative of its kind within the CG system, and arguably in the 
entire field of agriculture in the developing world. These two projects are unique and will no 
doubt provide insights into factors influencing PPPs and will be informative in their 
contribution on the challenges faced and lessons to be learnt.   
 
1.4.2 Data collection 
 
This research uses a combination of primary and secondary data sources. The introductory 
chapters are based on primary sources of information such as international treaties, 
conventions, national Acts of Parliament, policy documents and secondary information from 
a variety of sources including academic journals, workshop and conference reports, reports of 
previous studies and other media on the subject.  
 
The chapters on the case studies are primarily based on primary information obtained through 
interviews conducted during field work in the two countries over a nine week period between 
                                               
54
 The CGIAR Financial Report 2005 available at www.cgiar.org   
55
 Manicad (1999) supra note 22 see also Van Wirk, J., Biotechnology and hunger: challenges for the biotech 
industry, Biotechnology and Development Monitor 41 (2000) 2 
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August and October 2006 and follow up activities until December 2006. The interviewees 
broadly fall under five categories: (i) ICRISAT and ILRI research staff, IP managers and 
research directors involved in the respective projects and their respective private sector 
partners; (ii) personnel in the respective national IP offices and relevant government 
departments such as science and technology, agriculture and environment; (iii) directors and 
other personnel in the national agriculture research institutes (NARIs) in the respective 
countries and representatives from prominent private sector companies and; (iv) select staff 
of various institutions which facilitate collaboration between private and public partners. 
 
A total of thirty-five semi structured interviews in India and twenty in Kenya were conducted 
over the nine week period. This data was aggregated and analysed and is used as the main 
source of information particularly in chapters six and seven. It supplements the primary and 
secondary sources in the other chapters 
 
1.4.3 Limitation of research  
 
As the selected case studies are ongoing rather than complete, the scope of the changing 
dynamics of the respective partnerships is only captured until the end of the data collection 
period (December 2006). The contribution is limited to the lessons learnt so far and the 
possible way forward. Whether the lessons are applied in the projects and the implications of 
these on the direction of research and partnership is a matter beyond this thesis and the 
subject of further and continuous research. Some of the subject matter of the research in the 
ECF Vaccine project is protected by confidentiality agreements.  As a result, the dynamics of 
the partnership may be informed and influenced by information that the author is not privy to. 
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Chapter Two  
 
Agriculture in developing countries: the changing scene 
 
2.0 Introduction 
 
The environment under which agriculture R&D is conducted has changed in the last 
few decades. Global agriculture and food systems are increasingly guided more by 
markets than state intervention, driven by consumer preferences, influenced by new 
technologies and integrated through global trade.   
 
Studies in the last two decades indicate that there is increased privatisation in 
agriculture. This includes privatisation of knowledge: research products and tools 
used in agriculture research are now more likely than ever before to be protected by 
IPRs. There are indications that IP is increasingly in use in public agriculture research 
institutes and in public private partnerships with food security objectives.  
 
Various studies also point to the increased private sector presence in agriculture. This 
is demonstrated by increase in the number of private sector companies engaging in 
agriculture research and related activities and the amount of private sector investment 
and expenditure in agriculture.   
 
This chapter provides a brief overview of the trends and development in agriculture 
R&D globally and more specifically in Kenya and India. It specifically investigates 
increasing privatisation in the study countries. It uses three things as indicators of 
increased private sector presence in agriculture: the number of companies engaging in 
agriculture over time, amount of private sector investment in agriculture over time, 
and alliances between the public and private sectors. It looks at the link between IPRs 
and increasing private sector presence in agriculture and finally assesses the potential 
impact of all these changes on food security attainment efforts.  
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It argues that although the public sector is the predominant actor in agriculture in 
Kenya and India, there is evidence of increasing private sector presence. This 
generally increases the likelihood of using IPRs in both the private sector and public 
sector and has heightened the public sector’s awareness of IP and its implications on 
food security. The changes experienced in agriculture research present immense 
challenges as well as opportunities in the attainment of food security.   
 
2.1 Institutional evolution of agriculture research in developing countries 
 
The late 1960s and early 70s witnessed a breakthrough in food crop technology and a 
rapid increase in food production. This can be attributed to a combination of several 
factors. Some of these include firstly, the recognition that reliance on technology 
transfer from countries in the ‘North’ to those in the ‘South’ was not sustainable or 
appropriate: the technology did not serve the tropical needs of the developing 
countries.1 Secondly, the early successes of the Green Revolution particularly in Asia 
demonstrated the great potential for investment in agricultural research focussed on 
developing world problems. This together with the world food crisis emphasised the 
need for rapid growth in food production. Thirdly, a number of economic studies at 
the time illustrated the positive link between investment in agriculture and the overall 
economic growth of a country.2 At the backdrop of these developments was the 
establishment of Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR 
or CG) in the 1970s.   
 
The development of public research systems varied considerably by region and 
country. In sub Saharan Africa, many countries inherited the agriculture research 
infrastructure established by former colonial powers. Some of these did not 
necessarily address the countries’ needs. The countries at the time were preoccupied 
                                               
1
 Byerlee, D., Alex, G. & Echeverria, R., ‘The evolution of public research systems in developing 
countries: facing new challenges’ in Byerlee, D. & Echeverria, R., (eds.) Agricultural research policy 
in an era of privatisation (Oxon: CABI Publishing, 2002) 
2
 Neoclassical agricultural economists who championed this view included Nicholls, W., ‘The place of 
agriculture in economic development’ in Eicher, C. & Witt, L., (eds.) Agriculture in economic 
development (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964); Johnston, B. & Mellor, J., The role of agriculture in 
economic development, American Economic Review 51/4 (1961) 566; Ranis, G. & Fei, J., A theory of 
economic development, American Economic Review 51/4 (1961) 533; Ranis, G. & Fei, J., Innovation, 
capital accumulation, and economic development, American Economic Review 53/3 (1964) 283; and 
Ranis, G. & Fei, J., Development of the labour surplus economy: Theory and policy (Homewood: 
Richard D. Irwin, 1964). 
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with building capacity to replace expatriate staff and enhancing the research 
infrastructure.3  Investment in institutional reform in Asia generally began earlier than 
it did in sub-Saharan Africa and benefitted from a longer period of support.4 
 
A defining characteristic of public research in developing countries in all regions was 
the trend toward establishing national agriculture research organisations. By the 
1980s, the focus on reform had turned towards improving the effectiveness of national 
agricultural R&D which involved integrating research activities within a single 
agency, coordinating and developing national agricultural research plans and 
improving management practices such as planning, monitoring and evaluation.5  
 
Universities generally played a limited role in applied research in developing 
countries except perhaps in countries such as India which have a grant system where 
the mandate for applied research is explicitly given to the universities.  
 
In the late 1980s, the golden era of public agriculture research in developing countries 
was declining. Public agriculture research expenditures stagnated mainly due to fiscal 
austerity as a result of structural adjustment programmes and policy reform and other 
factors such as competition from other sectors for scarce public funds, and a growing 
decline in commodity prices.  
 
2.2 Increased privatisation and commercialisation 
 
The small potential for private returns historically left crop research and development 
largely in public research institutions.6 Until the green revolution and the global food 
crisis in the 1980s, the public sector mainly focused on cash crops. The emphasis was 
inevitably directed to food crops during the food crisis.7 The public sector’s research 
agenda has since expanded and a more commercial focus has been adapted. In 
                                               
3
 Roseboom, J., Pardey, P., & Beintema,  N., ‘The changing organisational basis of African agricultural 
research’ EPTD Discussion Paper no. 37 (Washington DC: IFPRI, 1998) 
4
 Byerlee & Echeverria (2002) supra note 1 
5
 Beintema, N. & Stads, G., Sub-Saharan African agricultural research: recent investment trends, 
Outlook on Agriculture 33/4 (2004) 239 
6
 Alston, J. M., Pardey, P.G. & Taylor, M. J., (eds.) Agricultural science policy: Changing global 
agendas (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2001) 
7
 For an account on how the public sector has evolved, see Byerlee et al. (2002) supra note 1 
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developing countries, budgetary austerity in the late 1980s and in the 1990s saw 
public spending on agriculture drastically reduced. The public sector had to adapt to 
this through the creation of new institutional models to confront with the challenges. 
This involved in some cases an evolution from centralised public research institutes to 
more diverse research systems.8 In more recent years, reforms have moved towards 
issues such as redefining the government’s role in agriculture research, decentralising 
decision making processes, increasing stakeholder participation, identifying new 
sources and mechanisms of funding and strengthening system linkages.9 Most 
agricultural public research institutes are now commodity oriented and have adopted a 
‘supply driven’ research agenda. 
 
Although the private sector had had some presence in the agricultural scene, it was at 
this time following the budgetary austerity period that its presence in agriculture 
became more entrenched.10  
 
2.2.1 Privatisation defined  
 
This chapter adopts a general definition of privatisation: the shift of activities, 
functions, responsibilities or the production of goods and services in whole or in part 
from the public sector to the private sector. It also covers the privatisation of 
knowledge where knowledge is owned by identifiable legal entities as opposed to 
being owned by ‘the public.’ It connotes a transfer of ownership or control from the 
public to the private sector and at a lower level, from the public domain to a legal 
person. Commercialisation on the other hand is used to describe the shift not from one 
sector to another but the change in an organisation’s outlook relative to the market; its 
effect is to put the enterprise on a commercial footing, to orient it toward the market. 
Commercialisation of research products is often viewed in this context.   
 
This chapter shows that there is increasing privatisation of agriculture research in 
developing countries. To assess the trend towards privatisation, the following section 
                                               
8
 Id  
9
 Chema, S., Gilbert, E. & Roseboom, J. ‘A review of the key issues and recent experiences in 
reforming agricultural research in Africa’ Research Report no. 24 (The Hague: ISNAR, 2003) 
10
 Graff, G., Cullen, S., Bradford, K., Zilberman, D. & Bennett, A., The public-private structure of 
intellectual property ownership in agricultural biotechnology, Nature Biotechnology Volume 21/9 
(2003)  
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presents time-series data relating to the number of private enterprises engaging in 
agriculture and the amount of private investment in agriculture. Public private 
partnerships (PPPs) are also looked at as indicators of increased private sector 
presence while the link between IPRs and increased private sector presence is 
analysed conceptually.   
 
2.2.2 Evidence of privatisation  
2.2.2.1  Funding11  
 
Globally, public agriculture research expenditure amounted to nearly US$21.7m in 
1995, almost double the amount in 1976. Just under half (47%) of this was in 
developed countries. Asia, excluding China, accounted for 21% while sub Saharan 
Africa accounted for a further 5.8%. In the 1990s, for the first time, developing 
countries as a group spent more than developed countries on public agricultural 
research; the group’s research expenditure grew by 50% in the 1985 – 1995 decade 
compared to a more moderate growth of 16.7% in public agriculture expenditure in 
developed countries. According to the estimates, developing countries account for 
nearly 53% of the total global public agriculture expenditure.  
 
Table 2.1: Global public agricultural research expenditures, 1976-1995 (1993m 
international dollars)  
expenditures 1976 1985 1995 
Developing countries 4738 7676 11469 
           Sub Saharan Africa 993 1181 1270 
           China 709 1396 2063 
           Asia and Pacific, excluding China 1321 2453 4619 
            Latin America and the Caribbean 1087 1583 1947 
            Middle East and North Africa 582 981 1521 
Developed countries 7099 8748 10215 
Total 11837 16424 21684 
Source: Pardey & Beintema, 2001 
 
On the other hand, the private sector spent an estimated US$13,446m in 2000 on 
agriculture R&D up from US$11,511m in 1995; more that a third of global total 
                                               
11
 Data relating to private investment in agriculture are difficult to collect. Generally, there are no 
comprehensive and uniformly generated data of private sector expenditure in agriculture particularly in 
developing countries. The data available in a few sources are not strictly comparable owing to the 
different methods of data collection and definitions. Data from central sources rely on the submission 
by private companies which may not provide the information every year. The author has attempted to 
provide the best available data.  
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agriculture expenditure in 2000 was private. The private sector plays a bigger role in 
developed than in developing countries accounting for 51.5% in 1995 and 55.2% in 
2000 of total expenditure in developed countries compared to 5.5% and 6.3% 
respectively in developing countries. Moreover, of the total investments in agriculture 
R&D, only 2% in 1995 and 2.3% in 2000 were derived from private firms in 
developing countries.   
 
Table 2.2: Public and private sector expenditure in agriculture research, 1995 & 
2000 (1993 million international dollars) 
 1995 2000 
   % share   % share 
% Growth 
1995-2000 
 Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private 
Developing 
countries 
11469 672 94.5 5.5 12819 869 93.7 6.3 11.7 29.3 
Developed 
countries  
10215 10829 48.5 51.5 10191 12577 44.8 55.2 (0.23) 16.1 
Sources: Pardey & Beintema (2001) for 1995 figures and CGIAR Science Council (2005) for 2000 
figures  
 
Although the private sector is clearly a small player in developing country agriculture 
R&D, its growth from US$672m in 1995 to US$869m in 2000 represents a 29.3% 
growth rate compared to 16.1% growth rate in developed countries. The private sector 
is thus growing at a faster rate in developing countries.  
 
In India, with the exception of some vegetable seed production, private sector 
presence in agriculture was not significant until the mid 1980s. Since then private 
research in India has grown absolutely and relatively mirroring the trend in 
developing countries. It has more than doubled within the decade between 1985 and 
1995 compared to a more modest growth in public sector expenditure and accounted 
for about 14% of the total agriculture research investment. In a study conducted on 
Asian countries including China, the largest amount of private research was found to 
be in India where investment was about US$55 million per year in the mid 1990s.12 
However, the private research intensity (research investment relative to the size of a 
country’s agricultural economy) in India was less than 1% although it doubled 
between 1985 and 1995.  
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 Pray, C. & Fuglie, K., ‘Private investment in agricultural research and international technology 
transfer in Asia’ Economic Research Service Technical Report 805 (Washington DC: United States 
Department of Agriculture, 2001a); Pray, C. & Fuglie, K., ‘Policies for private agricultural research in 
Asian developing countries’ in Petes, G. & Pingali, P., (eds.) Tomorrow’s agriculture: Incentives, 
institutions, infrastructure and innovations (Hants: Ashgate, 2001b) 
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Table 2.3: Public and private agriculture expenditure in India, 1985 and 1995 
(1995 US$ million) 
Agriculture expenditure % share  Year 
Public Private Public Private 
1985 206 26 88.8 11.2 
1995 348 56 86.1 13.8 
Growth rate 85-95 (%) 69 115   
Source: Pray & Fuglie (2001) 
 
From the above, it is clear that private sector expenditure in agriculture in India grew 
absolutely and relatively between 1985 and 1995. More recent data on capital 
formation seems to corroborate the increase in private sector engagement in 
agriculture in India. Gross capital formation is the sum of acquisitions including 
improvements on fixed assets and increase in the value of finished goods.13 It shows 
that the share of private sector in gross capital formation in agriculture is on an 
upward trend.   
 
Table 2.4: Gross capital formation in Agriculture in India, 1995-2003 (100,000 
Rupees) 
Gross capital formation in agriculture % share  Year 
Public Private Public Private 
1995-96 4849 10841 30.9 69.1 
1996-97 4668 11508 28.9 71.1 
1997-98 3979 11963 25 75 
1998-99 3870 11025 26 74 
1999-2000 4221 13083 24.4 75.6 
2000-01 3927 12979 23.2 76.8 
2001-02 4127 13201 23.8 76.2 
2002-03 4538 14119 24.3 75.7 
Source: Central Statistical Organisation (2003) 
 
Gross capital formation is an indicator of investment and in this case is a proxy of 
private sector presence in agriculture. It shows that firstly, most (75.7% in 2003) of 
the value added in agriculture is from the private sector and secondly, that this has 
been on a steady increase since 1995 save for a couple of dips. Although this data is 
not able to definitively show the state and trend of private sector investment in actual 
research it nevertheless tells us that private sector investment in agriculture has 
increased as far as investment in fixed assets and value addition is concerned. In terms 
of total actual R&D investment, the public sector was the predominant sector with a 
share commanding 86% (table 2.4) although private expenditure increased by 115% 
between 1985 and 1995.  
                                               
13
 A strict definition is neither intended nor attempted.  
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In Kenya, recent estimates on public and private expenditure in agriculture show that 
the private sector grew from US$0.8m in 1991 to US$1.5m in 2000, a growth of 
87.5%. Annual growth varied greatly within this period although public investment in 
agriculture was by far more erratic and had, in 2000, increased by about 21% of the 
1991 levels. This erratic public spending behaviour is reflective of the strained 
relationship with donors and development aid resulting in irregular levels of public 
spending during the period. The private sector’s share increased from 2% in 1991 to 
3% in 2000. The private sector accounted for almost 3.5% in 1998; its expenditure in 
this period was stagnant and its share increased only because of an acute drop in 
public sector spending.   
 
Table 2.5: Public and private agriculture expenditure in Kenya, 1991-2000 (2000 
US$ million) 
Agriculture expenditure % share Year Public Private Total Public Private 
1991 37 0.8 37.8 97.9 2.1 
1992 35.5 0.9 36.4 97.5 2.5 
1993 45.8 1 46.8 97.9 2.1 
1994 57.1 1 58.1 98.3 1.7 
1995 47.7 1.2 48.9 97.5 2.5 
1996 54.9 1.4 56.3 97.5 2.5 
1997 39.2 1.3 40.5 96.8 3.2 
1998 36.3 1.3 37.6 96.5 3.5 
1999 42.5 1.3 43.8 97.0 3.0 
2000 45 1.5 46.5 96.8 3.2 
Source: IFPRI, ASTI database available at www.ifpri.org  
 
2.2.2.2 Increase in number of private sector companies engaging in 
agriculture  
 
A distinction between the foreign and local private sector is useful. In 1995, about a 
third of private research in India was conducted by foreign firms.14 This was mainly in 
seed and pesticide research. About 40% of the research on seed and livestock was 
similarly conducted by foreign firms.15  
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 Pray & Fuglie (2001a) supra note 12 
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In the seed industry, foreign firms accounted for about a third of the private seed 
market with large Indian firms accounting for 23%.16 India has a large number of seed 
firms although only a few have large operations. About half of seed sales are by 
private companies.17 Most seed firms conduct breeding in hybrid crops mainly with 
inbred lines developed in the public sector including international agriculture research 
centres. A few large companies (mostly foreign) have programmes that conduct 
research to develop their own inbred lines.18 Some local companies collaborate with 
overseas companies for access to proprietary tools and technologies. Private hybrids 
now account for a significant proportion of the market for sorghum, maize, and 
cotton.19  
 
Developments in biotechnology have further strengthened the trend: private 
investment in agriculture biotechnology outpaces public investment. Genetically 
modified crops in India have been developed by a handful of private multinational 
corporations. In the period between 1996 and 2001, private firms accounted for about 
95% of applications for field trials20 demonstrating the dominance of the private 
sector over the public sector in transgenic agriculture.   
 
Studies conducted by the Biotech Consortium India Limited (BCIL) in 2001and 200321 
show that total biotechnology firms increased from 176 in 2001 to 401 in 2003. The 
number of private firms conducting agriculture biotech increased from 85 to 132 and as at 
2003, agriculture’s share of total biotechnology activity in India was 32.9%.  
 
In Kenya, the public sector still conducts the majority of agriculture research. Data on 
private sector research activity is hard to find and what is available is dated. A 
national survey of private R&D activity in 1988 in all sectors showed that agriculture 
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 Pray, C. & Kelly, T. Impact of liberalisation and deregulation on technology supply by the Indian 
seed industry (Hyderabad: ICRISAT, 1998); Pray, C. & Basant, R., ‘India’ in Pray & Fuglie (2001a) 
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 ICAR, pers. comm.  
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 ICAR, pers. comm.  
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 Singh, R., Pal, S. & Morris, M. Maize research, development, and seed production in India: 
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 Biotech Consortium India Limited., Directory of Biotechnology Industries and Institutions in India 
(New Delhi: BCIL, 2001); Biotech Consortium India Limited., Directory of Biotechnology Industries 
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accounted for 42% of private R&D activity and 60% of the full time research 
scientists engaged in private companies.22   
 
Data from the Seed Traders’ Association of Kenya (STAK) suggests that the number 
of private companies in agriculture is on a steady increase. STAK’s membership 
increased by almost 300% from 17 in 1995 to 67 in 2008. 90% of all seed from the 
private sector is supplied by STAK members although only about half of private seed 
traders are members of STAK. Virtually all members of STAK join in the first year of 
their establishment.23 Although figures from STAK do not present the whole picture 
on the growth of private sector in agriculture, they however indicate that this is 
occurring. That seed companies join within a year of their establishment suggests that 
the growing number of STAK members corresponds to the growing number of total 
private seed traders.  
 
Figure 2.1: STAK membership, 1995-2008  
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        Source: compiled using data from STAK 
 
In agriculture research capacity, the private sector accounted for only 1.3% of all full 
time employees in agriculture in 2000. This is the highest share the private sector had 
between 1991 and 2000. In that period, research capacity in private sector grew by 
57% while it dropped by 13.7% in the public sector. The public sector nevertheless 
has 98.6% of the total research capacity. This suggests that the private sector plays a 
stronger role in funding agricultural research as opposed to performing research itself. 
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 Makau, B., ‘Survey on private sector research and development resources and activities in Kenya’ 
National Council of Science and Technology (NCST) Publication No. 26 (Nairobi: NCST, 1988) 
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 Seed Traders’ Association of Kenya (STAK), pers. comm.  
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It is probable that many private companies contract the public sector to perform 
research on their behalf.  
 
Table 2.6: Agriculture research capacity in Kenya, 1991-2000 (FTE) 
FTE Researchers  % share  Year 
Public Private Public Private 
2000 822.3 11 98.7 1.3 
1999 868.6 10 98.9 1.1 
1998 879.5 9 99.0 1.0 
1997 892.2 7 99.2 0.8 
1996 907.3 8 99.1 0.9 
1995 908.4 9 99.0 1.0 
1994 928.5 11 98.8 1.2 
1993 955.6 9 99.1 0.9 
1992 961.5 9 99.1 0.9 
1991 953 7 99.3 0.7 
Source: IFPRI, ASTI database available at www.ifpri.org  
 
Similar to foreign private sector engagement in India, foreign private sector activity in 
Kenya is mainly on the provision of input technologies most of which are produced in 
the developed world; virtually all foreign private sector companies are multinationals. 
The local private sector mainly engages in seed production and other plant breeding 
activities. Farmer organisations in sectors such as tea and coffee are also part of the 
local private sector. These finance their respective research institutes through levies 
on marketed output.  
 
Like in India, agriculture biotechnology is an area where private sector presence has 
increased. In Kenya, research in biotechnology is public sector led although government 
funding is minimal; most of the funding comes from bilateral donors and is almost always 
project specific. Virtually all experimentation in agriculture (and health) biotechnology 
involving private companies occurs in partnership with government institutions as 
required by law. There is therefore an emerging pattern of public private partnerships. 
Private sector involvement in biotechnology is all foreign.24 There are no local private 
companies engaging in agricultural biotechnology. 
 
The horticultural industry is another sector which has seen an increase in private 
sector activity; virtually all the private horticultural companies in Kenya are foreign 
although there are indications that their activity may have led to local spin off 
companies which are subcontracted by the main foreign companies. About 90% of all 
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 National Council of Science and Technology (NCST), pers. comm. 
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research activity is conducted by private companies.25 The horticulture industry has 
grown rapidly since the mid 1980s in terms of research expenditure, number of actors 
involved, produce earnings and export sales. A survey of plant variety protection data 
shows that Kenya is a technology importer in horticulture corroborating the 
suggestion that the foreign private sector dominates in horticulture: foreign enterprises 
make up 95% of all horticultural PBR applications.26  
 
Statistics relating to plant variety release show that 22 maize varieties were released in 
Kenya between 1960 and 1999 all of which were from the public sector. Between 
2000 and 2003, the public sector released 8 maize hybrids compared to the private 
sector’s 47 maize varieties.27 This clearly shows increased private sector involvement 
in plant breeding.  
 
2.2.2.3  IPRs and increasing private sector presence in agriculture  
 
IP and privatisation of knowledge 
With regard to privatisation and increased private sector presence, IPRs may be 
analysed on two levels: as an indicator of privatisation and as a factor motivating 
private sector investment. In this regard, privatisation is taken to mean the transfer of 
control or ownership from the public domain to a legal person. The presence of IPRs 
indicates privatisation of the technology protected; privatisation in this regard refers 
to the privatisation of knowledge. A general assumption is that a higher incidence of 
IP protection directly correlates with increased privatisation i.e. IPRs imply the 
privatisation of knowledge. 
 
Ownership and control are central to privatisation: IPRs accord the right holder 
ownership and control of the protected technology. Although the publication 
requirement in patents for example, ensures information relating to the technology is 
placed in the public domain, only the right holder and/or those authorised by him have 
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control of the protected technology. IPRs are therefore an example of privatisation of 
knowledge.      
 
If privatisation is taken to mean transfer of control or ownership from the public to the 
private sector, IP protection does not necessarily mean that protected technology or 
products are moved from the public to the private sector. This is largely determined 
by how the right holder, whether in the public or private sector, chooses to exercise 
his IPRs. Of course the fact that it is up to the right holder to determine how to 
exercise the IPRs means that he has the ultimate control of the IPRs. The exercise of 
IPRs as distinguished from the existence of IPRs is addressed in chapters three and 
four.  
 
Increase in the public sector’s awareness of IPRs and related issues is often attributed 
to the public sector’s exposure to the private sector practices. Use of IPRs in the 
public agriculture research institutions is often prefaced by factors such as the advent 
of the international IPR regime and collaboration with the private sector. The 
inference is that IPRs are mainly used by the private sector and that by engaging in 
agriculture, the private sector ‘imports’ the usage of IPRs to others in the agriculture 
sector including public research institutions. From this perspective, it may be argued, 
at least in theory, that the increase in private sector presence increases the likelihood 
of using IPRs in agricultural research by both the private and public sectors. Empirical 
research would of course be crucial in defining the argument. It may be that private 
companies in a particular context are no more likely to use IPRs than their public 
sector counterparts.   
 
IP as a factor contributing to private sector presence 
This subsection enquires whether IPRs have helped increase private sector presence in 
agriculture particularly in Kenya and India. Indirectly, it looks at why private sector 
presence has increased in agriculture and whether IPRs have played any role in this. 
As argued above, IPRs accord the right holder ownership and control of the protected 
technology. The classic economic rationale assumes that the right holder will exercise 
his right to appropriate the benefits offered by the protection. It is this assumption of 
appropriation of benefits that IPR proponents argue is a factor motivating private 
sector investment in any field including agriculture.  
 33 
Various studies have in the past tried to link IPRs with private research. A study by 
Park and Ginarte28 showed that IPRs had a positive impact on private research. 
Another study by Kanwar and Evenson29 showed that IPRs had a strong positive 
effect on innovation. With regard to agriculture, various authors have argued that 
IPRs improve incentives to plant breeders thereby increasing technology transfer and 
spillovers to farmers.30 However, empirical analysis of the impact of IPRs particularly 
in developing countries is lacking; the results from studies are inconclusive and often 
contradictory. For example, one study of Latin American countries found that PBR 
incentives had a significant and positive effect on private wheat breeding in Argentina 
but not in Chile31; another concluded that at best, PBR certificates had limited effect 
in stimulating private sector investment in agriculture in the US32; another study two 
decades later argued that PBR certification in the US resulted in neither an increase in 
private investment in wheat breeding nor an increase in experimental or commercial 
wheat yields.33 
 
In a relatively recent study of the impact of IPRs in plant breeding in India, China, 
Columbia, Uganda and Kenya, the authors argue that plant variety protection is not 
necessary for initial private seed sector development but may contribute to further 
                                               
28
 Park, W. & Ginarte, J., ‘Intellectual property rights and economic growth’ (Washington DC: 
American University, 1996). The study however found that IPRs did not have a measureable impact on 
economic growth although there was a positive correlation between IPR and research investments and 
between research investments and economic growth.   
29
 Kanwar, S. & Evenson, R., Does intellectual property protection spur technological change? Oxford 
Economic Papers 55 (2003) 235  
30
 Such authors include Nottenburg, C., Pardey, P. & Wright, B., ‘Addressing freedom to operate 
questions fro international agricultural R&D’ in Pardey, P. (ed.) The future of food: biotechnology 
markets and policies in an international setting (Washington DC: International Food Policy Research 
Institute, 2001); Lele, U., Lesser, W. & Horstkotte-Wesseler, G., Intellectual property rights in 
agriculture (Washington DC: World Bank, 2000); see also Fuglie, K., Ballenger, N., Day, K., Klotz, 
C., Ollinger, M., Reilly, J., Vasavada, U. & Yee, J., ‘Agricultural research and development: public and 
private investments under alternative markets and institutions’ Agricultural Economics Report 735 
(Washington DC: USDA, 1996)  
31
 Pray, C., ‘Plant breeders’ rights legislation, enforcement and R&D: lessons for developing countries’ 
in Peters, C. & Stanton, B., (eds.) Sustainable agricultural development: the role of international 
cooperation (London: Dartmouth, 1992); this was also confirmed by Van Wijk, J. ‘The impact of plant 
breeders’ rights in developing countries: Results of a study in five Latin American countries’ in van 
Wijk, J. & Jaffe, W., (eds.) Intellectual property rights and agriculture in developing countries 
(Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, 1996)  
32
 Butler, L. & Marion, B., ‘The impacts of patent protection on the US seed industry and public plant 
breeding’ North Central Regional Research Publication 304 (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1985)  
33
 Alston, J. & Venner, R. The effects of the US Plant Variety Protection Act on wheat genetic 
improvement Environment and Production Technology Division Discussion Paper 62 (Washington 
DC: IFPRI, 2000) 
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growth and diversification.34 They conclude that identifying clear causality of IPRs 
and private sector engagement in agriculture in the study countries is difficult 
although this does not mean that IPRs are unimportant.   
 
Appropriation of benefits from new technology is a factor generally motivating 
private sector investment. It is however worth noting that there are other means of 
appropriation of benefits besides IPRs (including trade secrets) in plant breeding. 
Examples of these other mechanisms include hybrid technology and purchase 
agreements. Hybridisation offers biological protection: seed replanted from hybrids 
lose their vigour and quality therefore seed saving of hybrids is not an issue; farmers 
have to plant new hybrid seed every season. Because hybrids lose their vigour, they 
cannot meet the DUS35 criteria necessary for protection and are therefore not subject 
to plant breeders’ rights. In the case of maize in Kenya, hybridisation appears to offer 
more incentive to farmers than the possibility of seeking PBRs: private seed 
companies invest in maize hybrids rather than the open pollinated varieties (OPVs)36 
which are protectable by PBRs. The same is witnessed in Asia where private sector 
investment is mostly in hybrids.37 
 
Appropriation through PBRs does not explain private sector investment in OPV rice 
varieties in India in the absence of PBRs. For example, in Andhra Pradesh, more than 
half of the state’s rice seed is provided by the private sector; this is virtually all OPV 
and was, as at 2007 unprotected by PBRs as the plant variety protection law in India 
was yet to be implemented.38 The growth of the seed industry in India has been 
occurring since the mid 1980s; the plant variety protection law was only implemented 
in 2007. In Kenya, the Kenya Seed Company, a large parastatal and at least two other 
companies produce and market their own maize OPVs; these are yet to apply for 
                                               
34Louwaars et al. (2005) supra note 27  
35
 Distinctness, Uniformity and Stability; the parent lines used in the hybrid can however be protected 
by PBRs where they are not hybrids themselves.  
36
 STAK, pers. comm.; KEPHIS, pers. comm.  
37
 Gerpacio, R., The roles of public sector versus private sector in R&D and technology generation: the 
case of maize in Asia Agricultural Economics 29/3 (2003) 319 shows this in private sector investment 
in hybrid maize; Pray, C., Ramaswami, B. & Kelly, T., The impact of economic reforms on R&D by 
the Indian seed industry Food Policy 26 (2001) 587 show private sector investment in hybrid rice and 
rapeseed  
38
 Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR), pers. comm. See also Louwaars et al. (2005) supra 
note 27 
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PBRs.39 These examples suggest that there are other factors motivating private sector 
investment in agriculture. It is also evident that IPRs are not equally relevant across 
all agriculture subsectors.  
 
Literature in agricultural economics include other “push” and “pull” factors 
motivating private sector research in agriculture whose analysis is beyond the remit of 
this chapter. These are the size of the potential market for new products, the cost of 
developing new technology, the role played by the public sector, trade and market 
liberalisation, and other components that contribute to the general business climate. 
Three of these warrant brief mention.  
 
The influence of the market size on entry into e.g. plant breeding is straightforward. 
Various empirical studies have showed that the larger the perceived size of the 
potential market, the greater the probability of entry.40 The structure of the market 
also determines the level and magnitude of private sector entry. State owned seed 
monopolies and in some instances public sector projects pose significant entry barriers 
to the private sector or in some cases crowd out the private sector where it exists.41 
The market size and liberalisation hypotheses find particular strength in India where 
rapid private sector growth followed the seed liberalisation policies in the 1980s. 
Reforms during this period included elimination of entry restrictions for foreign firms 
and large Indian conglomerates and the promulgation of new seed laws that reduced 
the restrictions on imports of varieties as well as germplasm for research purposes.42   
 
Another determinant of private sector investment in agriculture worth mentioning is 
the role played by the public sector. Public research helps to keep private research 
costs down; the cost of private research is reduced by spillovers generated from public 
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 KEPHIS, pers. comm. 
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 Naseem, A., Omamo, S. & Spielman, D., ‘The private sector in agricultural R&D: policies and 
institutions to foster its growth in developing countries’ ISNAR Discussion Paper 6 (2006); Griliches, 
Z. Hybrid corn: An exploration in the economics of technological change, Econometrica 25 (1957); 
Griliches, Z., R&D and productivity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); Scherer, F., 
Demand-pull and technological innovation: Schmookler revisited, Journal of Industrial Economics 
30/3 (1982) 225; and Scherer, F., Inter-industry technology flows and productivity growth, Review of 
Economics and Statistics 64 (1982) 627  
41 Alfranca, O. & Huffman, W., Aggregate private R&D investments in agriculture: The role of 
incentives, public policies, and institutions, Economic Development and Cultural Change 52/1 (2003) 1   
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 Pray, C. & Umali-Deininger, D., The private sector in agricultural research systems: Will it fill the 
gap? World Development 26/6 (1996) 1127 
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research.43 1995 figures on sources of germplasm used in the local private sector 
maize breeding programmes in India show that 38% were from private sources while 
the rest were from the public sector including IARCs.44 A survey of Indian private 
plant breeders found that the public research system has been a major source of 
breeding material for cotton and sorghum while the International Crops Research 
Institute for Semi Arid Tropics (ICRISAT, an IARC) is a major source of germplasm 
for sorghum and millet supplying about 65 and 80 percent respectively to the private 
sector.45  
  
Public research provides technology to improve seed companies’ appropriability. For 
example, hybrid rice is the focus of much private research in India whose origin can 
be traced to research carried out by the International Rice Research Institute and 
national government programmes that developed hybrid rice technology for the 
tropics.46 The public sector also provides knowledge and competent human resources 
to the private sector. 47  
 
Contributions of public research may in part explain private sector investment in 
agriculture biotechnology. The situation here is a bit different in that any public 
contribution is mainly from the ‘international public’ rather than the local or national 
public research system. This is more the case in Kenya where all private research in 
biotechnology is foreign. In India, anecdotal evidence suggests some form of 
spillovers from the public to the local private sector and vice versa.48   
 
Apart from the biotechnology spillovers from the public sector, the technological 
opportunity itself that is provided by biotechnology is another factor motivating 
private investment in agriculture biotechnology. Advances in biotechnology have the 
potential to reduce the cost of further research. Biotech tools such as molecular 
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 Pray, C., ‘The growing role of the private sector in agricultural research’ in Byerlee & Echeverría 
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 Tripp, R. New seed and old laws: regulatory reform and the diversification of national seed systems 
(London: Overseas Development Institute, 1997) 
45 Ramaswami, B., Pray, C. & Kelley, T., Dissemination of private hybrids and crop yields in the semi-
arid tropics of India, Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics 57/1 (2002) 39 
46Pray & Fuglie (2001a) supra note 12 
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markers that were previously used in limited areas e.g. high value crops are now in 
use in grains such as maize and rice. Similarly, the cost of producing plants resistant 
to pests such as bollworms in cotton has been reduced by the availability of Bt genes 
that can be transferred to cotton, rice and most other crops. Of course the cost 
reductions are still limited but there’s potential for growth. The more opportunities 
private companies have to transform the available stock of knowledge into 
commercially viable technology, the more likely they are to invest. It is not surprising 
therefore that advances in molecular biology, bioinformatics, genetics, biochemistry 
and related fields have resulted in private sector investment in agriculture 
biotechnology.  
 
2.2.2.4  PPPs as indicators of privatisation 
 
In today’s globalised world, conflict, complexity, interdependence and cooperation 
characterise both the nature of problems actors in all sectors face and of the solutions 
they pursue. Convergence of synergies, linkages and concerted efforts among 
governments, private sector, civil society groups and individuals are one of the few 
effective ways of dealing with modern complex problems.  
 
Partnerships between the public and private sectors are currently enjoying remarkable 
acclaim in both official and scholarly circles49; they are seen as a means of addressing 
broad and multifaceted problems that defy clear definition and have no simple 
solutions. This is especially so in development rhetoric characterised by multiple 
stakeholders, competing interests and multifarious issues. 
 
 
 
                                               
49Kettler, H. & Towse, A., (2002) Public-private partnerships for research and development: 
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Agricultural Economics 83/3 (2001) 742; and Huang, J., Rozelle, S., Pray, C. & Wang, Q., Plant 
Biotechnology in China, Science 295/5555 (2002) 674  
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Table 2.7: Major partners in 13 Kenyan-based agricultural biotech projects  
Projects (facilitating organisation) Major partners 
Development of drought-tolerant and pest/insect 
resistant maize varieties (BTA facilitated) 
KARI, Biotechnology Trust Africa (BTA), Dutch 
Government Ministry of International 
Development & Cooperation (DGIS), the 
International Maize and Wheat Improvement 
Centre (CIMMYT), University of Missouri-
Columbia and Brookhaven National Laboratories 
 
Citrus tree tissue culture project for the mass 
propagation of clean planting material (BTA) 
National Horticulture Research Centre/KARI, 
University of Nairobi, BTA, DGIS 
 
Banana tissue culture project for mass 
propagation of clean planting material (BTA) 
KARI, Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture 
and Technology, BTA, DGIS, Rockefeller 
Foundation, UNESCO, World Bank, USAID and 
Rutgers University 
 
Irish potato tissue culture project for mass 
propagation of clean planting material (BTA) 
National Potato Research Centre/KARI, BTA, 
DGIS 
 
Sweet potato and cassava tissue culture project for 
mass propagation of planting material (BTA) 
KARI, BTA, DGIS, International Institute for 
Tropical Agriculture and the International Potato 
Centre (CIP) 
 
Evaluation & promotion of Bacillus thuringiensis 
(Bt) toxin-based biopesticides (BTA)  
KARI, University of Nairobi, BTA, DGIS, 
Kenyan Industrial Research and Development 
Institute (KIRDI), International Centre of Insect 
Physiology and Ecology (ICIPE), International 
Crop Research Institute for Semi Arid Tropics 
(ICRISAT) 
 
Macadamia tissue culture project for mass 
propagation (BTA) 
KARI, BTA, DGIS, Japan International 
Cooperation Agency, World Bank 
 
Biotech to benefit small scale banana producers in 
Kenya (ISAAA) 
KARI, Rockefeller Foundation, International 
Development Research Centre/Canada, (ISAAA) 
 
 
Virus resistant sweet potato (ISAAA) KARI, Monsanto, CIP 
 
Understanding the mechanisms of maize streak 
virus resistance of maize lines from Kenya & 
eastern and southern Africa (ISAAA) 
KARI, Rockefeller Foundation, John Innes 
Centre/UK, University of Cape Town, ICIPE, 
Norvatis Seeds 
 
Transgenic cassava project (ISAAA) KARI, Moi University, USAID, Danforth Centre 
 
Insect resistant maize for Africa (IRMA) project 
(CIMMYT) 
KARI, CIMMYT, Syngenta Foundation 
Development of a vaccine against East Coast 
Fever (ILRI) 
KARI, International Livestock Research Institute 
(ILRI), Oxford University, Merial Ltd, University 
of Victoria/Canada, Department for International 
Development/UK, Edinburgh University/UK, 
TIGR 
Source: Ayele, et al. (2006), with modifications 
 
Although PPPs may not, strictly speaking, be indicators of increased privatisation, 
they are nevertheless a useful proxy of private sector engagement and involvement in 
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agricultural research. At the very least, PPPs suggest commercialisation on the part of 
the public sector; they show an appreciation of the market-oriented strategy necessary 
for engaging in applied research. On the part of the private sector, PPPs perhaps point 
to the level of engagement of private companies in agricultural research. Where a 
private firm forms a partnership with a public research institution, it is assumed that 
the company already has some experience in the subject area of partnership. This 
could be upstream research or downstream development and distribution of 
technology. PPPs therefore serve as useful tools in that they are indicators of the level 
of private sector involvement.  
 
Time series data on agricultural PPPs in the two countries is not available. There are 
however anecdotal indications that there are increasing partnerships between the 
public and private sectors. In Kenya, the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute 
(KARI) conducts some projects jointly with some universities and has numerous 
collaborative projects with the international agricultural research centres, donor 
organisations and the private sector. This is especially so in modern biotechnology 
projects.  
 
As at December 2006, there were about 13 agricultural modern biotechnology 
projects in Kenya. These modern biotechnology projects have four interesting 
features: firstly, all are PPPs, secondly, all are North-South partnerships; thirdly, 
many involve multinational corporations and finally, and perhaps most telling, they 
are all in collaboration with KARI. This has helped ensure their relative progress; 
involving KARI (a government agency) ensures the government buys into the project 
and thus facilitates its progress.  
 
2.3 Impact of privatisation & commercialisation on food security 
 
The current spike in the prices of agricultural commodities and its pervasive global 
effect across sectors reminds us of the important and multiple roles that agriculture 
plays in the global economy. The world’s population has increased dramatically in the 
past three decades while agricultural production has grown in the same period at a 
much slower pace:  The world’s population currently stands at 6.5 billion and is 
projected to rise to more than 9 billion by 2050. Although global food production 
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meets the needs of the world’s population, the per capita food production and 
availability is lowest in developing countries, particularly those in Asia and Africa. 
Current estimates indicate that 852 million suffer from hunger; a vast majority of 
these—815 million—are in the developing world.   
 
In Sub Saharan Africa, agricultural growth has remained constant at best with most 
countries registering a decline in food production; food security remains a paramount 
issue. The world’s leaders and top development agencies galvanised efforts in the 
form of the UN Millennium Development Goals, the first of which is to eradicate 
extreme poverty and hunger. This is evidence that food security is a paramount 
concern not only to individual governments but also to the global community as a 
whole. The recent spikes in the cost of agricultural commodities globally showed that 
whereas food security in the past was predominantly a problem affecting developing 
countries, food security concerns are now at the forefront in the global agenda. 
 
This section now turns its attention to the implications of increasing privatisation and 
commercialisation on food security. Collectively, it looks at the potential impact of 
three changes: the growing number of private sector companies engaging in 
agriculture, increasing private sector investment in agriculture and the increase in 
agricultural partnerships. The potential impact of IPRs on food security are analysed 
in the next chapter. As there are no conclusive studies linking these factors and food 
security, this analysis is accordingly theoretical and addresses these factors from a 
‘potential impact’ perspective.     
 
2.3.1 Definitions, causes and solutions 
 
The causes of global food insecurity are many and varied particularly in the 
developing world. The attempts at defining food security have been just as numerous 
and, to date, there is no universally accepted definition. Maxwell lists over thirty 
different definitions of food security used by various authors between 1975 and 
1991.50  Various definitions proffered include: 
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 Maxwell, S., Food security: a postmodern perspective, Food policy 21/2 (1996). See also Maxwell, 
S.  & Smith, M., ‘Household food security: a conceptual review’ in Maxwell, S. & Frankenberger, T., 
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• Access by all people at all times to enough food for an active, healthy life. 
Food security includes at a minimum: i) ready availability of nutritionally 
adequate and safe foods, and ii) an assured ability to acquire acceptable foods 
in socially acceptable ways51  
• Physical and economic access, at all times, to sufficient, safe and nutritious 
food to meet dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life52 
• Access by all people at all times to enough food for an active, healthy life53  
• The state in which all persons obtain a nutritionally adequate, culturally 
acceptable diet at all times through local non-emergency sources54 
• When all people at all times have access to sufficient food to meet their dietary 
needs for a productive and healthy life55 
• Condition of having enough food to provide adequate nutrition for a healthy 
and productive life56 
• The availability of foodstuff in sufficient quantity at a global level57 
 
The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) in the 1996 World Food Summit 
attempted to remedy earlier deficiencies in the definition of food security. The 
ensuing definition was that: 
 
“Food security, at the individual, household, national, regional and 
global levels [is achieved] when all people, at all times, have physical 
and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet 
their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy 
life.”58  
 
                                                                                                                                       
(eds.) Household food security: concepts, indicators, measurements: a technical review. (New York & 
Rome: UNICEF & IFAD,1992) 
51
 USDA definition, available at 
http://www.worldhungeryear.org/fslc/faqs/ria_074.asp?section=14&click=9  
52
 FAO glossary, available at http://www.fao.org/ag/wfe2005/glossary_en.htm  
53
 World Bank, available at 
http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/ardext.nsf/12ByDocName/KeyTopicsFoodSecurity  
54
 Sustainable Agriculture Net glossary available at www.sustainableag.net/glossary_e-i.htm  
55
 USAID, available at http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/agriculture/food_security.htm  
56
 Future Harvest glossary available at http://www.futureharvest.org/about/glossary.shtml  
57
 Scoones, I., ‘Agricultural biotechnology and food security: exploring the debate’ IDS Working Paper 
145 (Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, 2002) 
58
 FAO. Rome declaration on world food security and world food summit plan of action, World Food 
Summit, Rome 13-17 November (1996) available at http://www.fao.org/wfs/index_en.htm  
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The FAO definition was refined in The State of Food Insecurity 2001 to include 
social access to food.59 This thesis uses this broad definition of food security. 
 
Two observations can be made from the definitions in the above exercise. The first 
relates to the levels at which food insecurity can be analysed. The 1996 World Food 
Summit focuses on food security at the individual, household, national, regional and 
global levels. Such a classification has been used in analyses of the causes of food 
insecurity.60 The second observation is that the food security definitions acknowledge 
the importance of not only availability of food but also effective access and 
distribution of the available food and the appropriate utilisation of the food. These 
three distinct factors—availability, access and utilisation—are important not in the 
least because they help in developing the indices for measuring and analysing food 
security.  
 
The fairly recent focus on access and utilisation can be closely identified with Sen’s 
seminal study where he challenged the then widely held conviction that lack of food 
supply (availability) was the primary cause of famine.61 Sen avoided the adoption of 
the concept of food security for this reason, and instead focused on the entitlements of 
individuals and households. As access issues are entrenched in social, political and 
economic relations, Sen’s work represented a clear shift in emphasis from natural to 
societal causes of food insecurity. The USAID Policy Determination defines food 
security and lists the causes of food insecurity through the three dimensions: 
availability, access and consumption.62  
 
The causes of food security can be analysed at the micro (individuals and household) 
and macro (national, regional, international) levels. Cullet63 distinguishes between 
food security at national and at individual levels. Using his classification, at the 
individual level, poverty and lack of income is the leading constraint to food security. 
This is evinced in the Millennium Development Goals which address eliminating 
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poverty and hunger as one goal (and indeed the first goal). Poor people are least likely 
to have access to sufficient safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and 
food preferences.64 The Rome Declaration recognised poverty as a ‘major cause of 
food insecurity and sustainable progress in poverty eradication is critical to improve 
access to food.’65  
 
Shiva66 asserts that a distinction between global and individual food insecurity cannot 
be maintained as the causes and influences of food insecurity at both levels are 
inextricably tied. Adopting a wider approach to causes of food insecurity, Shiva goes 
further than stating poverty as a cause of food insecurity and instead addresses the 
causes of poverty as the causes of food insecurity. She argues that the failure to place 
food security in a framework of rural-oriented economic growth, in combination with 
policies to stabilise domestic food economies are to blame. Shiva contends that this 
failure is a direct consequence of the current international trade regime characterised 
by corporate driven reforms. 
 
Constraints to food availability include biotic and abiotic factors. This set of causes 
has been used to advocate for biotechnology as a tool for increasing productivity by 
adapting crops to the biotic and abiotic conditions. In advocating for biotechnology as 
part of the solution, Chaturvedi posits that the constraints on productivity have 
become more acute since the 1980s when the Green Revolution varieties reached their 
potential.67  
 
Climatic change and natural disasters such as the Indian Ocean tsunami, earthquakes 
and the prevalence of armed conflict and wars lead to food crises. Inadequate rain and 
a locust invasion in 2004 lead to an 80% increase in grain prices and severe food 
shortage in Niger.68 Although there is no conclusive evidence that climatic variability 
and occurrence of extreme events such as drought, flood or storms have increased 
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significantly, global models nevertheless suggest that such changes in climatic 
variability are likely to occur in the future.69 
 
2.3.2 Increased private sector presence and food security 
 
Increasing private sector presence in agriculture has potential positive effects on food 
security. Firstly and premised on the assumption that increased private investment in 
agriculture means that more resources are available for agriculture research, private 
investment in agriculture could help ease the financial burden in the public sector. 
Private companies typically invest in areas where they are likely to get financial 
returns e.g. commercial cash crops. This means that the public sector can roll back its 
activities in these areas and concentrate on other areas which are less attractive to the 
private sector e.g. orphan crops. This would in theory lead to more efficient use of 
funds as public investment including that from the conventional donor agencies can 
be targeted at food security related research particularly that which the private sector 
has no interest in conducting.  
 
Increased private sector investment presents the public sector with an opportunity to 
relinquish some of its activities to the private sector and can facilitate the 
improvement of cost recovery and efficiency in the public sector’s remaining research 
activities. There has, however, to be a healthy balance between public and private 
research particularly in fragile areas such as agriculture. Because of the private 
sector’s profit-based motive, a private sector led agenda risks distorting research 
priorities which results in neglecting research in crops with low rates of profit returns. 
Evidence from various studies conducted on private sector investment in agriculture 
shows that the private sector investment is centred on commercial crops rather than 
food crops.70 This makes the case for public sector led agriculture research 
particularly in developing countries with fragile food systems. Evidence from Kenya 
and India shows that although private sector investment in agriculture is growing at a 
faster rate than that from the public sector, the latter still plays the primal role in 
agriculture research.   
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Although increased private sector presence in agriculture presents the public sector 
with the opportunity to withdraw from areas covered by the private sector and hence 
avoid competition, a potential risk relates to the migration of agriculture research staff 
from the public to the private sector. Having been involved in agriculture research for 
longer, the public sector generally has more experienced staff than the private sector. 
The two sectors are in competition for this pool of experienced researchers. As the 
private sector is generally better financially equipped, the public sector risks losing 
staff to better paid jobs in the private sector.  The erosion of public sector capacity has 
grave consequences on public agricultural research and its ability to address food 
insecurity.  
 
Although the use of conventional breeding and the improvement of agricultural 
practices may have served some countries well in the past, biotechnology is 
increasingly being cited as offering the scope to resolve some of the agronomic 
problems affecting crop production in developing countries and hence improve food 
security.71 Private sector presence in the agricultural sector has further increased with 
the advent of modern biotechnology.72 IPRs have clearly contributed to the 
development of biotechnology by offering the prospect of private profit.  
 
The use and application of agriculture biotechnology in developing countries raises 
various issues. Alongside global concerns for environmental and human safety, most 
developing countries lack the capacity and the supporting systems such as biosafety 
regulations under which biotechnology is applied. That apart, biotechnology is but a 
tool and does not contain all the answers to food insecurity. Analysing the possible 
impact of biotechnology on food security in developing countries, Spillane posits that 
biotech will benefit the poor farmers only if ‘applied to well defined social and 
economic objectives.’73 Cullet adds that application of biotechnology increases the 
                                               
71
 Swaminathan, M., ‘Genetic engineering and food security: ecological and livelihood issues’ in 
Persley, G. & Lantin, M., (eds.) Agricultural biotechnology and the poor: proceedings of an 
international conference, Washington DC. 21-22 October 1999 (Washington DC: CGIAR); Chaturvedi 
(2002) supra note 67 
72
 OECD., ‘Accessing agricultural biotechnology in emerging economies’ framework papers from the 
OECD Global Forum on Knowledge Economy: Biotechnology, Paris, 18-19 November (2002)  
73
 Spillane, C., ‘Agricultural biotechnology and developing countries: proprietary knowledge and 
diffusion of benefits’ in Swanson, T., (ed.) Biotechnology, agriculture and the developing world: the 
distributional implications of technological change (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2002) 
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likelihood of specialisation and increase in commercial crops at the expense of food 
crops.74 Biotechnology therefore has the potential to achieve food security or to distort 
agriculture research.  
 
Cooperation with the private sector through partnerships and other forms of 
collaborations is generally viewed as positive. PPPs have the potential to increase the 
effectiveness and volume of total agriculture research efforts. The two case studies in 
this thesis are PPPs which have demonstrated the potential of partnerships in 
addressing food security. The success of PPPs and their ability to meet their food 
security objectives however depends on how they are administered. Poor regulation, 
governance and decision making processes can drain public resources. Cultural 
differences may also reduce the benefits and increase the costs of running the 
partnership. PPPs may also lead to partners engaging in rent seeking behaviour. 
Research institutions may also give preference to PPPs because of the additional 
budget involved at the expense of other research programmes.75  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
Private sector investment in agriculture is growing; in India, the seed industry is 
predominantly from the private sector with domestic as well as multinational seed 
companies. Investment in biotechnology has also increased leading to more private 
sector presence in both countries although in the case of Kenya, the private companies 
in agricultural biotechnology are virtually all foreign. Like India, private investment 
in agriculture in Kenya is concentrated in the seed and plant breeding industries. At 
best, agriculture R&D in the two countries is private sector-influenced rather than 
private sector-led. Agricultural research is still largely funded by the public sector in 
addition to, particularly in Kenya, donor agencies. 
 
The role of IPRs in increasing private sector participation is uncertain. Theoretically, 
IPRs present the private sector with incentives to invest in research. In the two study 
countries, there is evidence that the private sector has opted for incentives provided by 
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 Cullet (2003) supra note 60 
75
 See generally Van der Meer, K., ‘Public-private cooperation in agriculture research: examples from 
the Netherlands’ in Byerlee & Echeverria (2002) supra note 1 
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non-IPR mechanisms such as biological protection provided by hybrids. There is no 
conclusive evidence that IPRs increase private sector investment in agriculture 
although this is not to mean that they are unimportant. A more probable link between 
the two is that the private sector presence in agriculture increases the likelihood of the 
use of IPRs in agriculture research. This is supported by PBR and seed certification 
data from Kenya; most of the PBR applications are from the private sector.  
 
Because the paramount goal of reduction of poverty and eradication of hunger 
(Millennium Development Goal 1) is inextricably woven into the fabric of the 
agriculture, there is general global consensus that governments in developing 
countries especially those worse hit by poverty and food insecurity have a paramount 
role in agriculture.  The agricultural sector as a whole is embedded in an extended 
network of economic and political relations existing between various institutions and 
enterprises, markets as well as between sectors of the economy. Success in achieving 
the overarching goal of poverty reduction and attainment of food security crucially 
depends on the delicate balance between competing and diverse interests.  
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Chapter Three  
 
Private rights and public goods: conflicts in food security 
oriented research  
 
3.0 Introduction  
 
The previous chapter illustrated inter alia that private sector presence in agriculture 
has increased in the last two decades in the study countries although the public sector 
is still the dominant player in the field of agriculture. The increasing private sector 
presence, the advent of the IPR system and the concomitant protection of research 
tools and other technologies are some of the developments influential in exposing 
public research organisations to IPRs.  
 
Using the international agricultural research centres under the Consultative Group on 
International Agriculture Research (CGIAR or CG) as an example, this chapter 
examines whether the exposure to IPRs compromises the public goods mandate of 
international agricultural research centres (IARCs) in the CGIAR. Given the centrality 
of food security to the CGIAR’s raison d’etre, it may reasonably be assumed that such 
compromise potentially has dire consequences for food security. The CGIAR is 
chosen as it is the largest public sector investor in agriculture in developing countries 
with a specific food security mandate.1  
 
This enquiry into the interface between public goods and IPRs is based on the premise 
that IPRs as a concept are structured towards the attainment of private rights and are 
therefore more consonant with the private sector and its for-profit motivation.2 
                                               
1The Consultative Group on International Agriculture Research is an alliance of public and private 
donors made up of countries, international and regional organisations and private foundations that 
support the network of  fifteen  mostly commodity based international agriculture research centres. The 
CGIAR’s mission is to ‘to achieve sustainable food security and reduce poverty in developing 
countries through scientific research and research-related activities in the fields of agriculture, forestry, 
fisheries, policy, and environment.’ See chapters 4 and 6 for more on the CGIAR.    
2
 Mugabe, J., Intellectual property protection and traditional knowledge: an exploration of international 
policy discourse,  paper prepared for WIPO (1998) available at http://www.acts.or.ke/paper%20-
%20intellectual%20property.htm 
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Increasing concern about the application and management of IPRs by the public 
sector3 provide further justification for analysing the compatibility of IPRs with the 
provision of public goods.  
 
This chapter argues that there is an inherent theoretical conflict in the application of 
private rights for the provision of public goods given that IPRs introduce excludability 
to a good. But there is a distinction between the existence and exercise of IPRs. It is 
the latter rather than the former that determines the effect IPRs have on the provision 
of public goods. This chapter concerns itself with the existence of IPRs while the next 
will look at the exercise of IPRs.  
 
This chapter is organised in six parts. The first section looks at the theory behind 
public and private goods. The second investigates whether agricultural research as 
conducted by the CG Centres yields public goods while the next looks at IPRs and the 
correction of market failure. The fourth examines the theoretical implications of using 
IPRs in the provision of public goods. The fifth section shows instances where public 
agricultural research institutions are exposed to IPRs, while the last section highlights 
some of the potential impacts that IPRs may have on food security.   
 
3.1 Public goods and private goods: a theoretical perspective   
 
The following section concerns itself with two questions: firstly, what determines 
whether a good is public or private and secondly, what determines what sector is best 
suited to provide a particular type of good. The ultimate goal is to determine what 
happens when pubic goods are provided through the use of private rights. Do they still 
remain public goods? A secondary question is whether the public sector is the 
generally most suited sector to provide public goods and if so, what happens when the 
exception pertains.   
 
The interest in public goods can be traced back to classical economics perhaps 
beginning with the publication of Samuelson’s seminal articles in the mid 1950s.4  
                                               
3
 Maredia, M., Application of intellectual property rights in developing countries: implications for 
public policy and agricultural research institutes, paper submitted to the WIPO (2001) available at 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/about-ip/en/studies/pdf/study_k_maredia.pdf 
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Samuelson used the “jointness of consumption” as the main attribute to divide all 
goods into two classes: private consumption goods and public consumption goods. 
According to Samuelson, “collective consumption goods” are those goods ‘… which 
all enjoy in common in the sense that each individual’s consumption of such a good 
leads to no subtraction from any other individual’s consumption of that good…’5 
Jointness of consumption is also referred to as nonrivalry, nonrivalry of consumption 
or indivisibility of benefits. Some authors do indeed use the terms interchangeably.6  
 
Musgrave7 on the other hand argued that a different attribute – whether someone can 
be excluded from benefiting once the good is produced (excludability) – was more 
important that Samuelson’s rivalness attribute. Both aimed to show when market 
forces would perform optimally in the provision of specific classification of goods 
and when markets would fail.  
 
Pure public goods are contrasted to private goods which are said to be rivalrous and 
excludable. Pure public goods are not diminished by use (non-rivalrous) and are 
freely available for all (non-excludable) so as to be accessible to growing numbers of 
people without any marginal cost. These qualities in their purest form are exemplified 
by knowledge. Jefferson observed in 1813 that ‘He who receives an idea from me, 
receives instruction himself, without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at 
mine receives light without darkening me.’8 The effect of IPRs on knowledge is 
revisited later in the chapter.  
 
According to Samuelson,9 rivalrous goods, whether excludable or not could be 
efficiently provided through market mechanisms while Musgrave,10 arguing that 
                                                                                                                                       
4
 Samuelson, P., The pure theory of public expenditure, Review of economics and statistics 36/4 (1954) 
387 and Samuelson, P., A diagrammatic exposition of a theory of public expenditure, Review of 
economics and statistics 37 (1955) 350 
5
 Samuelson (1954) supra note 4 at p1 
6
 Cornes, R. & Sandler, T., The theory of externalities, public goods and club goods (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996) 
7
 Musgrave, R., The theory of public finance (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959) 
8
 Jefferson, T., Thomas Jefferson, Writings (New York: The Library of America, 1984); Powell 
similarly observed that ‘The learning of one man does not subtract from the learning of another, as if 
there were a limited quantity to be divided into exclusive holdings… That which one man gains by 
discovery is a gain of other men. And these multiple gains become invested capital…) Powell as 
quoted in Dalyrmple, D. International agricultural research as a global public good: Concepts, the 
CGIAR experience, and policy issues, J. Int. Dev. 20 (2008) 347 at p350  
9
 Samuelson (1954) supra note 4 
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excludability was the determining factor, contended that market mechanisms are 
preferable for those goods that are excludable whether rivalrous or not. Similarly, 
Cornes & Sandler11 argue that nonexcludability is the crucial factor in determining 
which goods must be provided by the public sector. All agreed that the wide 
dispersion of benefits concomitant with pure public goods renders them unsuitable for 
private entrepreneurship and that these are therefore best provided for by the state.  
 
Most of the economic explorations on the distinction between public and private 
goods are studies in allocative and distributive efficiency i.e. public finance; they aim 
at determining when government spending or intervention is necessary and when the 
market is best suited to provide for particular types of goods.  
 
Examples of pure public goods have been dwindling since the critique of the classical 
examples of the lighthouse and of national defence. Classical economics literature 
such as Buchanan’s An economic theory of clubs12 further sparked economists’ 
interest in the chasm between pure public goods and pure private goods.13 The 
resulting rigorous explorations led to expansion of the list of goods that did not fit into 
either category. It is now widely acknowledged that goods rarely fall neatly within the 
above criteria hence the recognition of club goods and common pool resources. 
 
Strictly speaking, most goods have shades of rivalry and excludability characteristics. 
Samuelson himself conceded that many goods commonly termed as public goods do 
not fit within his definition;14 moreover, given that the world is finite, resources in it 
are finite too and the economic concept of scarcity applies ubiquitously so that public 
goods are not exempt. Strict non rivalry is therefore not possible. Similarly, Pickhardt 
                                                                                                                                       
10
 Musgrave (1959) supra note 7 
11
 Cornes and sandler (1996) supra note 6 
12
 Buchanan, M. An economic theory of clubs, Economica, 32 (1965) 1  
13
 In examining the conditions under which individuals with a common interest organise and bear the 
cost of pursuing that interest, Olson’s Logic of collective action alluded to the difficulty in strict 
categorisation of goods as either public or private. He showed that private organisations can also 
provide public goods e.g. the benefits from large organisations such as labour unions or lobbies 
automatically go to every individual in the group, whether or not he helped bear the costs  
14
 Samuelson (1955) supra note 4 
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observes that most goods which give rise to private benefits also involve externalities 
in varying degrees thereby combining both public and private good characteristics. 15 
 
Drahos underscores this by stating that ‘a public good is not a single good, but an 
effect with complex antecedents made up of a set of complementary goods (private 
and public) and different types of social actors.’16  Examples of seemingly pure public 
goods that are in fact impure public goods include education, health, agriculture and 
the justice system where in practice, these are not consumed in equal amounts by 
everyone and one person’s consumption decreases the amount available for other 
people to consume or at least reduces the quality of service available to others.17 
 
Moving slightly away from the classification criteria as a determinant of whether a 
good is private or not, one might examine other perspectives such as those held by 
Goldin and by Holtermann. The former argues that the “publicness” of a good is not 
an inherent characteristic of the good itself but of the manner in which it is produced. 
For Goldin,18 any good can be either a public or private good depending on the choice 
of production method. This view assumes that public goods are provided by the public 
sector and private goods by their counterpart, a notion that is refuted in most literature 
and later in this chapter. 
 
Holtermann posits that it is the way that goods are made available and how they are 
utilised that makes them public or not. This perspective finds resonance with the 
theme of exercise pursued in the next chapter.  
 
Holtermann19 distinguishes between the availability and utilisation of a public good; 
its provision may be public in so far as it is equally available for everyone’s 
consumption but its utilisation may contain aspects of private goods in that utilisation 
                                               
15
 Pickhardt, M., Fifty years after Samuelson’s “The pure theory of public expenditure”: What are we 
left with?, paper presented at ‘The 58th Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance (IIPF)’ 
Helsinki, 26-29 August (2002) 
16
 Drahos, P., ‘The regulation of public goods’ in Maskus, K. & Reichman, J., (eds.) International 
public goods and transfer of technology under a globalised intellectual property regime (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004) 
17
 A phenomenon termed as ‘congestion’; see Cornes and Sandler (1996) supra note 6 
18
 Goldin, K. D., ‘Equal access vs. selective access: a critique of public goods theory’ in Cowen, T., 
(ed.) The theory of market failure: a critical examination (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 
1992) 
19
 Holtermann, S., Externalities and public goods, Economica, 39/153 (1972) 78  
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is different for different individuals and an increase in one person’s utilisation 
decreases the amount available to others. In determining if a good is a pure public 
good or a mixed good, Holtermann maintains that this will depend on whether an 
individual consumption unit can be defined and secondly, whether consumption is in 
the control of the consumer, at least in principle. He however concedes that the 
dividing line is not always clear.  
 
The “privateness” or otherwise of goods is also not constant. Through technological, 
legal, institutional, policy and other interventions, a public good can be made private 
and vice versa. For example, technological advances in ICT such as digital rights 
management and encryption allow the media industry to exclude customers from 
cable and satellite TV reception from what was once a public good (non excludable 
and non rival) when radio and TV transmission first emerged. In agriculture 
biotechnology, the use of terminator technology constitutes a technological 
intervention intended to increase excludability. Vaknin argues that in the same way, 
technology converts some private goods into impure public goods: ‘education used to 
be a private good with positive externalities. Thanks to technology and government 
[intervention] it is no longer the case. It is being transformed into a non pure public 
good.’20 To the transformative nature of interventions, Kaul and Mendoza include 
policies and other social interventions: ‘in many if not most cases, goods exist not in 
their original forms but as social constructs, largely determined by policies and other 
collective actions.’21 
 
Given that the nature and externalities of goods can change over time, it is not 
possible to demarcate goods into strict categories of pure public and private goods. 
Most goods lie in the pure public goods – private goods continuum. In fact, it might 
be a misnomer to refer to it as a continuum as impure public goods differ from one 
another along more than one dimension: varying degrees of excludability and rivalry 
exist within the category of impure public goods. Cornes and Sandler caution that this 
                                               
20
 Vaknin, S., ‘Is education a public  good’ available at 
http://www.totse.com/en/politics/political_spew/iseducationapu173733.html at p3 
21
 Kaul, I. & Mendoza, R., ‘Advancing the concept of public goods’ in Kaul, I., Conceicao, P., Le 
Goulven, K. & Mendoza, R., (eds.) Providing global public goods: managing globalisation (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003) 
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‘spectrum is best viewed as a pedagogical device that provides a way of visualising 
the diverse kinds of goods.’22 
 
From the foregoing, one can conclude that the characteristics of the good together 
with the way the good is made available and utilised, determine whether a good is 
public, private or otherwise. One must however bear in mind the transformative 
nature of interventions e.g. policies, technologies, etc. as these have the potential to 
transform a good from one type to another. The question of who provides the good is 
not a factor in determining whether a good is public or private; private research can 
produce impure public goods and vice versa.  
 
The preceding was an attempt to look at the factors that determine whether a good is 
public or private. The following now turns to what determines what sector is best 
suited to provide a particular type of good. The context is necessarily agriculture.  
 
3.2 Agriculture research as a public good 
 
Emerging literature on global public goods can be used to shed light on agriculture 
research as a public good. The enquiry of whether agriculture is a public good is held 
within the wider context of what sector is best suited to provide public goods accruing 
from agriculture; it is premised on the fact already established in the preceding section 
that very few goods are truly purely public goods.  
 
The social returns to research investment even when conducted by the private sector 
possess some degree of public goods characteristics. Indeed Nelson,23 Arrow24 and 
others25 argued that social returns from private research investment exceed private 
returns. Research conducted by the public and private sectors (and by the two in 
                                               
22
 Cornes and Sandler (1996) supra note 6 at p9 
23
 Nelson, R. The simple economics of basic scientific research Journal of Political Economy 67 (1959) 
297  
24
 Arrow, K., ‘Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention’ in The rate and 
direction of inventive activity: Economic and social factors (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1962) 
25
 Mansfield E., Rapoport J., Romeo A., Wagner S. & Beardsley G., Social and private rates of returns 
from industrial innovations, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 91 (1977) 233; Ruttan V., 
Technology, growth, and development: an induced innovation perspective (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001) 
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collaboration) is likely to produce public goods. It follows therefore that public 
benefits from research may therefore accrue not just from public investment but from 
private investment as well. The inverse is also probable.   
 
The non rivalry and non excludability of pure public goods and some impure public 
goods renders them unsuitable for private production; the risk of ‘free riding’ results 
in under production of goods by the private sector. In such cases, the public sector 
should step in to ensure that the socially desired level of production and consumption 
is achieved. This however does not mean that the public sector must be primarily 
engaged in the production of public goods; these can be subcontracted to the private 
sector where this is thought to be cost effective. David puts it succinctly: ‘The term 
“public good” does not imply that such commodities cannot be privately supplied, nor 
does it mean that the government must produce it.’26 
 
The public sector has been known to engage in production of private goods such as 
where the public sector itself is contracted by the private sector; examples in 
agriculture include conducting soil tests for private breeders and sub letting premises 
and equipment for small private companies to conduct research. This is becoming 
more common with the growing practice of diversification of services and income 
within public research institutions.   
 
Gardner and Lesser27 apply the global public goods concept in assessing the most 
promising activities for donor support of international agriculture research. They 
argue that public agriculture research as conducted by the CGIAR centres produces 
impure rather than pure public goods because not all of the goods and services 
produced from the centres’ research is available to all people; the existence of 
excludability means the goods and services produced are impure public goods: 
‘However, much agricultural research does not produce Samuelsonian public goods, 
much less global ones. The typical case is that some users cannot be excluded or 
charged for some uses of the goods or services produced. Agricultural research thus 
                                               
26
 David, P. ‘The political economy of public science’ in Smith, H., (ed.) The public regulation of 
science and technology (New York: Palgrave, 2002) at p36 
27
 Gardner, B. & Lesser, W. (2003) International agricultural research as a global public good, Amer. J. 
Agr. Econ. 85/3 (2003) 692  
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produces “impure” public goods. Equivalently, it can be said that agricultural research 
generates spillovers or exernal benefits…’28 
 
Adopting a similar argument, Dalrymple29 posits that because agriculture research is 
usually limited to a commodity or sector, its outputs are by definition excludable to 
other commodities or sectors and are hence impure rather than pure public goods. But 
the classical economic concept of excludability as discussed in the preceding section 
relates to excludability of individuals rather than of commodities or sectors; the latter 
cannot be used as units of analysis to test excludability. Agriculture research is an 
impure public good but Dalrymple’s reason, according to classical economic theory, 
does not make it so.   
 
In countering Dalrymple’s argument, Ryan falls victim to the same trap. Using 
biotechnology as an example, Ryan argues that higher end biotechnology cuts through 
sectors and breaks down ‘interspecific biological barriers’: ‘Especially at the 
basic/strategic end of the spectrum, such boundaries hence would not seem to 
constrain the public good ambit per se.’30 He seems to suggest that the more potential 
a good has for research spillover (such as basic biotechnology which can be applied 
across various sectors), the more it moves towards being a pure public good. Like 
Dalrymple, Ryan bases his analysis of whether a good is purely public on the 
applicability of the good across sectors rather than the inclusivess (or rather 
nonexcludability) of the good or service relative to users. Later, Dalrymple31 argues 
that particularly due to its interaction with private research, public agricultural 
research is increasingly providing impure public goods rather than pure public goods. 
This seems to suggest that private research ‘dilutes’ the public nature of goods.  
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 Id at p693 
29
 Dalrymple, D., Scientific knowledge as a public good: thinking about benefits of research to society 
could break down barriers, The Scientist 19/2 (2005) 10; see also Dalrymple, D., Impure public goods 
and agricultural research: toward a blend of theory and practice, Quarterly Journal of International 
Agriculture 45/1 (2006) 71  
30
 Ryan, J., ‘International public goods and the CGIAR niche in the R for D continuum: 
operationalising concepts’ in CGIAR Science Council Positioning the CGIAR in the Research for 
Development Continuum (Rome: Science Council Secretariat, 2006) at p3 
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 Dalrymple, D., International agricultural research as a global public good: concepts, the CGIAR 
experience and policy issues, J. Int. Dev. 20 (2008) 347  
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Even in its simplest form, agriculture research is no doubt an impure public good as it 
contains elements of both pure public and private goods. The ultimate end product of 
agriculture – food – is a private good in so far as it is both rivalrous (once consumed, 
it no longer exists) and excludable (the owner can exclude others from consuming it). 
The basic rationale of most agriculture research programmes particularly those in 
developing countries and certainly those in the CGIAR centres is the attainment of 
food security where all people have access to sufficient safe and nutritious food to 
meet their dietary needs for an active and healthy life. This in itself constitutes among 
other things, the provision of food (private good) although the spillovers or benefits of 
a healthy well fed nation impact on society as a whole (public good). Similarly the 
knowledge required in growing agronomically appropriate crops of high quality and 
yield is non-rivalrous and generally non-excludable (pure public good) although the 
application of that knowledge (embodied in the resulting technology) is potentially 
exclusive (impure public good).  
 
The foregoing highlights the difficulty in clearly demarcating goods into pure public 
and private goods and makes the case that public goods can be produced by any sector 
and that agriculture research yields impure rather than pure goods. Impure public 
goods such as agricultural research can therefore be produced by the public sector, the 
private sector, a combination of the two or indeed other sectors.  
 
3.3 IPRs and the correction of market failure 
 
In an ideal market, the price of each good should be equal to the cost borne by society 
in consuming it. If goods are produced above marginal cost, they will be under-
consumed; if they are provided at marginal cost (free) they will tend to be under-
produced as there will be no incentive to invest in their production. Sometimes when 
the private sector engages in the production of impure public goods, the incomplete 
rivalry or excludability may yield in externalities thereby making their net marginal 
benefit lower to the producers than to society. This may render the private provision 
of various goods unprofitable in spite of their social profitability. Consequently, there 
can be under provision or no provision at all. Different mechanisms are used to 
correct this market failure; IPRs and government intervention are but two ways.  
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The utilitarian theory on IPRs is premised on incentives and rewards: that creators are 
encouraged to invent by the promise of a reward in the form of monopoly rights over 
their creation for a limited amount of time. The economic justification for IP lies not 
in rewarding creators for their labour but in assuring that they have appropriate 
incentives to engage in creative activities thereby addressing the question of under 
production. Ironically, IPRs themselves can cause market failure where they limit the 
diffusion of ideas and therefore prevent many people from benefiting from them. In 
this sense, the exercise of IPRs can result in under-consumption such as when IPRs 
result in vital drugs being prohibitively expensive so as to be out of reach of poor 
people. Moreover, it can be argued that IPRs seem to run counter to free market 
competition where they limit the availability of competitors to copy or otherwise 
imitate the intellectual efforts of the first person to develop an idea. These rights 
enable the IP holders to charge monopoly prices or to otherwise limit competition.   
 
Because IPRs impose social costs on the public, IP laws can be justified by the public 
goods argument only to the extent that they do on balance encourage creation and 
dissemination of new works to offset those costs. A reason why IPRs are limited in 
time, scope, and effect is precisely in order to balance these costs and benefits. In 
applying a utilitarian model, the economic incentive benefits of IPRs must be 
balanced against the costs of limiting diffusion of knowledge. A critical issue in 
assessing the need for IP protection is whether innovators have sufficient means to 
appropriate an adequate return on investment in R&D.  
 
Summarised therefore, the problem of knowledge embedded in technology is an 
example of a familiar problem of the supply of public goods: if sold at a price above 
marginal cost it will be under-consumed, if provided at marginal cost (usually free) it 
will tend to be under-produced unless there is some intervention to create an 
incentive. IPRs are one such intervention.  
 
IPRs are a form of state subsidy to those engaged in the creation of knowledge. 
Government intervention through IPRs (subsidising inventors) improves social 
welfare only if the cost of distortion created by IPRs is less than the social welfare 
gain of the additional innovation that IPRs stimulate. Moreover, IPRs are often seen 
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as macro economic tools with a long term effect on economies. ‘IPRs generate 
monopoly positions that reduce current consumer welfare in return for providing 
adequate payoffs to innovation, which then raises future consumer welfare.’32 
 
A distinction can be made between the exercise of property rights in relation to rival 
goods on one hand and in relation to non-rival goods on the other. Economists have 
long argued that strong property rights applied to rival goods result in efficient 
outcomes and therefore increased social gain. But IPRs for non rival goods involve a 
trade-off. As seen earlier, non-rival goods by definition can be used by many people 
at the same time. Creators of such goods must either not care about profit (being 
motivated by other incentives) or the good will not be produced. In other words, when 
IPRs are applied to non-rival goods, the benefits derived do not cover the costs borne 
by society.  
 
IPRs are but one way of addressing the potential under-provision problem related to 
supply of impure public goods. There are alternative ways of creating incentives;33 
Gallini and Scotchmer34 provide a useful review of the literature on alternative 
incentive mechanisms drawing from Wright’s analysis on how asymmetric 
information informs the choice of incentive mechanisms.35 Different interventions 
have different distributional implications, welfare impacts and influence the nature of 
research and development differently.  
 
IPRs may lead to the pricing of important welfare goods e.g. crops protected by plant 
variety rights out of poor people’s reach. Application of IPRs may also distort 
                                               
32 Maskus, K. Intellectual property rights in the global economy (Washington DC: Institute for 
International Economics, 2000) at p32 
33
 Such as Advance Market Commitments (AMCs), voluntary buy-out of patents, compulsory purchase 
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 Gallini, N. & Scotchmer, S. Intellectual property: when is it the best incentive system? Innovation 
Policy and the Economy 2 (2002) p51-77 
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research priorities such as when private companies choose to invest in commercial 
crops and neglect pro-poor ‘orphan’ crops. This is especially important given that six 
companies hold 75 percent of all agricultural patents,36 increasing the risk of non-
delivery of agricultural inventions to the poor. 
 
Even Adam Smith, the most ardent advocate of laissez-faire, recognised the need for 
government intervention in some select areas. This is needed in health, education and 
agriculture to reverse market failure, reduce transaction costs so as to enhance 
consumption or supply and hence positive externalities. Government intervention is 
needed to (re)direct research according to social value so as to promote creation of 
knowledge in areas with highest social return rather than according to the highest 
opportunity for rent extraction. This is particularly important given that the potential 
distributional impact of IPRs, social welfare costs and distortion of R&D are greater 
now than ever before as is the growing disparity in wealth allocation exacerbated by 
changes brought about by globalisation. Research into problems affecting the poor is 
increasingly marginalised over the development of technology for which rich 
consumers are willing to pay. 
 
3.4 The implications of applying IPRs in the provision of public goods  
 
It has been asserted that IP law is modelled on private gains and is therefore more 
compatible with private sector research.37 This section explores the implications of 
applying IPRs in the provision of public goods; it builds on two arguments earlier 
mentioned. One, the Holtermann perspective that it is the way goods are made 
available and how they are utilised that makes them public or not and two, the 
distinction between knowledge and technology is vital in understanding the effect 
IPRs have on public goods.38  
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 Mugabe, J., Intellectual property protection and traditional knowledge: an exploration of 
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While arguing that the main determinant of whether a good is public or private is the 
manner in which it is made available and how the good is utilised, Holtermann 
distinguishes between the provision and utilisation of goods. To recap, he posits that 
provision of impure public goods has public characteristics in that the goods are 
equally available to all (non-excludable). Utilisation on the other hand has private 
characteristics: one person’s consumption reduces the amount available for others’ 
consumption e.g. hospital beds in health care, access to justice in the court system, 
etc. 
 
Figure 3.1: The effect of applying IPRs to public goods using Holtermann’s 
classification 
Holtermann: 
public goods  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IPRs reverse this: 
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IPRs can be said to reverse Holtermann’s classification; firstly, public goods to which 
IPRs have been applied acquire private good characteristics i.e. the goods may be 
available to all but are only accessible to those who can pay the added royalty costs 
(assuming these are present). Secondly, where IPRs are applied to pure public goods, 
excludability in the provision of the goods concerned is traded off against non rivalry 
in the utilisation of the knowledge: the knowledge can be copied endlessly without 
being diminished and one person’s consumption does not subtract from others’ 
consumption.  
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Knowledge in its purest form is a pure public good in that it is nonrival, 
nonexcludable and has positive externalities. If technology is seen as the application 
of knowledge, IPRs may be said to alter the nature of technology from public to 
private by introducing excludability although not rivalry. For example, by imposing 
license fees and royalties to the final product, those who cannot meet the increased 
cost are excluded from using the product (excludability). The knowledge inherent in 
the technology is however not diminished by use (non rival). In fact, it may be argued 
that the disclosure requirement in the case of patents places more information relating 
to the technology (the application of the knowledge) in the public domain. This 
however has little bearing on excludability and non-rivalry because although more 
information is available to the public, a third party is still excluded from applying the 
knowledge during the life of the patent in the way described without authorisation 
from the right holder.  
 
Dalrymple makes a similar distinction between science and technology and argues 
that ‘science, as a form of knowledge, is more likely to inherently be a [public good] 
than is technology, which involves adaptation to particular circumstances and 
needs.’39 He argues further that even knowledge itself is not spared from 
excludability:  
 
‘But as pure knowledge is drawn on, often through applied research, and 
becomes embedded in a particular technique or product, it usually looses 
some of its pure public good characteristics and becomes, to a varying 
degree, an impure public good. This is particularly true if the private 
sector is involved and some sort of intellectual property protection is 
exercised. While the most common result is that the embedded form of 
knowledge is not freely available to all (excludability), it becomes of 
greater value or use to individuals or society as a whole.’40  
 
The main objective of public research organisations is presumed to be the provision of 
research products for the general public. Most public research organisations will 
particularly focus on research affecting the marginalized sections of the public. The 
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assumption is that the products of their research are equally available and accessible 
to everyone.  
 
In theory therefore, there is an innate conflict in the application of IPRs to the 
provision of public goods. How does a public research organisation apply IPRs 
(which introduce excludability) while still maintaining their mandate to provide goods 
equally available and accessible to all? This inherent theoretical conflict has been the 
subject of many a debate; public research organisations have had various reactions to 
this conflict between the philosophy of public research and the existence of IPRs.   
 
Having established that there is an inherent theoretical conflict in the application of 
IPRs to the provision of public goods, it has to be asked why public research 
organisations are faced with this dilemma. Why apply IPRs at all?  
 
3.5 Why and when are public agricultural research organisations exposed to 
IPRs?   
 
Trends in the last two decades are responsible for the exposure of public research 
organisations to IPRs. These include but are not limited to: a decline in public 
research funds and the pressure to generate income, the privatisation of research and 
the advent of the IP system.   
  
The past decade has seen a constant decline in funds allocated for research in 
agriculture. In the face of many competing claims on donor aid, international 
agricultural research no longer commands priority in funding.41 Donor aid to IARCs 
increasingly hinges on the impact of institutions’ research.  One effect of this is the 
trend from basic to applied research and the subsequent involvement of other partners, 
including the private sector, in downstream product development. Another effect of 
public research budget austerity is the increasing pressure on IARCs to commercialise 
their products to supplement their income. Although income generation is hardly the 
main factor motivating patenting (or other form of IP protection) of research in 
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IARCs, the reality is that IP protection has the potential to generate income for 
IARCs. 
 
The changing agricultural R&D scene has raised vital issues which IARCs and other 
public research organisations have to address. Not the least of these is the question of 
whether income generation is consistent with the wider mandate of public research 
organisations to serve the needs of the poor farmers and maximise benefits to society 
as a whole.42 Public research organisations face the challenge of balancing the need 
for income generation and that of the delivery of public goods.  
 
There is perhaps no greater factor that has contributed more in exposing public 
research organisations to IPRs than the privatisation of research. Globalisation of 
R&D and the growing assertion of ownership of agricultural resources through the 
application of IPRs by both the private and the public sectors characterise the 
environment under which IARCs and other public research organisations currently 
operate.  
 
In the fields of agriculture and health, partnerships between the public and the private 
sector enjoy remarkable acclaim and are currently hailed as crucial strategies for the 
delivery of global public goods in the respective fields. PPPs are viewed as important 
institutional mechanisms that have immense potential to address complex 
development issues such as food security through the exploitation of synergies 
existing in the two sectors. In some of these instances, the use of IPRs by public 
research institutes may be key in achieving the goal of promoting access. This is 
particularly true where private sector partners are required for say, the development, 
manufacture and or distribution of public research. In international agricultural 
research for example, it is commonplace for IARCs to partner with seed companies 
for the multiplication and distribution of seed.  
 
In product development partnerships, IPRs facilitate the engagement of the private 
sector by providing crucial bargaining chips. IPRs are sometimes used to segment the 
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market thereby enabling the achievement of public goods goal particularly in 
developing countries. For example, IPRs to a technology may be traded off for 
contractual obligations to deliver the product to developing countries at a reasonable 
price, i.e. the developed markets can be traded for control of sales in developing 
markets so as to ensure that demand in the latter is met. An example in health is 
research in malaria where the ‘paying market’ is low, the research partners may trade 
any other disease use for control of the IP for the neglected disease; the commercial 
partners may acquire the rights to the foreground IP pertaining to all other diseases 
save for the pro-poor disease the partnership addresses.   
  
Although it is generally argued that patenting research tools inhibits further research 
and thereby limits innovation,43 Boettiger and Chi-ham44 argue that where access to 
complementary enabling technologies necessary to produce a product is blocked, an 
institution with a patent on one of the research tools required has more leverage than 
one that does not. They argue that ‘if an IP manager chooses not to patent an enabling 
technology... the ability to control its applications is lost.’45 Control of research 
products and tools then becomes a reason to seek IPRs. Policy questions of whether 
research tools should be patented aside, the reality is that public research 
organisations are more likely to patent enabling technologies now than they were in 
the past.  
 
The same applies to subsequent improvement patents. Contrasting an IP manager who 
chooses not to patent a technology to one who does, Boettiger & Chi-ham posit that in 
the former case, ‘improvements to the technology are subsequently invented and 
patented, restricting the uses of the original technology’. In the latter, ‘the value of the 
subsequent improvement patent would depend on access to the underlying dominant 
patent.’46 These examples demonstrate the ‘reactionary’ nature that some public 
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research institutes adopt in the current environment characterised by increasing 
privatisation of research.  
 
Legal developments in some countries have transformed the public research 
environment and catalysed the public sector’s engagement with IPRs. A ready 
example is the United States’ Bayh-Doyle Act of 1980 which altered the incentives 
for federally funded universities to patent their research and license it to the private 
sector in line with ‘translational research’ objectives. University-industry partnerships 
and collaborations in the US increased dramatically as did university patents 
following the implementation of the Act.  
 
Funding agreements with donors have similarly been known to expose public research 
institutes to IPRs by containing IP related clauses. It is not uncommon for funding 
agencies, particularly in product development public-private partnerships (PPPs), to 
reserve the right to retain control of the IP especially in late stage product 
development. This is often a safety net strategy to ensure production of the relevant 
technology in the event that a private sector partner forestalls the development of the 
designated product.  
 
The advent of the IP regime has had a significant impact on the international 
agricultural research conducted for example by the CG Centres. One of the ways in 
which this has occurred relates to the risk of seeking IP protection for CG germplasm 
by third parties. A number of high-profile cases occurring in the late 1990s bear 
evidence to this. In 1998, PBR applications were made in Australia for accessions 
obtained from two CG Centres.47 Research by the Action Group on Erosion, 
Technology and Concentration (the ETC group, then known as the Rural 
Advancement Foundation International, RAFI) indicates that there could be more 
cases of this nature.48 In developing countries, it is likely that such abuse of CG 
germplasm is carried out not only by the private sector in the form of the numerous 
small seed companies, but also by partners in National Agriculture Research Institutes 
(NARIs) in spite of the Material Transfer Agreements (MTAs) that are used to 
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transfer CG germplasm to third parties probably due to ignorance and lack of IP 
capacity in both parties. 
 
Protecting technology has in some cases attracted the involvement of the private 
sector. In some of the collaborations with the private sector, the probability of 
developing proprietary technology with significant commercial implications cannot be 
ruled out as an important incentive for the private sector. In other cases, private seed 
companies, recognising the competitively high quality of plant genetic material bred 
by the CG Centres, have been reluctant to distribute seed from the centres unless they 
can do so exclusively.   
 
Similarly, dealings with the private sector have heightened the need for public 
research institutions to be IP savvy not in the least because of the danger of infringing 
IP belonging to a third party and the requirement to obtain freedom to operate.  In 
other instances, IARCs use IPRs in order to ensure their technology is in the public 
domain. This is in accordance with the typical public research organisations’ IP policy 
objective.   
 
3.6 Alternatives to using IPRs 
 
With regard to income generation, although the sale of IP protected research products 
can be beneficial in funding research costs, there is little formal analysis of the 
significance of the gains from using IP protection as a strategy for generating new 
revenues for research.49 IARCs and other public research organisations can employ a 
number of ways to generate income to offset their budget deficit. Sale of non-research 
products and services such as soil and chemical testing, diagnostic tests, sale of 
commercial seed and vaccines and staff consultancies50 are income generating 
activities that are generally within the mandate of public research organisations.  
 
The preceding concedes that there are occasions where public research organisations 
have to apply or at least deal with IPRs. Clear guidelines have to be made and 
followed to ensure that pursuit of mandate is primal. These are only a snapshot of the 
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IP challenges that CG Centres have to address in the context of research, 
commercialisation and protection of their products. 
 
This section shows that there are only a few situations where IARCs’ exposure to 
IPRs is avoidable. For those situations where it is inevitable that IARCs and other 
public agriculture research institutions engage with IPRs, the challenge is to apply 
IPRs in a manner that mitigates IPR’s excludability effect thereby ensuring that the 
institution’s food security oriented mandate is not compromised.  
 
The scepticism of using IPRs in public agriculture research institutions including 
IARCs is rooted in the inherent theoretical conflict between IPRs and public goods as 
discussed in the preceding sections. The key lies in employing interventions, mainly 
through policy in the case of IARCs, that ensure goods to which IPRs have been 
applied remain in the public domain and accessible to particularly the poor 
communities the IARCs serve.  
 
Figure 3.2: Reversing the excludability effect  
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The figure above uses knowledge as an example of a public good. In step 1, IPRs are 
applied to knowledge (nonrival, nonexcludable). This theoretically moves the goods 
(knowledge) from the public goods realm into the club goods (according to the 
Samuelson/Musgrave classification) as IPRs embed excludability, but not rivalry, into 
the goods; the knowledge does not diminish on repeated usage. For IARCs whose 
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mandate is premised on maintaining its products in the public domain and in a manner 
than makes the products accessible to the public, step 2 is vital. This entails the 
creative exercise of IPRs which ensures the move of the protected goods from the 
club goods category back to the nonexcludable, nonrivalrous public goods category.  
 
Chapter four specifically looks at how IARCs can creatively exercise IPRs in order to 
mitigate the excludability effect and hence ensure their IPR protected technologies are 
in line with their public goods mandate.   
 
 3.7 IPRs and the centrality of food security  
 
In agriculture, excludability through the imposition of royalties and licence fees to 
protected agriculture products is not the only potential impact IPRs have on food 
security.51 The causes of food insecurity are varied and numerous. Attempts at 
defining food security acknowledge the importance of not only availability of food 
but also effective access and distribution of the available food and its appropriate 
utilisation.52 These three distinct factors —availability, access and utilisation— 
provide useful starting points in analysing the potential impact of IPRs on food 
security.  
 
The potential impacts of IPRs on food security mainly relate to the availability and 
access aspects. In the former, the issue is how IPRs affect the availability of food. 
This mainly relates to the incentives IPRs offer to food security oriented research. 
Regarding access to food, the role of IPRs mainly relates to economic factors such as 
the cost of seed. Some writers argue that at the individual and household level, it is 
this access aspect of food security that is most vulnerable to IPRs.53    
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Theoretically, by providing the possibility of appropriation of private profits, the IP 
system is an incentive for the private sector to play a part in predominantly public 
sector dominated agriculture research. As discussed in the previous chapter, this only 
has a potential positive effect on agriculture and food security if (i) it actually leads to 
increased private investment and (ii) if it is balanced against the public needs so that 
increased private sector presence does not distort research priorities to the detriment 
of food security attainment efforts.   
 
The impact of IPRs on plant breeding, the seed industry and on biotechnology is 
premised on the provision of incentives and has a direct effect on the availability 
aspect of food security. In plant breeding, there is an expectation that IPRs offer 
incentives for the commercial exploitation of open pollinated varieties, diversifying 
away from exclusive reliance on hybrids and their built-in ‘biological’ protection. 
There is evidence in the two study countries that the commercial seed industry places 
value on hybrids despite lack of legal protection. The link between IPRs and increased 
investment in agriculture is tenuous in the Kenya and India.54 
 
Discussions on the impact of IPRs on food security centre mainly on the access 
aspect. Concerns have been expressed over the potential impact of IPRs on traditional 
knowledge and the control and access to protected plant genetic resources by the 
resource poor in developing countries.  
 
The introduction of IPRs in agriculture raises concerns with regard to farmers’ control 
over their resources and knowledge. PBRs could potentially place restriction on the 
free exchange of germplasm and knowledge that has characterised farming 
communities in developing countries for many generations. Rural farming 
communities in developing countries still trade and exchange seeds locally. The origin 
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of many plant varieties can be traced to such exchange and selection.55 Practices such 
as on-farm experimentation and conservation ‘form the basis of food security and 
livelihoods of communities throughout the developing world.’56  
 
Other concerns relate to the potential increase in the cost of seed used by subsistence 
farmers. These form the bulk of the farming community in Kenya and India. The 
justification behind the introduction of PBRs is similar to that of patents: to act as an 
incentive encouraging plant breeding and to enable plant breeders recoup the costs of 
their activities by the collection of royalties. The imposition of royalties on protected 
seed, alongside the restriction on farmers to save and re-use seed, impacts directly on 
access to seed by farmers. As earlier seen, access to food is a major component of 
food security and therefore anything that increases the costs of seeds is a direct 
constraint to achieving food security. As discussed further in chapter five, the impact 
of IPRs on the cost of seed and the farming practices in Kenya and India is yet to be 
seen. 
 
In biotechnology, a major concern particularly in the public research community is 
that IPRs may stifle innovation rather than promote it through the use of broad claims 
on proprietary technology.57 Broad claims are favourable to the right holders but 
inhibit research by others. Public research institutions, particularly those working in 
developing countries, such as the CG Centres have to be IP savvy to ensure that they 
do not infringe IPRs belonging to third parties.58 
 
This risk has made international agriculture research centres wary of using 
technologies patented in donor countries in developing countries.59 Research 
organisations have to negotiate Freedom To Operate (FTO) agreements with right 
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holders to ensure that the former do not infringe on the rights of the latter. This 
increases the costs of research and with the prevailing low levels of public funds, this 
cost may be passed on to the public. The public research institution may also be 
discouraged by the high costs of negotiating over protected enabling technology and 
other research tools; this may inhibit crucial research with potential to contribute to 
the attainment of food security.    
 
Generally, a plant variety must be new, distinct, uniform and stable to qualify for 
PBRs. It has been argued that PBRs could potentially lead to replacement of diverse 
seed varieties adapted for local conditions, usually by local farmers, with genetically 
uniform modern varieties promoted by commercial seed companies.60 The 
homogeneity of crops is in part to blame for the lack of crops’ resistance to pest and 
diseases.61 PBRs could also potentially undermine food security in developing 
countries by promoting cultivation of a narrow range of genetically uniform crops, 
usually non-food cash crops,62 at the expense of food crops which are often the crux 
of food security in developing countries. 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
 
‘Publicness’ and ‘privateness’ in a good are not innate properties – goods move along 
the public good – private good continuum and can be provided by any sector. 
Agricultural research is an impure public good and as it yields goods with both public 
and private good characteristics.  
 
IPRs introduce excludability to public goods. There is an inherent theoretical conflict 
in the application of IPRs to public goods. Public research institutions such as the CG 
Centres increasingly find themselves in situations where they have to protect their 
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research products through IPRs or where they use products protected by third parties. 
The use of IPRs in public research could potentially compromise the public 
institutions’ mandates resulting in dire consequences for food security.   
 
The existence of IPRs however differs from its exercise. It is the latter that determines 
the effect that IPRs have on institutions’ mandates. Public research institutions need 
to exercise IPRs in a manner that does not compromise their public goods mandate. 
The next chapter looks at some of the ways that public agriculture research 
institutions can creatively exercise IPRs to ensure that their food security oriented 
mandates are not compromised.  
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Chapter Four  
 
Mitigating the tension between IPRs and food security 
oriented public goods research  
 
4.0 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter looked at the existence of IPRs and the potential impacts of this 
on food security and concluded that although an inherent theoretical tension exists 
between the concept of IPRs and the provision of public goods, a distinction can be 
made between the existence and the exercise of IPRs. It is the latter rather than the 
former than determines what effect IPRs have on an institution’s or partnership’s food 
security related objectives.  
 
This chapter addresses the exercise of IPRs and investigates how the excludability 
effect inherent in IPRs can be mitigated. It does this within the context of 
International Agricultural Research Centres (IARCs) and agricultural PPPs. In the 
first category, the main concern is how IARCs can apply IPRs while maintaining their 
public good food security oriented mandates and in the second, the concern is how 
agricultural PPPs can balance the public and private IP related interests.  
 
The way in which IPRs are exercised in IARCs within the CG system is influenced by 
the IP policies adopted at the system level. This chapter examines the policies to 
determine whether firstly, they contemplate the use of IPRs and the circumstances in 
which they do so and secondly, whether they allow for the creative exercise of IPRs 
thus facilitating the mitigation of the excludability effect of IPRs and ensuring the 
fulfilment of the Centres’ public goods mandate.  
 
The chapter argues that for the creative exercise of IPRs in a manner that balances 
public and private interests, institutions and partnerships must have IP capacity. This 
is particularly necessary in PPPs, IARCs and other public research institutions 
engaging in research with proprietary potential.  
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The chapter begins by outlining the IP guidelines and policies relating to the 
Consultative Group on International Agriculture Research (CGIAR or CG). The 
chapter then looks at examples of how IPRs have been exercised within the CG and 
elsewhere in a manner that mitigates the excludability effect before outlining IP 
related challenges in PPPs and ways in which these may be addressed. The final 
section looks at why IP capacity and IP management are important in PPPs and in 
public research institutions such as the IARCs.  
 
4.1 The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research  
 
The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR or CG), 
established in 1971, is an alliance of public and private donors made up of countries, 
international and regional organisations and private foundations that support the 
network of 15 International Agricultural Research Centres (IARCs). Membership of 
the CGIAR currently stands at 64 made up of 47 countries, 13 international and 
regional organisations and four foundations.  
 
The CG’s mission is ‘to achieve sustainable food security and reduce poverty in 
developing countries through scientific research and research-related activities in the 
fields of agriculture, forestry, fisheries, policy, and environment.’1 The CGIAR 
expressly states that it ‘generates global public goods that are available to all.’ The 
CGIAR was established largely in response to the concerns on famine and genetic 
erosion that dominated debates in the 1950s, 60s and 70s. The CGIAR is credited with 
the success of high yielding varieties’ that characterised the Green Revolution in Asia 
and parts of Latin America.   
 
Each of the CG Centres has its own legal identity and mandate usually in terms of 
commodities. These are represented in the table below. The first four were the 
original members of the system having been established before the CGIAR; the rest 
were founded or adopted by the CGIAR to strengthen its mission.  
  
 
                                               
1
 See the CGIAR website www.CGIAR.org  
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Table 4.1: CG Centres and their mandates 
Centre When founded 
(when joined 
CGIAR) 
Location Mandate/crop focus 
IRRI-International Rice 
Research Institute 
1960 (1971)  Los Baños, 
Philippines  
Rice 
CIMMYT-International Maize 
& Wheat Improvement Centre 
1966 (1971)  Mexico City, 
Mexico 
Maize, wheat 
CIAT-Centre for Tropical 
Agriculture 
1967 (1971)  Cali, Colombia  Tropical fruits & forages, 
common bean, rice & 
cassava 
IITA-International Institute for 
Tropical Agriculture 
1967 (1971)  Ibadan, Nigeria  Cowpea, soybean, bananas, 
plantain, yams, cassava & 
maize 
ICRISAT-International Centre 
for Research in Semi-Arid 
Tropics 
1972 (1972)  Hyderabad, 
India 
Chick peas, pigeon peas, 
groundnuts, pearl millet & 
sorghum 
CIP-International Potato Centre 1970 (1973)  Lima, Peru  Potato, sweet potato, 
Andean roots & tubers  
ILRAD-International 
Laboratory for Research on 
Animal Diseases* 
1973 (1973) Nairobi, Kenya  -  
IFPRI-International Food 
Policy Research Institute 
1974 (1979) Washington, 
DC 
Food policy 
ILCA-International Livestock 
Centre for Africa* 
1974 (1974) Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia 
-  
IPGRI-International Plant 
Genetic Research Institute# 
1974 (1974) Rome, Italy  Agricultural biodiversity 
WARDA-Africa Rice Centre 1970 (1975) Bouake, Cote 
d'Ivoire 
Rice 
ICARDA-International Centre 
for Agricultural Research in 
Dry Areas 
1975 (1975) Aleppo, Syria  Barley, lentil, faba bean, 
chickpea, bread wheat, 
durum wheat, pasture & 
forage legumes 
ISNAR-International Service 
for National Agricultural 
Research+ 
1980 (1980) The Hague, 
Netherlands  
-  
ICRAF-World Agroforestry 
Centre 
1977 (1991) Nairobi, Kenya Agro forestry 
CIFOR-Centre for International 
Forestry Research  
1993 (1993) Bogor, 
Indonesia 
Forest systems & forestry 
IWMI-International Water 
Management Institute 
1991 Colombo, Sri 
Lanka 
Water management 
World Fish Centre 1992 Penang, 
Malaysia 
Fish, fisheries & 
aquaculture 
*in 1994, ILRAD & ILCA merged to form ILRI – International Livestock Research Institute whose 
mandate is livestock research; its headquarters are in Nairobi.  
#in 2006, IPGRI changed its name to Bioversity International 
+in 2004, ISNAR dissolved and main programs moved to IFPRI 
Source: www.cgiar.org  
 
The CGIAR has five focus areas: 
(i) sustainable production of crops, livestock, fisheries, forests and natural 
resources  
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(ii) enhancing the national agricultural research systems through joint research, 
policy support, training and sharing knowledge 
(iii)germplasm improvement for priority crops, livestock, trees and fish 
(iv) germplasm collection including collecting, characterising and conserving 
genetic resources 
(v) fostering research on policies that have a major impact on agriculture, food, 
health, new technologies and the management and conservation of natural 
resources  
 
CG Structure and governance 
The CGIAR system is a loosely connected network of several components which 
include the Consultative Group, its Executive Council and partners; the Science 
Council and the independent IARCs supported by the CGIAR.  
 
The individual CG Centres are the full time research units through which the CGIAR 
fulfils its mission. Each Centre is legally constituted as an independent self governing 
institution with its own charter, constitution, research responsibilities and mandates. 
The Centres function under legal agreements signed between them and the host 
countries. They function interdependently as members of the CG system.  
 
4.2 International legal environment influencing CG system wide policies 
 
Material held by the CG Centres falls broadly under two categories: the Ex situ 
germplasm collection held in trust and otherwise known as designated germplasm; 
and breeding material developed by the individual Centres. Virtually all of the ex situ 
germplasm collection is from countries in the South. There has been considerable 
debate over the status of this genetic material, to whom the CG is accountable and 
whether or not it is subject to IP protection. 
 
Collectively, the CG Centres hold more than 650,000 accessions of crop, forage and 
agroforestry species collected from a variety of countries and held in trust for the 
international community. These accessions include wild species of plants, traditional 
varieties developed through many generations of selection by farmers, crop breeding 
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lines and improved varieties. ICRISAT holds about 114,000 accessions of its five 
mandate crops while ILRI has about 19,000 accessions relating to forages.2  
 
The CG accessions are the single largest accumulation of plant genetic resources for 
food and agriculture (hereinafter PGRFA) in the world and are vital for ensuring 
global food security. The accessions were collected initially as part of plant breeding 
programmes for the CG Centres but have since gained great global significance owing 
to their diversity and richness particularly with regard to traditional farmer-collected 
varieties, land races and wild relatives of crops.  
 
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) entered into force in 1994; The CBD 
is an international, legally binding framework for the conservation and sustainable use 
of biodiversity. The CBD was the first global agreement to cover all aspects of 
biological diversity: genetic resources, species and ecosystems and also the first to 
recognise that the conservation of biological diversity is an integral part of sustainable 
development. It has a direct bearing on all institutions in the field of conservation 
including the CGIAR. The CBD has three main objectives: the conservation of 
biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components, and the fair and equitable 
sharing of the benefits arising from such use.3 It acknowledges the sovereign rights of 
state parties over their own biological resources4 and requires access to be on 
‘mutually agreed terms’ and subject to ‘prior informed consent’.5 It provides for the 
sharing of benefits arising from biotechnologies with developing countries.6 
 
Although the CBD covered many outstanding issues relating to PGRs, further 
clarification on ex situ collections held by CG Centres was required. In 1994, the 
Centres placed their collections under the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation 
(FAO) under standard agreements signed between each CG Centre and FAO. This 
agreements governed the ex situ collections.  
 
                                               
2
 As at June 2006 
3
 Convention on Biological Diversity, (1992), 31 ILM 818, available at 
http://www.biodiv.org/convention/articles.asp 
4
 Article 3 
5
 Art 15(4) & (5) 
6
 Art 19(2) 
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The International Treaty succeeded the CG Centre-FAO agreements in 2006 on the 
signing of agreements between the fifteen accession-holding CG Centres and the 
International Treaty’s Governing Board. The Treaty establishes a Multilateral System 
for access and benefit sharing into which contracting parties are obliged to place plant 
genetic resources for food and agriculture (PGRFAs) under its management and 
control. The PGRFAs to be placed into the Multilateral System are listed in the 
Treaty’s Annex 1. 
 
According to the CG Centre-Governing Board agreement, ex situ PGRFA held by the 
Centres and listed in Annex 1 are to be distributed under the terms of the Treaty’s 
Standard Material Transfer Agreement (SMTA). The Centres began using the SMTA 
for this purpose in January 2007. At the Treaty’s Governing Board’s Second Session, 
it was decided that the Centres should also use the SMTA when transferring non 
Annex 1 PGRFAs collected before the Treaty entered into force. As from February 
2008, CG Centres use the SMTA for transferring all PGRFAs they hold in trust apart 
from non Annex 1 material collected after the Treaty entered into force. Below is a 
tabular comparison of the instruments governing various categories of PGRs in the 
old and new regimes.  
 
One can make a number of observations from these changes: firstly, the Treaty 
cleared the status of the ex situ accessions collected prior to the coming into force of 
the CBD. Secondly, divisions between categories of materials are maintained in both 
the old and new regimes although these change. For example, in the old regime, the 
division was mostly between accessions collected prior to and after the CBD came 
into force while in the new, the division mostly relates to Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 
and pre and post Treaty material. 
 
However in both regimes, the most important distinction is between Centre bred 
material (and more specifically, PGRFAs ‘under development’) and other ex situ 
collections. In the new regime, PGRFAs ‘under development’ are defined by the 
SMTA as materials derived and distinct from the original material under the 
Multilateral System that is not yet ready for commercialisation and which the 
developer intends to further develop or to transfer to another for further development. 
Breeding lines and improved germplasm would usually constitute this category. 
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Table 4.2: Governing documents in collections held by the CG Centres 
Category Old regime (before Treaty) New regime 
Ex situ collections • Pre-CBD collections status 
unclear 
• Post-CBD collections →CG 
Centre-FAO 1994 Agreement 
(MTA) 
• Treaty addresses PGRFAs only 
• Annex 1 →SMTA from 1 Jan077 
• Non-Annex 1 (pre-Treaty) →SMTA 
from 1 Feb088 
• Non-Annex 1 (post-Treaty) →terms 
agreed between CG Centre & country 
of origin/acquiring PGRFAs, CBD or 
other applicable law9 
Centre bred material • Governed by CG Centre 
specific MTA 
• Annex 1,10 Non-Annex 1 (pre-Treaty),  
Non-Annex 1 (post-Treaty) →same 
documents as those in the respective 
categories in ex situ collections above 
• PGRFAs ‘under development’  
→SMTA, at discretion of developer 
(Centre) & may be subject to 
additional conditions11 
Non PGRFAs • Pre-CBD collections status 
unclear 
• Post-CBD collections →CBD, 
Agreement between CG 
Centre & host country; other 
applicable laws 
• Not covered by Treaty; at discretion of 
Centre but subject to CBD, Agreement 
between CG Centre & host country; 
other applicable laws & may be 
subject to additional conditions  
 
Thirdly, the new regime does not reduce the number of governing documents 
although it extends to more categories of PGRs not covered under the old regime. 
Arguably, the old regime provided Centres with more latitude regarding formulating 
bespoke Centre-specific policies (including on IP) although this was hardly exercised. 
Under the new regime, Centres are legally bound to follow provisions under the 
SMTA and can only exercise creativity with regard to PGRFAs under development 
and PGRs not covered by the SMTA. In practice however, Centres are for the most 
part involved in developing new and improved lines and therefore flexibility in 
creating provisions relating to PGRFAs under development is more important than in 
any other category.  
 
A number of facts must be noted: (i) the SMTA covers only PGRFAs; those PGRs 
that are not for food and agriculture are not covered by the Treaty or indeed the 
                                               
7
 International Treaty art. 15(1)(a) 
8
 International Treaty art. 15(1)(b); IT/GB-2/07/13 and IT/GB-2/07/Report available at 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/ag/agp/planttreaty/gb2/gb2repe.pdf  
9
 International Treaty art 15(3) 
10
 The Treaty does not oblige the CG Centres to use the SMTA for this category; the CG alliance 
adopted the SMTA for this category as part of their policy to ensure consistency and limit the number 
of documents in use for transfer of PGRFA  
11
 The CG’s System-wide Genetic Resources Programme has developed a guide for the Centres’ use of 
the SMTA available at http://www.sgrp.cgiar.org/Docs/SMTA/Guide_SMTA.pdf  
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SMTA; PGRFAs are defined as ‘any genetic material of plant origin of actual or 
potential value for food and agriculture’; genetic material is defined as ‘any material 
of plant origin, including reproductive and vegetative propagating material, 
containing functional units of heredity’. It is unclear whether this definition includes 
research tools containing DNA or RNA e.g. DNA markers and primers which do not 
use material as PGRFA but rather as mapping tools and as marker assisted selection 
(MAS) tools, in vivo RNA which is used mainly as expression tools to confirm 
phenotype from genotype and genomic DNA which is generally used for DNA 
fingerprinting and building a DNA library/database. A strict reading of the SMTA 
would lead to an interpretation that these are not covered by SMTA as the uses are not 
‘for food and agriculture’.   
 
(ii) Facilitated access under the established Multilateral System is ‘solely for the 
purpose of utilisation and conservation for research, breeding and training for food 
and agriculture, provided that such purpose does not include chemical, pharmaceutical 
and/or other non-food/feed industrial uses’.12 Where Centres are requested to provide 
materials for purposes other than those covered by the Multilateral System, the SMTA 
should not be used. No guidance is currently in place as to what Centres should use 
when faced with such requests e.g. for PGRFAs such as rice with claimed nutritional 
or medical properties which are processed into a product that is then sold as a 
nutritional supplement or medicine.  
 
(iii) The SMTA is used to facilitate access under the Multilateral System to other 
Contracting Parties; the Treaty is silent on how Contracting Parties should deal with 
non-Contracting Parties as are the agreements between the Centres and the Treaty’s 
Governing Board. A significant number of parties involved in the transfer and 
acquisition of PGRFAs from and to the CG Centres are non-Contracting Parties e.g. 
plant breeding companies.  
 
The Centres have attempted to deal with these ambiguities through their system wide 
policies and through the Statement issued by the Centres on signature of the 
Agreements between the Centres and the Governing Board. Regarding uses other than 
                                               
12
 International Treaty art 12(3)(a) 
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‘for food and agriculture’, where it is likely that these will be incorporated in 
downstream improved PGRFA, Centres agree to use SMTA; Centres treat exchanges 
with non-Contracting Parties in the same way as those with Contracting Parties.  
 
4.3 IP policy in the CGIAR system 
 
Having looked at how the international legal environment influences general policies 
at the CG system level, and having established what instruments govern different 
category of materials, this section looks specifically at the IP provisions in the 
relevant governing instruments. The section pays particular attention to the SMTA 
and to the CG’s Guiding Principles on IP. Attention to the former is obvious; 
regarding the latter, in most of the incidences where the SMTA is not applicable, 
Centres use their discretion which is informed by their IP policies which are in turn 
influenced by the CG’s Guiding Principles.  
 
The CG contemplated developing Guiding Principles on IP as early as 1991. At the 
CGIAR’s Mid-Term Meeting in 1992, the CG agreed on a set of working principles 
on genetic resources and intellectual property. These were largely based on guiding 
principles adopted by the CG Centres in 1991. The 1992 guiding principles were 
revised following three international developments. Firstly, the CBD entered into 
force in 1993; secondly, an agreement signed in 1994 between the FAO and the CG 
Centres placed the latter’s ex situ germplasm collections under the auspices of the 
former. Thirdly, the TRIPs Agreement entered into force in 1995. These 
developments called for a revision of the 1992 guiding principles on IP.  
 
It was against this background that a panel on IP was convened in September 1994. 
The panel’s report was endorsed in the International Centres Week in 1994. The 
CGIAR’s Guiding Principles on IP and Genetic Resources emanated from the panel’s 
recommendations. The Guiding Principles were revised and endorsed in 1996. They 
address issues such as national sovereignty, farmers’ rights, biosafety and IP 
protection with respect to designated germplasm and Centre-bred products. 13  
 
                                               
13
 CGIAR., The Guiding Principles on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources available at 
www.cgiar.org  
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Since the 1996 revision, various developments affecting the conservation, exchange 
and use of genetic resources continued to evolve necessitating further revision of the 
Guiding Principles. At a meeting in 2000, the Directors General of the CG Centres 
considered the text of a revised version of the Guiding Principles observing that there 
had been different and conflicting interpretations concerning IP. In 2005, the Genetic 
Resources Policy Committee proposed the use of a template for IP policy statements 
to address the lack of standardisation of IP policies in CG Centres. The template ‘is 
not meant to replace previously approved policy guidelines but to provide a tool that 
Centres can use to verify that their existing statements address all of the core issues in 
a consistent and harmonious manner.’14  
 
As each Centre has its own mandate and governing body, policy setting in the CGIAR 
reflects the will of many institutions rather than one. The implementation of the 
policies is left to the individual Centres. The Guiding Principles on IP and Genetic 
Resources state that ‘the Centres will adopt specific policies for the distribution and 
use of improved germplasm and biotechnological products following the above 
Guiding Principles.’ 
 
The CG Centres signed agreements with the Governing Board of the International 
Treaty; system level IP policies are currently under review to reflect these recent 
developments.  
 
Three questions guide our analysis of the IP related provisions at the CG system level:  
(a) whether the CG Centres can seek IP protection for research products from both 
designated germplasm and for Centre bred material;  
(b) whether third parties can seek protection for research products from both 
designated germplasm and Centre bred material; and 
(c) the terms under which this is allowed 
 
 
 
                                               
14
 Final minutes of the Genetic Resources Policy Committee, 18th Session, Rome Italy, 29-31 August 
(2005) 
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4.3.1 Can CG Centres seek IPRs for research products from designated 
germplasm and Centre bred material? 
 
The CG Guiding Principles recognise that Centres may need to use IPRs and provide 
that Centres can only seek IP protection to: (a) support public and private partnerships 
which pursue mission-based research or which develop and apply research results; (b) 
assure ready access by others to research products developed or funded by the Centre; 
(c) ensure the Centre’s ability to pursue its research, together with its partners, 
without undue hindrance; (d) facilitate the transfer of technology, research products 
and other benefits to the resource poor including, where appropriate, through 
commercialisation or utilisation or research products; and (e) facilitate the negotiation 
and conclusion of agreements for access to proprietary technologies of use to the 
Center's research and in furtherance of its mission. The Principles also contemplate 
situations where Centres may impose conditions on the supply of their research 
products and state that these should be in harmony with the CGIAR and Center 
missions and objectives.  A template for IP Policy statements recently approved by 
the CG Committee on Genetic Resources Policy places emphasis on the Centres’ 
need for full disclosure into the public domain, sharing of materials, data and 
information generated by Centres. It exhorts that Centres should hold as their basic IP 
Policy the pursuit of publication and should only seek IPRs when necessary to serve 
the poor.  
 
The Guiding Principles emphasise that IP protection should not be seen as a means for 
securing financial returns although in some cases the reality is that IP protection may 
be a source of operating funds.  
 
4.3.2 Should CG Centres seek IPRs for research products from designated 
germplasm and Centre bred material? 
 
An instance where protection may be sought is if it helps promote collaborative 
partnerships which speed up the development of new products and services and 
facilitates their deployment to the end users – the poor farmers in developing 
countries. CG Centres may enter into agreement with right holders of protected 
material but only to facilitate access and availability of the material to developing 
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nations and only when the benefits of such collaboration outweigh the potential 
disadvantages. In all cases, the requirements mentioned above must be met.  
 
In deciding whether or not to seek IP protection, CG Centres must consider the 
transaction cost and the incident management burden.15 Even though monetary gain 
by itself should not determine the decision of the CG Centres whether or not to 
protect a technology, it is nonetheless important and should be considered in the 
decision making process.  
 
The Centre Directors’ Committee Statement to MTM 1998 on Genetic Resources, 
Biotechnology and Proprietary Science, identified areas that need further clarification. 
Among these was the issue of benefit sharing for IPRs on Centre bred material and 
whether and when to allow for IP protection on Centre-bred material where there was 
no significant input by the recipient or when more than one recipient in a country 
requests permission to apply for IPRs.16 This is yet to be addressed. 
 
4.3.3 Can third parties seek IPRs for research products from designated 
germplasm and Centre bred material? 
 
Under the CG Guiding Principles, designated germplasm is not subject to IP 
protection or legal claim by Centres or other recipients. This was further reaffirmed 
by the Centre Directors in the CDC Statement on the Guiding Principles on IPRs 
relating to Genetic Resources.  
 
Designated germplasm and Centre bred material can be used by recipients for 
breeding purposes, research and training. The recipients include the private sector. 
The recipients may seek protection for the resulting products of breeding through 
UPOV or other sui generis systems. The recipients cannot preclude others from using 
the original material. Unlike patenting which requires Centre approval, third parties 
                                               
15
 See Maredia, K. & Erbisch, F., ‘Capacity building in intellectual property management in 
agricultural biotechnology’ in Erbisch, F. & Maredia, K., (eds.)  Intellectual property rights in 
agricultural biotechnology (Oxon: CABI Publishing, 1998)  
16
 See Bragdon, S., ‘Recent intellectual property rights controversies and issues at the CGIAR’ in 
Santaniello, V., Evenson, R., Zilberman, D. & Carlson, G (eds.) Agriculture and intellectual property 
rights: economic, institutional and implementation issues in biotechnology (Oxon: CABI Publishing, 
2000) for discussion on the outstanding issues 
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do not need Centre permission to seek PBRs on research products from designated 
germplasm or Centre bred material. The Guiding Principles fail to address this.  
 
On collaborative research, the Guiding Principles require the collaborator or grantee 
to seek permission from the Centre before applying for any IP on the research 
products. Cells, organelles, genes and molecular constructs can be patented, even 
those isolated from designated germplasm. Where PVP is sought, it must be through a 
system that allows for breeders’ and researchers’ exemptions. With regard to 
derivatives, the Guiding Principles are mindful of retaining the freedom to operate 
and avoiding situations where they would have to license back their rights from 
assignees.  
 
The International Treaty takes CG Centres as both providers and recipients of the 
material under its ambit. Recipients of the PGRs under the Multilateral System are 
prohibited from claiming ‘any intellectual property or other rights that limit the 
facilitated access to the plant genetic resources for food and agriculture or their 
genetic parts or components in the form received from the Multilateral System.17 This 
qualifier is ambiguous and may be interpreted to allow the patenting of genes isolated 
and sequenced from the Multilateral System material as they would no longer be ‘in 
the form received’. 18 
 
The SMTA allows IP protection provided that it does not limit facilitated access of 
the material covered.19 A recipient who obtains IPRs on any products developed from 
the SMTA material or its components, is bound by the benefit-sharing obligations of 
the SMTA as is any assignee. Under article 6.7, a recipient who commercialises a 
product from SMTA material AND restricts access to the material for research and 
breeding is required to make payments into the system established by the Treaty. 
These provisions seem to be contradictory; on one hand, art 6.2 prohibits IP 
protection where it limits access but on the other, art 6.7 allows such protection (and 
commercialisation) provided the recipient makes payment. A company that breeds a 
                                               
17
 International Treaty, art 12(3)(d) (emphasis added) 
18
 There have been arguments that even if this is possible, it would not have a negative effect on access 
as a patent on a gene would most likely cover the isolated and purified gene but would not cover the 
gene as it occurs in nature; this is however dependent on the breadth of the patent claim.  
19
 SMTA, art 6.2 
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new PGRFA product using SMTA-covered germplasm acquired from a CG Centre, 
commercialises it and further restricts access is liable to make payment. PVP under 
UPOV does not restrict further use of protected material for research and breeding 
although some sui generis PVP may not have these exemptions. Other mechanisms 
for restricting access may be contractual agreements or technological restrictions such 
as the Genetic Use Restriction Technology (terminator technology).  
 
Patenting a variety derived from SMTA material does not automatically trigger 
mandatory payments. This has to (i) result in restricting further research and breeding 
AND (ii) be accompanied by commercialisation. The commercialisation requirement 
makes it absurd that recipients who restrict access to products derived from SMTA 
material are not legally bound to make payments unless they also commercialise the 
product. A recipient can patent cells, organelles, genes and molecular constructs from 
SMTA material, limit their access through use of broad claims and yet not have to pay 
the Centre or the Multilateral System.  
 
Under the SMTA, where a CG Centre is the material provider, IP enforcement is the 
Centre’s responsibility; the Centre is required to notify the IP office of the relevant 
country of the IP violation.20    
 
Access to PGRFA under development is at the discretion of the developer during the 
period of development. Centres are allowed to impose additional conditions relating 
to further product development; this may include provisions on IP and appropriate 
monetary payment. On expiry of the protection period of IPR on a product 
incorporating material accessed from the Multilateral System, the recipient is 
encouraged but not obliged to place a sample of the product into the Multilateral 
System. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
20
 Statement of CG Centres on signing agreements with the International Treaty’s Governing Board 
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4.3.4 Do CG Centres have the authority to allow third parties to seek IPRs for 
research products from designated germplasm and Centre bred material? 
 
Before the inception of the International Treaty, there was considerable debate on the 
question of the Centres’ authority to permit third parties to exploit genetic resources 
held in trust. Under the trustee principle, a trustee’s duty is to keep control of and 
preserve trust property. One of the issues arising from this is whether a CG Centre can 
permit a third party to secure IP rights over germplasm held in trust.21 This question 
does not seem to have been answered directly by the CGIAR at the policy level 
although it can be argued that if the ultimate end of allowing third parties to seek IP 
protection for research products from designated germplasm and Centre bred material 
is to benefit the poor, and facilitate the CG Centre fulfil its mandate, then it would 
appear that the CG Centre would be acting within its trustee obligations. As the 
various policy documents currently stand, this issue of trusteeship does not seem to be 
appreciated thereby allowing for the IP protection of material by third parties for their 
own commercial interests. 
 
The International Treaty and SMTA are understandably preoccupied with establishing 
the Multilateral System rather than specifically addressing IPRs. Issues regarding IP 
protection, commercialisation and restriction of access need clarification and need to 
be addressed from an IP perspective in addition to the remunerative perspective that 
they currently take. These however need not be done by the International Treaty; it is 
clearly upon the CG system to tackle this and offer concise and clear guidelines to the 
constituent Centres.  
 
Generally, the SMTA and Guiding Principles envisage Centres’ engagement with IP. 
However, each of these read as a whole, reveal stark ideological differences. The 
SMTA leans to the ‘right’: it allows providers and recipients to seek IPRs with only a 
weak rider regarding payments to the Multilateral System. The Guiding Principles on 
the other hand are firmly planted to the left: they are conservative about aggressively 
using IPRs, seeking IPRs appears to be the exception to the rule. They are more 
                                               
21 See Blakeney, M., ‘Agricultural research: intellectual property and the CGIAR system’ in Drahos, P. 
& Mayne, R., (eds.), Global intellectual property rights: knowledge, access and development 
(Hampshire: Pelgrave Macmillan, 2002) for more discussion of the trustee principle  
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public-good-mandate-friendly and explicitly state that ‘to remain true to its mission, 
the CGIAR has a responsibility to be alert to …[IPR] changes and to be ready to 
adopt new tools and strategies that enable it to keep faith with its mission.’ The public 
goods mission is central to any revisions of the Guiding Principles. Moreover, as a 
general philosophy ‘The management of intellectual property by Centres will be 
guided by the CGIAR mission to contribute to food security and poverty eradication 
in developing countries through research, partnerships, capacity building and policy 
support.’   
 
Whereas the SMTA is not unsupportive of public goods mandate, it is not explicitly 
cognisant of this, at least not from an IP perspective. The result of the IP related 
policies at the CG system level is that a tension though not conflict exists between the 
two main governing/guiding instruments. This need not be detrimental to the CG 
Centres; it provides a ‘widened space’ within which individual Centres can exercise 
freedom regarding where and how to align their institutional IP policies.     
 
4.4 Reconciling private rights and provision of public goods 
 
Chapter three looked at potential reasons why, and circumstances where, public 
research organisations use intellectual property rights or are exposed to dealing with 
IPRs. Summarised, these are income generation, facilitating the delivery of research 
products to the public via the private sector, obtaining leverage with the private 
sector, avoiding infringing technologies protected by third parties and in order to 
acquire research products in the public domain. Income generation is not a main 
factor influencing IARCs’ decision on whether or not to seek IP protection of its 
products. In the other instances above, it is may be more difficult to substitute other 
practices for the use of IPRs.  
 
This requires the creative exercise of IPRs. The excludability effect of IPR 
encumbered technology can be mitigated by policy and institutional changes. 
Consider that Microsoft in 2006 released 500 ICT patents before their expiry. CABI 
(a not-for-profit organisation specialising in scientific research, publishing and 
communication) agreed to put its books on the internet six months after their 
publication and on CD free of charge for developing countries. Private biotech firms 
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have in some cases allowed freedom to operate (FTO) provisions to facilitate the use 
of IP protected technology in developing countries where it is unlikely that their 
commercial interests will be affected.22 In 2000, Harold Vamus, Patrick Brown and 
Michael Eisen proposed the publication of high quality scientific journals under open 
access free PLoS journals. This system has proved to be successful; a publication in a 
PLos journal almost has the same impact factor as that that in Science or Nature.23 
 
These few examples illustrate that the existence of IPRs need not impair the provision 
of protected technology to the public; the policies underlying these decisions mitigate 
the excludability effect introduced when IPRs are applied to goods.  
 
The exercise of IPRs in a manner ensuring that protected products are maintained in 
the public domain as much as possible goes beyond the creation of ‘public domain 
friendly’ policies. Whilst this is an important first step, implementation of those 
policies and agreements is crucial in balancing the equation between public goods and 
private rights. The use of IPRs in the CG Centres is relatively recent; most research 
projects with potential or actual proprietary technology are ongoing and it could take 
a while before the effect of using IPRs is seen downstream. 
 
An example of a completed project which illustrates the exercise of IPRs in this 
regard is the Golden Rice project. This was a product development partnership 
between the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI, one of the CG Centres) and 
various private partners whose objective was to create rice fortified with beta-carotene 
in order to address the pervasive vitamin A deficiency in rice growing regions. The 
freedom to operate review showed that about 70 patents (including applications) were 
applicable to the improved rice. This potential constraint was resolved by ‘a 
straightforward IP management strategy’. Krattiger and Potrykus report that ‘contrary 
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 Heselmans, M., Jonge, B., Vroom, W., Louwaars, N., ‘Sharing biotechnology with developing 
countries’ start document for the symposium ‘Reconsidering intellectual property policies in public 
research’ Wageningen University, 11 April (2008) 
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to what many commentators state, the licensing process was relatively uncomplicated, 
with the involvement of commercially experienced people.’24 
 
Judging from the number of patents involved and the number of licenses issued, the 
process could only have been uncomplicated because of the involvement of 
commercially and IP savvy people (public relations and other factors aside). 
Moreover, a lot of the IP capacity particularly regarding negotiation must have been 
from the private sector: ‘These core patents were licensed to Zeneca… [which] then 
negotiated access to all possible necessary patents, including intellectual property 
from [other companies].’25     
 
The Zeneca-led negotiations resulted in all the companies providing access to their 
technologies ‘free of charge for defined humanitarian research and use of Golden Rice 
in developing countries.’26 Golden Rice is available under humanitarian use which is 
defined as use in developing countries by resource-poor farmers (earning less than 
US$10,000 per year from farming). This provision is an example of how the 
excludability effect of IPRs can be reversed to ensure the public’s access to protected 
technology.  
 
Another example of creative exercise of IPRs is a partnership between Donald 
Danforth Plant Science Centre (a US not-for-profit plant sciences research institute), 
Sathguru Management Consultants and the International Crops Research Institute for 
Semi Arid Tropics (ICRISAT, a CG Centre) for the development of groundnuts 
resistant to tobacco streak virus, a disease that decimated groundnut production in 
India with losses of more than US$65million in 2000. The partnership acquired coat 
protein (CP) technology (vital for conferring resistance to the viral infection) from 
Monsanto through a non-assert agreement. This allowed the CP technology to be used 
for non profit public good. The CP technology is available free of royalties and 
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upfront payments to public institutions planning to develop the varietal groundnut.27  
The partnership was able to negotiate for the CP technology from Monsanto through a 
non-assert agreement demonstrating the need for IP capacity. The non-assert 
agreement itself is an example of how protected technology can be made available to 
the public while mitigating the excludability effect of IPRs.  
 
Open source biotechnology is another option increasingly cited as having the potential 
to mitigate the excludability effect in IPRs thereby balancing private rights with the 
provision of public goods.28 Similar to the open source software model, this entails 
pooling together technologies which are then made freely available under specified 
terms. The practical workings of open source biotechnology are however yet to be put 
to test.  An often cited example of open source biotechnology is CAMBIA’s open 
technology bank called BIOS. CAMBIA is an Australian non profit organisation that 
engages in life sciences based research. BIOS is a technology development and 
sharing initiative where protected technology is freely available for users who have to 
contribute the improvements they make to the core toolkit under the terms of the 
Biological Open Source Licence.29 
 
The use of non-assert agreements, humanitarian licenses and other contracts that 
ensure the public goods mandate of public research organisations is not compromised 
requires IP capacity including that in drafting appropriate clauses and contracts, IP 
negotiation with third parties and research partners and overall IP management. The 
same goes without saying in establishing or being involved in any open source 
arrangement.  
 
4.5 Challenges in balancing IPRs and the provision of public goods  
 
PPPs must pursue IP strategies that will maximise the social value of their proprietary 
products. However, PPPs encounter various IP challenges; these may be due to the 
differences in IP ideology and practice as is discussed in chapter five or may generally 
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be influenced by the partnership’s structure, the nature of research and the technology 
involved. In product development PPPs, most of these tend to be of a highly practical 
nature. The central challenges are ensuring high quality and low cost production, 
sustained supply, affordable pricing and effective delivery of products while meeting 
the partnership’s social goals. Agricultural PPPs are breaking into completely new 
territory with their IP negotiations. Some lessons can be learnt from the health sector 
which has had relatively more experience with product development partnerships; 
some of the examples below are drawn from the health sector and are useful in 
providing insights into the workings of PPPs in an IP context. 
 
A basic IP issue relates to the negotiation on the ownership of both background IP and 
IP created with PPP resources. This is particularly challenging where a partnership’s 
membership is staggered or where there are various background IPs owned by 
individual partners in the PPP. The partnership has to make decisions regarding the 
terms under which to own or to share the IP created through the research it has 
funded. Generally, pre-existing knowledge is licensed or donated to the partnership by 
the right holding partner. The partnership must agree on the terms under which this 
occurs. As a general rule of thumb, partnerships own the IP for the products they 
create. The Medicines for Malaria Venture (a health PPP) employs a ‘keep what you 
fund’ IP strategy in this regard: it owns any of the IP created through the research it 
has funded. The ownership of IP created by the partnership may be joint or single or 
held by a combination of some partners and not others; this has to be agreed to by all 
the parties.  
 
Partners must agree on the logistics (such as which partner files, who bears the costs 
and in what proportion) of filing and payment of costs for joint patent applications. In 
a partnership between UC Berkeley, One World Health and Amyris for improved 
production of a natural product treatment for malaria, patent costs for UC Berkeley’s 
pre-existing patents are shared between the other two partners while UC Berkeley’s 
patents on IP arising from collaborative research may be filed by UC Berkeley and 
licensed to either of the other two partners or both; the costs for these are shared by 
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the licensee on a pro rata basis. In other words, UC Berkeley does not pay for the 
costs of its patents.30  
 
PPPs also have to determine the terms on which their commercial partners can retain 
control of the IP. This is usually through licensing. Strategies ensuring that PPP 
activity is not held up are vital to the accomplishment of the partnership’s objectives. 
Partners need to reserve the right to retain control of the IP especially in late stage 
product development to ensure production of the relevant technology. When in-
licensing products or technologies, PPPs may seek to control rights to out source the 
project to third parties. It is important for the PPP to hold on to IP rights in the early 
stages so as to have more to bargain with in the later stages. The International Aids 
Vaccine Initiative (IAVI) arranges contracts with commercial partners so that if the 
latter choose not to continue development, IAVI gains access to any background 
patents it needs to be able to produce the product and continue development through a 
new partner. Kettler and Towse propose establishing explicit volume deals with the 
private sector partner; should the partner fail to manufacture the product at the 
volumes needed to meet the developing country need, the PPP can acquire the rights 
to the process and use contract manufacturers to meet the supply needs.31 Oehler 
advocates for the use of milestones in initial licensing agreements to ensure that key 
goals are met along the product development pathway.32  
 
For a PPP with primarily social objectives, nonexclusive licenses of the partnership’s 
final product to other parties are preferred as opposed to exclusive licenses. Licenses 
can also be royalty free. This is mainly to ensure the timely delivery of the product 
through a variety of licensees. In the partnership between IAVI and the Indian 
Council of Medical Research (ICMR, an Indian government agency), both parties 
jointly own all new IP generated by the partnership. ICMR has the exclusive right to 
use all IP to benefit India and other named countries. ICMR grants nonexclusive 
royalty free and sub-licensable licenses to all new IP arising out of the project to 
selected third parties in order to make, use, sell and import HIV/AIDS vaccine in 
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countries other than those covered by the agreement.33 Sometimes non exclusive 
licenses are used to ensure competition thereby lowering the price of the final product.  
 
Besides the usual IP challenges encountered in product development, PPPs have to 
contend with issues around balancing individual partners’ objectives and the 
partnership’s mutual objectives. It is presumed that the public sector partner’s 
objectives are met by the PPP’s public goods goal; how can private sector partners 
benefit from the partnership? One way that IP strategy can help achieve this is 
through technology and market segmentation. Where a technology has many potential 
uses e.g. across certain diseases, the IP may be shared according to disease use 
especially if the partnership is addressing a particular neglected disease affecting the 
poor. The private sector partner may acquire the IP rights to use the technology for 
diseases other than the neglected disease. In the UC Berkeley-One World Health-
Amyris partnership, Amyris has licenses for non-malaria indications of the protected 
technology.34  
 
Partnerships may also share IP on the basis of current and future improvements of the 
technology. The private sector partner can acquire rights to the improvements made to 
the technology. For example, where a transgenic plant is protected, IP rights to make 
use and sell the technology might include the rights to the crosses made with that 
plant, or may include the right to use individual components of the genetic construct 
in other constructs and other transgenic plant events.  
 
A more common IP strategy used to satisfy both public and private sector partners is 
that of segmenting the market through tiered pricing; private sector partners retain 
control of the IP to use in the ‘paying world’ while the public sector partners control 
the use of the technology for the developing country markets. The rationale is to 
reduce the financial barriers to technology access for low income markets while 
providing commercial parties with a profitable market in richer countries. This is 
common in global health partnerships particularly those dealing with vaccine 
development such as IAVI mentioned above: ICMR has the exclusive rights to use IP 
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developed in the partnership for use in India and other named countries while IAVI 
retains the rights to use the IP rights with respect to the rest of the world.  
 
In sharing royalties from final products, especially where background IP from some 
parties is involved, PPPs have to work out, preferably at the onset, the proportions for 
royalty payments. Parties should negotiate to avoid unrealistic expectations brought 
about by royalty stacking. This is when several different owners of IP expect a royalty 
the sum of which may make commercialisation economically unfeasible. Pro rata 
sharing or fixed fee payments may be used to address royalty stacking related 
problems.  
 
Other mechanisms of assembling IP to ensure easier access to inventions from third 
parties includes the use of patent pools; these allow for cross licensing of rights, and 
provide a framework for out-licensing the pooled IP to third parties. There is however 
virtually no experience in patent pools in both health and agriculture PPPs and their 
application and success is yet to be seen.35  
 
4.6 Intellectual property management  
 
There are many reasons why IARCs and PPPs with social welfare objectives such as 
the achievement of food security should invest in IP management and building IP 
capacity.  Firstly, as discussed above and in the previous chapter, the way in which 
IPRs are exercised is more important than their mere existence. For IARCs and food 
security oriented PPPs, the provision of public goods is central to their respective 
missions and objectives. This means that appropriate IP strategies must be adopted 
that will allow for the creative exercise of IPRs in a manner that achieves the food 
security related objectives in the context of private rights. IP management is a 
fundamental element in the public sector’s strategy of putting IP to work for the 
public good. This requires an appreciation of the competing interests in the provision 
of public goods through use of private rights and is particularly important in PPPs 
which in addition, have to maintain the interest of the private sector. Kettler and 
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Towse argue that the most important strategic tool in a PPP is the partnership research 
contract, particularly the conditions on IP:  
 
“PPPs must be as aggressive in the way they use IP as any commercial 
unit but for a different purpose – namely to pursue their social 
objective…This involves the negotiation of creative IP arrangements 
that do not scare off companies but also allow the PPP enough control 
to ensure their ultimate objective, a difficult challenge.”36  
 
Balancing the competing interests can only be achieved by the engagement of 
personnel with appropriate IP skills and knowledge. Failure to invest in IP capacity 
may result in skewing the power relations between the public and private sector 
partners in the case of PPPs. For IARCs and other public research organisations, lack 
of IP capacity may result in misuse of the institutions’ intellectual assets by third 
parties, infringement of third party IP by the institutions and loss of opportunities to 
partner with others who may help the institutions achieve their respective missions.  
 
In PPPs, the public and private sector perspectives on IPRs as a concept differ. The IP 
management practices and strategies also differ across the two sectors as is discussed 
in chapter five. The rationales for food security PPPs are discussed in greater detail in 
chapter six. The main rationale is found to be the complementarity of synergies 
between the two sectors. The concept of synergy has its basis the assumption that 
partnership arrangements can achieve more than the individual agents involved could 
independently. Ideally, parties in a PPP have to find the middle ground in order to 
achieve their mutual objectives. PPPs have the potential to amplify or ease the tension 
between the use of IPRs and the provision of public goods. Successful PPPs are those 
that manage to mitigate the excludability effect of IPRs to ensure the achievement of 
the partnership’s social welfare goals while at the same time ensuring that the 
respective partners’ goals and expectations are met. This involves continual 
negotiation to balance the IP interests of the partners involved. This can only happen 
if there is IP capacity.  
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Every research institution has some form of intellectual assets which it may decide to 
convert to intellectual property. “IP” therefore contains both the concept of private 
creativity and the concept of public protection for the results of that creativity.37 
Intellectual assets in themselves are important not in the least because of their 
potential to be converted to IP. Management must be seen in the light of both 
intellectual assets and intellectual property.   
 
Management of intellectual assets involves more than the protection and exploitation 
of IP. Given the growing importance of IP in the knowledge economy, failing to 
manage it may expose an institution to serious risk: firstly, there is the danger that the 
institution’s IP might be unlawfully appropriated by third parties and equally 
important is ensuring that the institution does not infringe IP belonging to others. An 
institution’s IP management functions must be integrated into its wider institutional 
management functions.38  
 
IP management increases the effectiveness of partnerships. It allows technologies to 
be transferred not only in one direction but in more complex ways and thus increasing 
the partnership’s potential to benefit more people. This is particularly important in 
product development partnerships involving multiple partners. IP management and IP 
capacity facilitates the adoption of creative licensing practices such as those discussed 
in the section above. These have the potential to maximise the social benefits arising 
from PPPs.  
 
For IARCs and other public research organisations, building and increasing IP 
capacity and management may allow the institution to seize new opportunities and 
take advantage of previously unavailable options:  
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“Without effective IP management, the public sector risks squandering the 
… powers that the … IP system provides. Intellectual property is a tool, 
and the impact of a tool depends on who uses it, how it is used, and for 
what purpose.”39  
 
IP management includes building IP capacity, clarifying the role of institutions, 
developing an inventory of intellectual assets, developing ownership of IP where 
appropriate, undertaking technology transfer and marketing the IP.40  
 
Various options regarding IP capacity are available to IARCs in the CG. These may 
engage the services of the Central Advisory Services on IP (CAS-IP), a CG agency 
offering IP advisory services to the CG Centres. These are usually given on a request 
basis. CG Centres also have the option of hiring or outsourcing IP counsel. These 
options should however be in addition to having in house IP management and 
capacity.  
 
In house IP capacity would address other intellectual asset management aspects that 
are vital to an institution. These include developing and implementing an institution’s 
IP policy and guidelines, educating scientific and other research staff in IP and its 
implications on their work, identifying intellectual assets and carrying out IP audits 
and providing continued hands-on IP staff training. Some of these functions may 
require collaboration with external IP counsel.  
 
Increasing IP capacity in public research institutions is important in building networks 
in technology transfer and licensing. This is particularly important for institutions 
such as the CG Centres which have a shared food security oriented mission. In house 
IP practitioners could exchange ideas and experiences, work towards establishing best 
practices and identifying performance standards for the CG system, their respective 
institutions and even specific projects. Increasing IP capacity in such institutions can 
raise the quality of debate from the existence of IPRs to the exercise of IPRs. It can 
help achieve a common perspective on IPRs across the system and assist CG Centres 
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in refining and streamlining their IP policies and practices in a manner that outsourced 
IP counsel cannot. CAS-IP attempts to bring IP personnel from the CG Centres 
together to facilitate exchange of experiences and ideas. It is however unclear whether 
these IP personnel have enough capacity to influence the IP policies at a system and 
institutional level. The risk of this is lack of ownership of the ‘top-down’ policies and 
a break in the implementation chain as IP personnel struggle to put into effect policies 
into which they had no input.    
 
One of the decisions that IARCs, other public research institutions and PPPs have to 
make in the context of management of intellectual assets is whether or not to convert 
the intellectual assets to IPRs. This is usually on a case by case basis although 
underlying IP policies (and research agreements in the case of PPPs) have a direct 
influence on the institution’s or partnership’s IP management strategy. For PPPs, it is 
vital that parties are involved in negotiating a balanced research agreement. This can 
only be possible if there is requisite IP capacity in all the partners involved. Failure to 
have the prefatory IP capacity risks having an uneven IP platform from which a 
project is launched. This could have grave implications including compromising the 
social welfare goals of a PPP.   
 
In deciding whether or not to seek IP protection, IARCs and public research 
organisations have to consider certain factors. Maredia and Erbisch41 summarise these 
as: what type of IP should be sought?  How should the institute use its protected 
technology – should it license it to others to generate income, license it to others 
royalty free, or use it as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the private sector? 
Where technology is protected by third parties, a public research institute has to 
decide whether it should license the technology or invent around it; where the 
institution negotiates a license with a third party right holder, it has to decide what 
terms and conditions to include in order to allow for its freedom to operate. Decisions 
such as these can only be made where there is sufficient IP capacity.  
 
Establishing a technology transfer office (TTO) is often suggested to facilitate 
commercialisation of research. Agriculture research institutions must be aware of the 
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costs of establishing and running a TTO. Technology transfer will not make any 
institution rich because building a robust programme requires sustained financial 
investment; strategies to set up and operate a TTO must be firmly grounded in 
realistic economic expectations. A TTO requires carefully planned and consistent 
long-term financial and administrative support. A critical mass of R&D activity is 
necessary to justify the costs of a fully functioning TTO. Public research institutions 
particularly those in developing countries may decide to share costs among a 
consortium of research institutions. This however presents many challenges but can 
be managed by clearly articulating policies on ownership, the distribution of income 
from commercialised technology and the mechanisms for the prevention and 
resolution of conflicts of interest.  
 
Where the costs of running a TTO do not justify the benefits, a research institution 
should not establish one. Decisions on whether to seek IP protection should be taken 
on a case by case basis. Research institutions must be aware of the financial and 
human resource costs associated with IP protection. These include administrative 
costs related to filing a PVP or patent application, the application fees, the costs for 
testing, conducting searches and other attendant costs, and renewal fees.   
 
Although CG Centres and most NARIs (national agriculture research institutes) in 
developing countries have a variety of options for protection of agriculture related 
proprietary technology, most of the institutions have preferred to follow a defensive 
publishing and other non-IPR strategies in order to keep inventions in the public 
domain.42 It appears that this is adopted as the default in many NARIs and in some 
CG Centres as discussed in chapter six. Two presumptions can be made from this 
observation. Firstly, it is possible that defensive publishing as a default IP strategy is 
done out of a lack of understanding and appreciation of the difference between the 
existence and exercise of IPRs. Secondly, it is possible that defensive publishing and 
other related strategies are adopted as informed decisions and in full appreciation of 
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the financial and human costs required in seeking IP protection. In the first instance, 
the inference is that these institutions do not have adequate IP capacity that would 
allow them to formulate and execute policies which facilitate the creative exercise of 
IPRs without compromising the institutions’ public goods mandate. In the second 
case, the inference is that the institutions have sufficient IP capacity not only to 
appreciate the difference between the existence and exercise of IPRs but also to 
conduct cost-benefit analyses regarding IP protection.  
 
Although focussed and conclusive studies are yet to be conducted on IP capacity and 
management strategies in agricultural public research institutions in developing 
countries, anecdotal evidence, including that garnered by the author, suggests that the 
first presumption is more likely: some IARCs and agricultural public research 
institutions in developing countries pursue defensive publishing and other such 
strategies as the default due to lack of IP capacity in using alternative creative 
strategies that would still ensure the achievement of their food security oriented 
mandates. Of course this is not to say that increasing IP capacity would change the 
institutions’ IP strategies and practices; it may well be the case that even where IP 
capacity is sufficient, the institutions would not abandon defensive publishing and 
other related IP strategies entirely. This is due to the influence of cost and related 
factors.       
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
As we have seen, CG IP policies are in part influenced by the International Treaty, 
general principles underlying conventions such as the CBD and the CG’s public 
goods mandate. Although the tone underlying the IT’s SMTA (through which most of 
the CG held material is transferred) and the CG’s Guiding Principles is different, both 
allow for the mitigation of the excludability effect of IPRs and acknowledge the use 
of IPRs in the CG Centres. Moreover, as the discussion above clearly illustrates, the 
Guiding Principles are broad enough to allow individual Centres to creatively exercise 
IPRs in a manner that balances their public goods mandate against that of potential 
private partners.  
 
 103 
Using IPRs in food security research need not exclude the poor from accessing the 
benefits from research. This chapter has illustrated that there are examples of creative 
exercise of IPRs by public agricultural research institutions and in PPPs particularly 
product development partnerships. These include the use of non-assert agreements 
and licensing provisions that guarantee end products are accessible to the poor while 
meeting the needs of the commercial partners.  
 
Indeed, as the chapter shows, IP capacity is vital and central to all agricultural public 
research institutions, such as those discussed above, which have food security 
oriented mandates. Such institutions must invest in IP capacity to ensure the 
formulation and execution of creative IP policies and agreements, which in turn, will 
guarantee the fulfilment of the institutions’ public goods mandate. Moreover, where 
PPPs are concerned, IP capacity is vital in negotiating research and partnership 
agreements, in executing them and in dealing with other downstream commercial 
partners.  
 
 104 
Chapter Five 
 
The role of IP law in food security oriented PPPs 
 
5.0 Introduction 
 
The preceding two chapters have argued that it is not the existence of IPRs but their exercise 
which influences the delivery of public goods and in the context of food security oriented 
PPPs, the achievement of their social welfare related goals. Progressing with this theme, this 
chapter distinguishes between IP on two levels: one, the (vertical) influence of the 
international IP regime on national legislation and two, the (horizontal) application or 
expression of IP between collaborating parties in the case of PPPs.  
 
Undoubtedly, the international IP regime has influenced national law; the TRIPs Agreement 
single-handedly imposed minimum standards that all WTO members must provide for the 
protection of intellectual property. This chapter examines how the international IP regime is 
implemented in Kenya and India and how this affects the conduct of research in food security 
oriented PPPs in their jurisdictions.  
 
Some scholars have suggested that pro-poor agricultural PPPs are constrained by different 
and sometimes conflicting incentive structures.1 As a subset of ‘incentive structures’, IP 
could potentially constrain the success of food security partnerships. In PPPs generally, the 
public sector’s understanding and interpretation of IP—firstly, as a concept, secondly, as 
expressed in international and national instruments and thirdly, as it related to the sector’s 
mandate—substantially differs from that of the private sector’s. These differing perspectives 
may influence the conduct of research in a PPP.  
 
This chapter presents a typology of IP users and their perceptions on IP. This typology is 
used in the succeeding chapter to map the variations in IP related perceptions in the 
respective case studies.  
                                               
1 Spielman, D. & Grebmer, K., Public-private partnerships in international agricultural research: an analysis of 
constraints, Journal of Technology Transfer 31/2 (2006) 291 
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The ultimate objective of this chapter is to determine the impact of IP legislation on the case 
studies. Combining the findings from the preceding two chapters and the vertical-horizontal 
distinction, this chapter argues that the existence of international and national IP regimes are 
not nearly as important in the conduct of research in food security PPPs as institutional 
policies and the partnership agreements adopted by institutions operating within these 
regimes. What matters are not the international or national IP regimes but the actors’ different 
IP perceptions and how these are expressed in the partnerships. Capacity is especially vital at 
this level.  
 
5.1 International IP regime relevant to agricultural R&D 
 
IPRs are an economic creation granted to inventors of intangible property to protect their 
innovations and creations and to reward innovative and creative activity. As a concept, IPRs 
have not been problematic; what has been contentious is the nature of their meaning and the 
various interpretations with varying results and implications for different groups and 
jurisdictions. This chapter deliberately omits the background and history to the various 
international instruments establishing the IP regime; it adopts a legal and technical approach 
in examining the relevant international legal instruments. 
 
5.1.1 The TRIPs Agreement 
 
A lot has been said about patentable subject matter under TRIPs article 27 and particularly 
the exceptions under article 27(3)(b). In the interest of clarity and brevity, this part restricts 
itself to three issues: (i) whether agriculture biotechnology inventions fall under patentable 
subject matter as prescribed by article 27; (ii) the scope of, limits to and exclusions from 
patentability; and (iii) what plant varieties are for the purpose of article 27(3)(b) and how this 
has been implemented in the host countries of the case studies. 
 
5.1.1.1  TRIPs Article 27 
 
Article 27(1) obliges WTO members to provide for the protection of inventions, whether 
products or processes, in all fields of technology by way of patents. To be patentable, the 
inventions must be new, involve an inventive step and be capable of industrial application. 
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This requirement is however subject to exemptions provided under article 27(2) and 27(3). 
The former allows for exemption in order ‘to protect order public or morality, including to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the 
environment.’ What constitutes ‘order public or morality’ and ‘serious prejudice to the 
environment’ is not prescribed and is at the discretion of the member state concerned.  
 
Under article 27(3)(a), members states may exclude from patentability ‘diagnostic, 
therapeutic and surgical methods of treatment of humans or animals’. Article 27(3)(b) has 
been the subject of many a debate particularly in the context of flexibilities available to 
developing countries. The use of the terms shall to refer to inventions and may to refer to the 
exemptions means that protection of inventions is mandatory (provided they meet the 
prescribed criteria) while exemptions are discretionary.  
 
At the risk of being repetitive, article 27(3)(b) is briefly analysed below. It states that 
members may exclude from patentability: 
“plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological 
processes for the production of plants or animals other than non-biological 
and microbiological processes. However, Members shall provide for the 
protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis 
system or by any combination thereof…”  
 
Applying a strict interpretation under the legal literal rule, a deconstruction of article 27(3)(b) 
can be represented below. 
 
Table 5.1: Protection under TRIPs article 27(3)(b) 
Must be protected  
• Micro-organisms & macro-organisms other than 
plants & animals 
• Non-biological processes for the production of 
plants or animals 
• Microbiological processes for the production of 
plants or animals 
• Non-essential biological processes for the production 
of plants and animals 
• Non-essential biological processes for the production 
of micro-organisms and macro-organisms 
• Plant varieties 
 
May be protected 
• Plants 
• Animals 
• Essentially biological processes for the 
production of plants or animals 
• Essentially biological processes for the 
production of micro-organisms and macro-
organisms 
 
 107 
Some terms under article 27(3)(b) are ambiguous inviting a wide range of interpretations. It is 
often argued that developing countries should take advantage of this ambiguity and flexibility 
and apply an interpretation consonant with their national priorities and level of development.  
 
Micro-organisms 
To begin with, there is no definition of what a micro-organism is or what constitutes 
‘essentially biological processes’. Recommending that developing countries use a higher 
threshold for patent protection in respect of living matter, Blakeney writes that there is no 
commonly accepted definition of ‘micro-organism’ either in science or in patent office 
practice; the key issue for protection being not the subject matter, but rather whether or not 
the invention meets the patent granting criteria.2  
 
Essentially biological processes, non-biological processes  
On ‘essentially biological processes’ the inference is that biological processes that are not 
essential must be protected. There is no evidence of a scientific meaning of ‘essential’; the 
presumption in this context is that it is a term addressing the extent of excludable subject 
matter and therefore open to different interpretation. If it is possible to attribute a percentage 
of a final plant, animal, macro or micro-organism to a specific biological process or step of 
processes, what share would be considered ‘essential’? Although this oversimplifies the 
reality of scientific research, it demonstrates the possibility, at least in theory, of varying 
interpretation of the significance of specific biological processes.  
Modern biological processes may be classed as being ‘non-biological’.3 Non-biological 
processes for the production of plants and animals must be protected.  
 
Effective sui generis system 
Plant varieties must be protected; TRIPs offers no definition for plant varieties. There are 
three options available for the protection of these: (i) protect plant varieties by patents; (ii) 
protect plant varieties by an effective sui generis system; or (iii) protect plant varieties by a 
combination of both (i) and (ii). TRIPs offers no guidance as to what is meant by ‘effective’. 
Blakeney offers four suggestions: effective through enforcement; effective to protect both 
                                               
2
 Blakeney, M., Access to genetic resources, gene-based inventions and agriculture, background paper to the 
‘How intellectual property rights could work better for developing countries and poor people conference’ 
London, 21-22 February (2002) 
3
 Correa, C., The GATT Agreement on trade related aspects of intellectual property rights, E.I.P.R 16/8 (1994) 
327-335 however questions if a plant or animal can be produced by a non-biological process 
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modern and farmers’ varieties; the rights should be protected in accordance with national 
objectives referred to in the TRIPs Agreement; the protection should be consistent with 
international obligations agreed to and assumed by members such as those under the CBD.4  
 
Some scholars have argued that a sui generis system has generally been understood to mean a 
system modelled on the UPOV Conventions5 not in the least because, to date, UPOV 
represents the only internationally recognised system of plant variety protection. Matthews 
argues that even when sui generis is not read as UPOV-like system, an ‘effective’ sui generis 
system would most likely be one that is determined and approved by industrialised countries.6 
 
With regard to plants, Member States have four rather than three options: they may choose 
not to protect plants at all; protect by use of patents; protect by using a sui generis system; or 
protect using a combination of patents and a sui generis system.  
 
TRIPs makes no reference to UPOV and, consequently, Member States are not obliged to 
join UPOV or model their sui generis legislation on the UPOV Conventions. Watal suggests 
that the TRIPs agreement’s failure to mention the UPOV Conventions may have been 
because the 1991 Convention was not yet in force at the time of the TRIPs negotiations while 
the 1978 Act was considered inadequate.7  
 
Although countries are free to legislate on any form of ‘effective’ sui generis system, most 
developing countries—especially those that did not provide for PVP protection prior to their 
accession to the WTO—have tended to use UPOV as a template. This may be attributed to 
three of many factors: the fact that there are no readily available alternative sui generis 
systems for developing countries to model their laws on; possibly because the UPOV model 
is often promoted though bilateral trade agreements; and the unwelcome reception of creative 
models of sui generis systems may make countries resigned to accepting UPOV-like national 
legislation. Brave attempts by India and by the African Union to produce a sui generis system 
                                               
4
 Blakeney (2002) supra note 2 
5
 Mugabe, J., Barber, C. Henne, G., Glowka, L. & La Vina, A., ‘Managing access to genetic resources: National 
policy and legislative framework’ in Mugabe, J., Barber, C. Henne, G., Glowka, L. & La Vina, A., (eds.) Access 
to genetic resources: strategies for sharing benefits (Nairobi: ACTS Press, 1997) 
6
 Matthews, D., Globalising intellectual property rights: the TRIPs Agreement (New York: Routledge, 2002) 
7
 Watal, J., Intellectual property rights in the WTO and developing countries (London: Kluwer Law 
International, 2001) 
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resulted in the former’s application to join UPOV being suspended8 and severe criticism of 
the latter’s Model Law by UPOV officials. 
 
It is reported that UPOV officials amended 30 articles of the OAU Model Legislation on the 
Protection of Rights of Local Communities, Farmers and Breeders and for the Regulation of 
Access to Biological Resources to align them with the UPOV Conventions.9 This, and 
UPOV’s reaction to India’s attempt at producing a UPOV-alternative sui generis legislation, 
suggests that the ‘flexibility’ under TRIPs article 27(3)(b) regarding the sui generis option is 
little more than lip service. UPOV-like PVP is the reality in most developing countries.  
 
Regional and bilateral trade and investment treaties are in part responsible for the promotion 
of the adoption of UPOV based PVP legislation in developing countries.  
 
5.1.1.2  Agricultural biotechnology  
 
With regard to modern agricultural biotechnology, scrutiny of article 27 yields three possible 
interpretations: (i) no exceptions option; (ii) all exceptions option; and (iii) some exceptions 
option.10 
 
Under the ‘no exceptions option’, animals, plants, micro-organisms, essential and non 
essential micro-biological and macro-biological processes, non biological processes and plant 
varieties are patented. The ‘all exceptions option’ construes the terminology broadly or 
narrowly to ensure the absolute minimal protection that is legally permissible while keeping 
as much subject matter outside of patent protection. The third option consists of a 
combination of the first two options and results in a wide range of permutations between the 
two extremes. The third column in the table below merely presents one of the many 
possibilities. 
 
                                               
8
 UPOV has made it clear that if India is to join UPOV, it has to change its provisions on farmers’ rights 
9
 Singh, H., Emerging plant variety legislations and their implications for developing countries: Experiences 
from India and Africa, paper presented at the ‘National Conference on TRIPS: Next Agenda for Developing 
Countries’ Hyderabad, 11-12 October (2002) 
10
 Dutfield, G., Muraguri, L. & Leverve, F., ‘Exploring the flexibilities of TRIPs to promote biotechnology 
capacity building and appropriate technology transfer’ a report prepared under the European Commission’s 6th 
Framework Programme for Research as part of the project ‘Impacts of the IPR Rules on Sustainable 
Development’ (London:Queen Mary, University of London, 2006) 
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5.1.2 The UPOV Conventions 
 
The background to UPOV is well documented. Before the introduction of IPRs in the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, IP protection was under the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO). One of the treaties administered under WIPO and 
dealing specifically with plant genetic resources is the International Convention for the 
Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV Convention).245 The Convention’s objective is 
to ensure that member states acknowledge inventions by plant breeders and reward them with 
exclusive rights over new plant varieties.246 It establishes the concept of plant breeders’ rights 
(PBRs).  
 
The underlying principle of plant variety protection is in many ways similar to that of patent 
protection. The main reason for plant variety protection is cited as to ‘serve as an incentive to 
development of agriculture, horticulture and forestry and to safeguard the interests of plant 
breeders.’247 Recouping costs invested in breeding plant varieties as well as accumulating 
funds necessary for further investment is part of the justification for plant variety 
protection.248 
 
Since its inception the UPOV Convention has been amended three times—in 1972, 1978 and 
1991. Membership to the 1972 and 1978 Acts has been closed and any country wishing to 
join UPOV has only the option of the 1991 Act. The main operating Acts are those of 1978 
and 1991. 
 
There are substantial differences in the two versions of UPOV.249 Under the 1978 Act, the 
breeder is entitled to protection, whatever the origin—artificial or natural, of the initial 
variation from which his variety is derived250 that is, he is entitled to protection if he 
                                               
245
 Signed in Paris in December 2 1961 and entered into force in 1968. The UPOV Convention has been revised 
three times: in 1972, 1978 and in 1991. See www.upov.int  
246
 UPOV 1991 Act, article 2. 
247
 UPOV, ‘Why protect new varieties of plants?’ Available at http://www.upov.int/eng/brief.htm  
248
 Mugabe, J., et al. ‘Managing access to genetic resources: national policy and legislative framework’ in 
Mugabe, J. et al. (eds.) Access to genetic resources: strategies for sharing benefits (Nairobi: ACTS Press, 1997) 
249
 See Watal, J., Intellectual property rights in the WTO and developing countries (London: Kluwer Law 
International, 2001) at 136-149 for detailed analysis on the differences and similarities. See also Verma, S., 
TRIPs and plant variety protection in developing countries E.I.P.R. 17/6  (1995) 281 
250
 Article 4 of UPOV 1978 Act available at http://72.14.203.104/search?q=cache:h-
mZEoSqqKEJ:www.upov.int/en/publications/conventions/1978/msword/act1978.doc+UPOV+1978+text&hl=e
n&gl=uk&ct=clnk&cd=5  
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“discovers” a new plant variety. Authorisation is needed from the plant breeder for the 
production for purposes of commercial marketing, the offering for sale, and the marketing of 
the reproductive or vegetative propagating material.251 The 1978 Act however does not 
require prior authorisation from the plant breeder for research and creating of new varieties 
from his varieties and the marketing of those new varieties.252 Member States are however 
free to grant more extensive rights to breeders, and especially to extend the protection to the 
marketed product.253 
 
The 1991 Act broadens the scope of protection by widening the range of activities for which 
the authorisation of the plant breeder is required.254 Unlike the 1978 Act, mere discovery is 
not enough; a breeder must have developed his discovery in order to secure protection. The 
protection of a variety derived from a protected variety is controversial and difficult to 
determine. Although the 1991 Act exempts obtaining of authorisation from the plant breeder 
for acts done privately, non-commercially and for experimental purposes, it requires 
authorisation for breeding and exploiting essentially derived varieties (EDVs). 255 Varieties 
whose production requires the repeated use of the protected variety e.g. as a parent for a 
hybrid variety, are said to be essentially derived. Under the 1991 Act, if a breeder makes 
some improvement over a protected variety he will have to seek permission from the holder 
of the original rights before marketing the new variety. The Act defines what constitutes a 
variety essentially derived from another.256 The 1978 Act does not require such permission.  
With regard to farmer’s rights, the 1978 Act allows farmers to save seed or reproductive 
material of a protected variety for re-planting to produce a further crop. The 1991 Act 
provides for an optional exemption from breeders’ rights: Article 15(2) allows contracting 
parties to provide an exception in favour of farmers that is ‘within reasonable limits and 
subject to the safeguarding of the legitimate interests of the breeder.’ Thus saving of seed is a 
farmer’s right under the 1978 Act but only a privilege that may be granted subject to the 
terms in Article 15(2) under the 1991 Act.  
 
                                               
251
 Id., article 5(1)  
252
 Id., article 5(3) 
253
 Id., article 5(4) 
254
 Article 14 of the UPOV 1991 Act available at 
http://72.14.203.104/search?q=cache:VhMNFwIR75wJ:www.upov.int/en/publications/conventions/1991/mswor
d/act1991.doc+UPOV+1978+text&hl=en&gl=uk&ct=clnk&cd=6  
255
 Id., article 15(1)  
256
 Id., article 14(5)b 
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Table 5.3: PVP under the UPOV Conventions, Kenyan & Indian domestic legislation 
Particulars UPOV 1978 UPOV 1991 Kenya India 
Scope of 
protection 
May be applied to all 
genera & species but 
minimum 
requirement is 
24genera & species 
within 8years 
Varieties of all 
genera & species 
Varieties of all 
genera & species 
Genera & species 
listed with respect to 
new varieties and 
EDV 
s; extant varieties & 
farmers varieties as 
defined  
Exclusion  None except as above None, but subject to 
the public order, 
public health, etc 
None  Non-listed genera & 
species with respect to 
new varieties & EDVs 
Criteria  New, Distinct, 
Uniform & Stable  
New, Distinct, 
Uniform & Stable  
Distinct, Uniform, 
Stable & 
‘sufficiently varietal 
pure’ 
New, Distinct, 
Uniform & Stable for 
new varieties & EDVs, 
DUS for extant 
varieties, unclear for 
farmers’ varieties 
Disclosure Description Description Description Description & 
declaration 
Nature and 
scope of rights  
Prevent others from 
producing, 
marketing, & 
commercialising 
propagating materials 
including ornamental 
plants or parts 
Prevent others from 
producing, 
reproducing, 
conditioning for 
propagation, offering 
for sale, selling, 
marketing, exporting, 
importing, or 
stocking for any of 
these purposes; under 
certain conditions, 
rights to extend to 
harvested material  
Prevent others from 
producing, selling, 
marketing, 
exporting or 
stocking the 
protected variety; 
from propagating, 
selling parts or 
products of 
protected variety in 
special cases 
Prevent others from 
producing, selling, 
marketing, 
distributing, importing 
or exporting the 
variety 
Exemptions For further breeding; 
for private & non 
commercial use; 
allows farmers to 
save seed or 
reproductive material 
of protected variety 
for re-planting 
For further breeding, 
restricted in the case 
of EDVs; for private 
& non commercial 
use; for experimental 
use; farmers’ 
privilege allowed 
within reasonable 
limits and subject to 
taking into account 
the legitimate 
interests of breeder; 
private and non 
commercial use; 
experimental 
purposes 
For further 
breeding; for 
research purposes; 
no explicit reference 
to farmers’ rights 
but generally, 
farmers allowed to 
save, use, exchange 
and share protected 
variety. Although 
sale is not explicitly 
prohibited, it is 
restricted by seed 
sellers registration 
and seed 
certification 
provisions 
Exemption for 
breeding or 
experimental purposes 
but permission needed 
if protected variety is 
repeatedly used; 
Farmers’ rights rather 
than privilege- allowed 
to save, use, exchange, 
share or sell protected 
variety but may not 
sell protected seed 
which is branded 
Minimum 
Duration 
 
15 years from grant, 
18 years for trees & 
vines  
20 years from grant, 
25 years for trees & 
vines 
 
15 years from grant, 
18 years for trees & 
vines; extendable up 
to 25yrs 
For new varieties, 6 
yrs from registration 
(9 yrs for trees & 
vines); extendable up 
to 15yrs (18yrs for 
trees & vines) 
Double 
protection 
Not permitted Permitted Not permitted Not permitted 
Source: Louwaars et al (2005) with modifications; respective UPOV Conventions; Kenyan and Indian Acts of 
Parliament 
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The criteria for eligibility are the same under the two conventions. Varieties have to be 
distinct from existing commonly known varieties, sufficiently uniform, stable (the DUS test) 
and new in the sense that they must not have been commercialised prior to certain dates 
established by reference to the date of the application for protection.257 Protection under the 
1978 Act runs for at least15 years258 and 20years in the case of the 1991 Act.259 
The main differences between the two conventions are summarised in the table below which 
also shows where Kenya and India lie within this framework. 
 
As at January 2009, UPOV had 67 members;260 all of these have enacted national PVP 
legislation that is UPOV-compliant. Developing countries which joined UPOV at the time 
when membership to both Conventions was open joined the 1978 Convention rather than the 
1991 Convention.261 For some however, the domestic PVP law is more in line with the 1991 
Convention although they are members of the 1978 Convention.262 There are some 
developing countries with existing plant variety protection legislation that are not members of 
any of the UPOV conventions.263 India lodged an application to join the 1978 UPOV 
Convention before membership to the 1978 Convention was closed; it is speculated that its 
membership will be denied given the state of its PVP law which is analysed later in this 
chapter.  
 
5.1.3 The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources 
 
The FAO International Treaty (IT) is discussed below in the context of the provisions 
relevant to PPPs in agricultural research in developing countries. The FAO IT is important in 
the context of this thesis not in the least because it makes specific provision for genetic 
material held by the CGIAR Centres of which the host institutions to the two case studies, 
ICRISAT and ILRI, are part.  
 
                                               
257
 Article 6 of the 1978 Act and article 5 of the 1991 Act 
258
 18 years for vines and trees 
259
 25 in respect of vines and trees 
260
 See http://www.upov.int/en/about/members/pdf/pub423.pdf for an updated list of UPOV members 
261
 However, as membership to the 1978 Convention is closed, developing countries wishing to join UPOV have 
only the option of joining the 1991Convention 
262
 For example Kenya which currently aspires to ‘upgrade’ to UPOV 1991 
263
 For example Tanzania and Indonesia 
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Unlike its predecessor, the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, the IT is 
legally binding. Its most unique feature is the establishment of a Multilateral System to 
facilitate access to plant genetic resources (PGRs).264 The Multilateral System comprises a 
collection of 35 food and 29 feed crops to which member states are assured of ‘facilitated 
access’. Member states are required to include all PGRs for food and agriculture (PGRFAs) 
of the 64 crops in the public domain. With regard to private collectors and ‘all other holders’ 
of PGRFAs of the 64 crops, member states are enjoined to encourage and invite the owners to 
include them in the Multilateral System. In addition, member states are required to put in 
place appropriate measures to facilitate this.265 Although only 64 crops are covered, and even 
then, only for the purpose of food and agriculture, these crops account for about 80% of the 
world’s total calorie intake from plants. 
 
The FAO International Treaty and CG Centres 
The FAO International Treaty (IT or Treaty) is a unique treaty particularly because of its 
involvement of ‘non state’ actors. Under basic international law theories, international 
conventions, treaties and agreements apply only to sovereign national states. International 
Agriculture Research Centres including those under the CG system are required to sign 
agreements with the Treaty’s Governing Body making them de facto ‘members’ of the 
Treaty. This establishes a direct link between the Treaty and the Centres in a way that is 
distinctly different from the indirect relationship that non state actors have with international 
treaties which by their nature have to be ‘mediated’ by national governments within which 
the non state actors reside. In the latter more common scenario, non state actors are obliged to 
abide by international treaty provisions only to the extent that these are implemented into 
national laws which then prescribe the manner in which the non state actors are bound.  
 
This unique relationship between the CG Centres and the Treaty makes the latter the most 
relevant and direct international IP regime of the three (TRIPs, UPOV and the Treaty). In so 
far as CG Centres are obliged to use standard material transfer agreements for the acquisition 
and transfer of PGRFAs (as prescribed by the Treaty) the CG Centres’-Treaty relationship 
requires no medium and is thus direct and binding.   
 
 
                                               
264
 Under article 11 
265Article 11(3) 
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Table 5.4: Membership to agriculture-related IP international instruments 
International 
instrument 
Kenya 
ratified/acceded 
India 
ratified/acceded 
ILRI ICRISAT 
Patent Cooperation 
Treaty 
June 1994 December 1998 Not applicable Not applicable 
WTO/TRIPs January 1995 January 1995 N/A N/A 
CBD 1994 1994 N/A N/A 
UPOV 1978 May 1998 Applied to join N/A N/A 
FAO ITPGR 2003 2002 June 2006 June 2006 
 
5.2 Kenya’s IP framework relevant to agricultural R&D  
 
Legislation in IP in Kenya was a colonial heritage. Sijthoff argues that IP law was introduced 
to advance general imperialist interests at the time; he supports his argument by pointing out 
the low levels of literacy, technological advancement and innovation among the natives.266 
 
Although the first registered patent in Kenya dates as far back as 1932, Kenya had no 
independent patent protection system until 1989. The Patents Registration Act required the 
applicant to have been a grantee of a patent in the UK or derive his right from a grantee of a 
patent in the UK.  
 
The National Council for Science and Technology and the Legal and Patents Committee were 
mandated to draw up guidelines on an appropriate patent system for Kenya and make 
recommendations on a national patenting policy formulation and implementation. The 
Committee findings included providing for the training of personnel and infrastructure for 
carrying out patent examinations and processing applications. The Industrial Property Act 
Cap 509 was thus enacted in 1989 to replace the Patent Registration Act. It came into force in 
1990. The Act was amended a number of times and was finally replaced by the Industrial 
Property Act No. 3 of 2001 which ensured conformity with the TRIPs Agreement.  
 
5.2.1 Protection of agricultural biotechnology inventions 
 
The Industrial Property Act (IPA) is the primary statute governing patents and other 
industrial properties. It incorporates both the necessary minimum standards and the allowable 
flexibilities of the TRIPs agreement. The preamble states the objective of the Act is “to 
provide for the promotion of inventive and innovative activities, to facilitate the acquisition 
                                               
266
 Sijthoff, L., Design protection (London: Butterworths, 1976) 
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of technology through the grant and regulation of patents, utility models, technovations and 
industrial designs, to provide for the establishment, powers and functions of the Kenya 
Industrial Property Institute…” 
 
Patentable subject matter 
The IPA provides for the patentability of both products and process inventions267 that are 
new, involve an inventive step and are industrially applicable or are ‘a new use’.268 This 
inclusion of ‘a new use’ seems to use a broad definition that is more in line with the ‘no 
exceptions’ category in the schema developed above. Sections 23, 24 and 25 define what 
constitutes novelty, inventive step and industrial application respectively. The Act excludes 
from patentability:  
“discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods; schemes, 
rules or methods for doing business, performing purely mental acts or 
playing games; methods for treatment of the human or animal body by 
surgery or therapy, as well as diagnostic methods practised in relation 
thereto, except products for use in any such methods; mere presentation 
of information; and Public Health related methods of use or uses of any 
molecule or other substances whatsoever used for the prevention or 
treatment of any disease which the Minister responsible for matters 
relating to health may designate as a serious health hazard or as a life 
threatening disease.”269  
 
The IPA declares that plant varieties are not patentable although “parts thereof or products of 
biotechnological process” may be patentable.270 This provision would fit in the ‘some 
exceptions’ category in the options discussed above. Inventions contrary to public order, 
morality, public health and safety, principles of humanity, environmental conservation are 
also excluded from patentability.271 
 
The IPA requires Kenyan residents to file a patent application in Kenya prior to filing a 
patent application in respect of the same invention abroad. Contravening this requirement 
                                               
267
 Section 21(2) 
268
 Section 22 
269
 Section 21(3)(a)-(e) 
270
 Section 26(a) 
271
 Section 26(b) 
 118 
renders an applicant liable on conviction to a fine and/or term of imprisonment. Written 
authority is required where an applicant wishes to file a patent application abroad prior to the 
lapse of six months from the date the application for the same invention was filed in 
Kenya.272 
 
On patents relating to living matter, where a micro-organism has been used in a process or 
produce and is not available to the public and cannot be described in the patent application so 
as to enable the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art, section 29(1)(a) 
requires that a culture of the micro-organism be deposited with a depository institution. 
Applicants must disclose the origin of material used in the invention. This is aimed at curbing 
biopiracy. Some high profile cases have been highlighted in the media.273 This is resonant 
with the spirit underlying an ‘all exceptions’ option.  
 
Scope of rights 
Part VII of the IPA covers the rights and obligations of the applicant or the owner of the 
invention. The patent holder has the right to preclude any person from exploiting the 
protected invention whether a product or process by making, importing, offering for sale, 
selling and using the product; or stocking such product for the purposes of offering it for sale, 
selling or using it.274  
 
The patent holder’s rights however extend only to acts done for commercial or industrial 
purposes and not to acts done for scientific research.275 The IPA allows for parallel 
importation by limiting the patent rights ‘in respect of articles put on the market in Kenya or 
in any other country or imported into Kenya.’276 This was to address the controversy relating 
to the lack of access to essential drugs.277 This provision has however never been invoked.  
 
                                               
272
 Section 28 
273
 For example Sheridan, C., Kenyan dispute illuminates bioprospecting difficulties, Nature, 8 November 
(2004) on the Kenya Wildlife Service case against Genencor International Inc. over micro-organisms extracted 
from Kenyan lakes which are used for processing jeans and making detergents; it is debatable whether the 
requirement to disclose the origin of material in patent applications filed in Kenya staves off biopiracy as 
majority of the ‘bioprospectors’ do not file applications in Kenya. The media has proved to be an effective 
medium of deterrent as was the case in a collaborative HIV research project between Kenyan and University of 
Oxford scientists; ‘Kenya sues British AIDS team for theft’ The Daily Nation 5 June (2004)  
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275
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 Kameri-Mbote, P., Intellectual property protection in Africa: an assessment of the status of laws, research 
and policy analysis on intellectual property rights in Kenya (Nairobi: ACTS Press, 2004) 
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Duration 
The length of a patent is 20 years from the filing date of the application.278 The regulations 
prescribe the amount to be paid as annual fees; if the annual fee is not paid, the application or 
patent is deemed to have been withdrawn and is published as such.  
 
Part X covers contractual licences and provides for inter alia the rights and obligations of 
licensees and licensors, forms of licence contracts, prohibited terms in licence contracts, 
procedure for registration of the contract, issue of certificates and compulsory licences. The 
Act also covers other forms of industrial property such as utility models, industrial designs 
and technovations.  
  
Biosafety 
The National Biotechnology Development Policy was adopted in 2006 to guide the research, 
development and trade in biotechnology products. Although the protection of agricultural 
biotechnology inventions falls under the IPA, the Biosafety Act regulates modern 
biotechnology research and related biosafety matters. Any research on and use of 
biotechnology in Kenya must receive the approval of the National Biosafety Authority 
established under section 5 of the Act. 
 
Activities requiring the approval of the Authority include contained use, introduction to the 
environment, placing in the market, transit or import of genetically modified organisms.279  
 
Noticeably, the Act states that its provisions do not apply to GMOs that are pharmaceutical 
for human use;280 thereby failing to set out the fate of the regulation of these GMOs leading 
to comments that they are not regulated at all.281 
  
5.2.2 Plant Variety Protection in Kenya 
 
At the time Kenya joined the WTO in 1995, the Seeds and Plant Varieties Act of 1972 was 
already in place and already provided for the protection of plant varieties. On a technical 
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 Section 60 
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 African Centre for Biosafety, Comment on the Republic of Kenya’s Biosafety Bill (Richmond: African 
Centre for Biosafety, 2007)  
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level therefore, Kenya did not have to do anything to implement TRIPs Article 27(3)(b) on 
accession to the WTO. The then Industrial Property Act and the Seed and Plant Varieties Act 
embodied the spirit and intent of Article 27(3)(b). 
 
Kenya acceded to the 1978 UPOV Convention in 1999. The Statute Miscellaneous 
Amendment Bill of 2000 domesticated the UPOV provisions in Kenya.  
  
Protectable subject matter 
The Industrial Property Act stipulates that plant varieties as provided for in the Seeds and 
Plant Varieties Act (but not parts thereof or products of biotechnological processes) are not 
patentable. 282 As it allows parts of plants to be patentable, it clearly adopts the ‘some 
exceptions’ option.  
 
Plant variety protection in Kenya is provided for under the Seeds and Plant Variety Act 
(SPVA). The preamble outlines the SPVA’s objectives as including provision for the testing 
and certification of seeds, the establishment of an index of names of plant varieties, and 
provision for the grant of proprietary rights to breeders.  
 
Criteria for grant of PBRs 
The Fourth Schedule to the Act specifies the criteria for the grant of PBRs. These are the 
traditional ‘substantially distinguishable’, ‘sufficiently uniform’ and ‘stable’. In addition to 
this, the Schedule adds that the plant variety must be pure.283 A variety must also be new; it is 
considered new if the propagating material, whole plant or harvested material of it has not 
been sold or offered for sale with the agreement of the owner in Kenya for more than 1 year 
prior to the date of application or outside Kenya for more than 6 years (prior to the 
application date) in the case of woody plants or more than 4 years for non-woody plants.  
 
An applicant must propose a denomination for the new variety to enable the variety to be 
recognised. Failure to provide one or if the proposed denomination is unacceptable the 
applicant is required to propose one or provide an alternative as the case may be.  
 
 
                                               
282
 section 26(a) 
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 121 
Nature of PBRs 
The breeder has rights to control the reproduction, commercialisation, sale and stocking of 
the protected variety:  
 
“…the holder of plant breeder’s rights in a plant variety shall have the 
exclusive right to do, and to authorise others to do, the following—produce 
reproductive material of the variety for commercial purposes, to 
commercialise it, to offer it for sale, to export it, to stock it for any of these 
purposes and to have any or all of their activities performed.”284 
 
This provision extends beyond that under UPOV 1978 as it includes restrictions on 
exportation and stocking but falls short of the scope of protection provided by the 1991 
Convention. PBRs are currently available for varieties of any kind of plant other than algae 
and bacteria. PBRs are granted for a minimum 18 years in the case of trees and vines and 15 
years for all other plant varieties.285 Protection for all may be extended for up to 25 years.  
 
Exemptions to breeder’s rights 
Where production and stocking for production is concerned, protected varieties may be used 
for research purposes or for developing new varieties in the breeder’s nursery.286 Similar to 
the 1978 Convention, private non-commercial use of protected varieties is permitted. 
 
There is no explicit reference to farmers’ right to save seed. Seed saving is in practice 
allowed although seed sale is restricted by certification requirements. Farmers are free to 
grow or use a protected variety for non-commercial purposes, use the plants or parts of the 
protected variety for human consumption, non-propagating purposes and for plant breeding. 
Farmers may therefore be able to save exchange and re-use protected seed but may not offer 
it for sale to others. Seed offered for sale must be certified and a seed seller must obtain a 
seed seller’s licence under the Seeds and Plant Varieties (Seeds) Regulations.287 Seed sellers 
renew their licence annually; non-renewal of licence for two consecutive years renders the 
                                               
284
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285
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seed seller’s operational status as ceased.288 Read as a whole, the SPVA provisions on 
farmers’ rights are midway between 1978 and 1991 Conventions in that although they do not 
restrict seed saving, the SPVA is reluctant to grant farmers far reaching privileges.   
 
                                               
288
 ‘Government threatens to deregister companies that have failed to renew licenses’ The East African 
Standard, 13 February (2005) available at 
http://www.eastandard.net/archives/?mnu=details&id=13050&catid=14  
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5.3 India’s IP framework relevant to agricultural R&D  
 
Protection of IP in India dates as far back as the 16th and 17th centuries with the establishment 
of commercial and, later, colonial interests by the Portuguese, Dutch, French and British. In 
1856, the Act of Protection of Inventions which was based on the British Patent Law of 1852 
was passed. The Patents and Designs Protection Act of 1872 and the Protection of Inventions 
Act of 1883 were consolidated into the Invention and Designs Act in 1888 which, together 
with the Indian Patents and Designs Act of 1911, comprised the pre-independence IP 
legislation.289 
 
5.3.1 Protection of agricultural biotechnology inventions 
 
After independence, a Patents Bill was introduced into parliament and was enacted as the 
Indian Patents Act of 1970. The Indian Patents Act has undergone numerous amendments in 
1999, 2002, 2004 and 2005. The Act contains no explicit mention of biotechnology. 
 
Patentable subject matter 
The Indian Patents Act defines an invention as a new product or process involving an 
inventive step and capable of industrial application. It further defines what constitutes an 
inventive step. The Act uses an ‘exclusion’ style by listing what is not patentable as opposed 
to what is patentable under the Act. Section 3 lists as unpatentable inter alia, a frivolous 
invention, mere discovery of a scientific principle or formulation of an abstract theory or 
discovery of any living thing or non-living thing substances, mere discovery of a new form of 
a known substance which does not result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of the 
substance or the mere discovery of any new property or new use for a known substance or of 
the mere use of a known process, machine or apparatus ‘unless such known process results in 
a new product or employs at least one new reactant’, mere arrangement or re-arrangement or 
duplication of known devices each functioning independently of one another in a known way, 
among others including the usual diagnostic, therapeutic or treatment methods, mathematical 
or business method and presentation of information.  
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On biotechnology inventions, micro organisms are patentable but plants and animals in whole 
or part, seeds, plant varieties and species and essentially biological processes are not 
patentable: “plants and animals in whole or any part thereof other than micro-organisms but 
including seeds, varieties and species and essentially biological processes for production or 
propagation of plants and animals;”290 are not inventions within the meaning of the Act. This 
seems to adopt the ‘all exceptions’ option.  
 
The Patent Act does not list non-biological processes, microbiological processes, non-
essential biological processes for the production of plants or animals, essentially biological 
processes for the production of micro-organisms and macro-organisms other than plants and 
animals or macro-organisms other than plants and animals as excluded from patenting. These 
must therefore be understood to be patentable under the Indian Patent Act.291 By permitting 
these to be patentable, the Patent Act seems to be a variant of the ‘some exceptions’ option.  
 
Prior to the 2002 amendment, processes for ‘medical, surgical, creative, prophylactic or other 
treatment’ of animals and plants to render them ‘free of disease or to increase their economic 
value or that of their products’ were excluded from patenting. In the 2002 amendment, 
‘plants’ was deleted the effect being that a method or process of modification of a plant is 
patentable. Taken together with section 3(j), this means that genetically modified seeds can 
be patented as can non essentially biological processes for their production. 
 
Significantly, section 3(p) lists as not patentable an invention which is in effect traditional 
knowledge or which is an aggregation or duplication of known properties of traditionally 
known components. This section reflects the lessons learnt from India’s experiences with bio 
prospectors and from generations of traditional knowledge practitioners. 
 
Scope of rights 
The Indian Patents Act spells out the rights conferred by a patent: the patent holder has the 
exclusive right to prevent third parties who do not have his consent from making, using, 
offering for sale, selling or importing for these purposes the product or product obtained 
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 126 
directly by the patented process.292 Co-owners of a patent have equal rights unless an 
agreement to the contrary is in force. An exception to the patentee’s rights for experiment, 
research or educational purposes is permitted under the Act.293 
 
Duration 
The duration of the protection is 20 years from the date of filing the patent application. 
Where the patent renewal fee is not paid within the prescribed period, the patent ceases to 
have effect. On the cessation due to non-payment of the renewal fee or on expiry of the term 
of patent, the subject matter covered by the patent shall not be entitled to any protection.294 In 
the former case however, an application for the restoration of a lapsed patent may be made to 
the Controller detailing the circumstances which led to the failure to pay the prescribed fee.295 
 
5.3.2 Plant Variety Protection in India 
 
Efforts to develop a plant variety protection system were underway in India before the TRIPs 
Agreement; TRIPs therefore offered the momentum to the process rather than the raison 
d’être. Seshia offers a comprehensive discussion of the interplay between on one hand, the 
international framework, domestic law making processes and the political economy of PVP, 
and on the other hand, the agency of actors that was responsible for the drafting and the 
content of the current Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act (hereinafter the 
PPV&FRA) of 2001.296  
 
India’s policy on IPRs was largely governed by the notion of free access; the obligation to 
provide for PBRs in order to be TRIPs compliant had to be balanced against ensuring access 
to PGRs and protecting farmers’ interests in order to reflect the underlying tenet. Prior to the 
seed policy reform in the 1980s, the role of private seed companies in agriculture was 
restricted. Under the Seed Policy adopted in 1988, the government liberalised the importation 
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of seed including hybrid seed for a number of important crops. This spurred the growth of 
private seed companies in India which were instrumental in advocating for PVP.297  
 
The PPV&FRA was enacted in 2001 after almost a decade of negotiations. The multiplicity 
of the stakeholders involved in the decade of negotiations is borne out by the content of the 
final Act. The Act is unique in that it attempts the hitherto unchartered balance of conflicting 
and divergent interests of plant breeders, farmers, and communities; it provides for strong 
protection of rights for all quarters. The history of negotiations leading to enactment of the 
PPV&FRA is reflected in the UPOV-plus protection of plant varieties and the FAO IT-plus 
protection of farmers’ rights. The resulting Act was welcomed by virtually all stakeholders; 
for those representing farmers’ and communities’ rights, the Act met their demands by 
acknowledging farmers and communities as breeders and according their breeding efforts the 
right to protection as it did that from commercial breeders. The seed industry’s acceptance of 
the broad protection of farmers’ rights was perhaps influenced by the view that farmers’ 
rights seen in the light of ownership would reinforce the IPR system.  
 
Protectable subject matter 
The Act commences with a preamble stating its potentially conflicting objectives: the 
protection of the rights of farmers for the contribution in conserving, improving and making 
available PGRs for the development of new plant varieties; and the protection of PBRs in 
order to stimulate investment in R&D in both the public and private sectors and to facilitate 
the growth of the seed industry. The preamble also states that the PPV&FRA gives effect to 
TRIPs article 27(3)(b).  
 
The Act provides for protection of four categories of plant varieties: new varieties, essentially 
derived varieties; extant varieties and farmers’ varieties.298 Ramanna and Smale posit that this 
classification can be correlated with the interests of the specific stakeholders ‘or the means of 
variety protection which would most likely benefit each.’299 The Act defines extant varieties 
and farmers’ varieties. The latter are varieties which have been traditionally cultivated and 
evolved by the farmers or varieties which are wild relatives or land races of a variety about 
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which farmers possess the common knowledge. Essentially derived varieties (EDVs) are also 
protectable under the Act; the definition of these is similar to that found in UPOV 1991. In 
terms of farmers’ rights, the Act is to the extreme left of the 1978 UPOV Convention while in 
terms of protection of new varieties and EDVs, the Act is more in line with the 1991 
Convention. 
 
Ramanna argues that the four types of protectable varieties correspond to the interests of the 
various stakeholders involved in the negotiations: new varieties mainly benefit the private 
sector; extant varieties are most likely to be protected by the public sector, community 
associations and farmers, EDVs likewise benefit the public sector, community associations 
and farmers while farmers’ varieties are mostly relevant for individual farmers and farmers’ 
associations.300 Section 16 allows any breeder, his assignee, successor or any authorised 
person, farmer or group of farmers or community of farmers, university or public institution 
claiming to be the breeder, to apply for the protection of any type of variety.  
 
Section 29(2) states that the ‘Central Government shall… specify the genera or species for 
the purposes of registration of varieties other than extant varieties and farmers’ varieties’ 
under the Act. This means that EDVs and new varieties for which protection is sought must 
fall within the specified list while extant and farmers’ varieties with respect to which 
registration is applied need not be under the specified list and can therefore be for any genera 
or species.  
 
Criteria for grant of PBRs 
The PPV&FRA seems to have different criteria for the grant of PBRs for the different 
categories of protectable varieties. For new varieties and EDVs, the Act prescribes the usual 
NDUS criteria.301 Extant varieties need not fulfil the novelty criterion; the DUS criteria is as 
specified under regulations made by the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights 
Authority established under the Act.302 The criteria for protection of farmers’ varieties are 
unclear.  
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In all cases, applicants must assign a single and distinct denomination to a variety with 
respect to which protection is sought.303 The Act lists the requirements that the denomination 
has to meet in order to be accepted.  
 
Duration   
The minimum length of protection accorded (for new varieties) by the Act is 9 years for trees 
and vines and 6 years for all other crops. This may be reviewed and renewed on payment of 
prescribed fees for a period of up to 18 years in the case of trees and vines and 15 years for 
all other crops from the date of registration of the variety. All other categories of protectable 
varieties can only be renewed for a period of up to 15 years from the date of notification of 
that variety by the Central Government under the Seeds Act.304 This provision falls short of 
the 1991 Convention and would meet the duration of protection requirement under the 1978 
Convention only if the maximum allowable protection period is exercised.   
 
Scope of rights  
PBRs are conferred on the issuance of a certificate of registration. The right holder, his 
successor, agent or licensee has the exclusive right to ‘produce, sell, market, distribute, 
import or export the variety’.305 These rights go beyond those prescribed by UPOV 1978. For 
extant varieties, unless a breeder or his successor establishes his right, the Central 
Government or the State Government shall be deemed to be the owner of the right granted in 
respect of the extant variety.306 
 
For EDVs, the right holder has the same rights although he requires the authorisation of the 
breeder of the initial variety; such authorisation may be subject to such terms and conditions 
as both parties may mutually agree upon.307 Where the initial variety is a farmers’ variety, 
authorisation must be with the consent of the farmers or group of farmers or community of 
farmers who have made contribution in the preservation or development of such variety.308 
The Act is silent on how this is to be determined. 
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Farmers’ Rights 
Under UPOV 1991, farmers’ privilege is seen as an exception to plant breeders’ rights. The 
most unique feature of the PPV&FRA is that it recognises farmers as breeders whose efforts 
are worthy of protection. A farmer is defined as one who engages in crop cultivation or in 
conserving and preserving traditional crop varieties or wild species of crops and selecting 
them for their useful properties.309 The Act therefore recognises the farmer as cultivator, 
conserver and breeder. It establishes farmers’ rights demonstrating a major conceptual shift 
from farmers’ privilege. It also shows an extension of the private property construct 
developed for new varieties into the sphere of communal and traditional knowledge. This 
concept of farmers’ rights is however not without its critics. Asking if rights should be 
‘reduced to a mere compensation mechanism’, Swaminathan argues that farmers’ rights as 
contained in the Act are not a judicial concept but a mechanism to ensure compensation.310 
 
Farmers’ rights under the PPV&FRA are extensive; a farmer is entitled to save, sow, re-sow, 
exchange, share or even sell his farm produce including seed of a variety protected under the 
Act in the same manner as he was before the Act’s entry into force. The restrictions on his 
rights extend only to selling branded seed of a protected variety. Branded seed is defined as 
‘any seed put in a package or any other container and labelled’ in a manner indicating that 
such seed is of a protected variety.311 Other incidental rights include farmers’ rights to 
register traditional varieties, farmers’ right to benefit sharing, and farmers’ right to get 
compensation for undisclosed use of traditional varieties. Similar to the concept of farmers’ 
rights under the ITPGR, the Act provides for farmers’ rights for reward and recognition.312 
 
In addition to these novel rights, a farmer is entitled to compensation from a breeder (through 
the established National Gene Fund) where the latter provides propagating material that fails 
to provide the stipulated performance.313 In proceedings before the Authority, the Registrar, 
the Tribunal or the High Court, a farmer or group of farmers are not liable to pay any fee for 
the inspection of documents or for obtaining a copy of any decision.314 Farmers are also 
protected against innocent infringement.315  
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Notwithstanding its overt reference to the farming community, it is unlikely that the farming 
community will enjoy the full benefits of the Act’s provisions. Firstly, the criteria for 
protection of farmers’ varieties are unclear. The usual NDUS criteria are unsuitable for 
farmers’ varieties and beneficial only to commercial breeders.316 It is also probable that the 
Act is likely to benefit large private seed companies more than it would the public sector or 
the small scale seed industry. 
 
All PBRs must be maintained by a fee paid annually by every breeder, agent or licensee. The 
fee is determined on the ‘basis of benefit or royalty gained by such breeder, agent or licensee’ 
in respect of the variety.317 Failure to pay the fee for two consecutive years renders the 
registration forfeited.  
 
Researchers’ Rights 
Similar to both Conventions, the PPV&FRA provides for the use of protected varieties by 
any person for the purpose of conducting research or experimentation. Noticeably, the Act 
uses the term ‘researchers’ rights’ rather than the UPOV ‘exception to the breeders’ rights’. 
The use of a protected variety as an initial source of variety for the purpose of creating other 
varieties is also permitted. The researcher however has to obtain the authorisation of the 
breeder of the protected variety where the repeated use of the protected variety is necessary 
for commercial production of the newly developed variety.318 This provision is similar to that 
under the 1978 UPOV convention. 
 
Subsection conclusion 
National IP laws are undoubtedly shaped by the international IP regime. Both Kenya and 
India have not taken full advantage of the flexibilities under the TRIPs Agreement e.g. 
through appropriate definition of terms such as ‘micro-organism’ and ‘essentially biological’ 
and ‘non-biological’ processes. The two countries have implemented the TRIPs provisions 
differently although both are TRIPs-compliant. Using the options schema developed, both 
countries have adopted the ‘some exceptions’ option.  
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With regard to PVP, Kenya lies between the 1978 and 1991 Conventions; some provisions go 
beyond the protection accorded under the 1978 Act but fall short of the 1991 Convention 
while others are more in line with the latter Convention. India’s provisions on PVP are 
mixed: with regard to farmers’ rights, the PPV&FRA offers greater protection than that 
allowable under the 1978 Convention; the Act provides for protection of extant varieties 
which are not protectable under either Convention; on new varieties, the Act’s provisions are 
similar to those under the 1991 Convention in many respects.   
 
5.4 Impact of IP on agricultural R&D  
 
Having discussed the international IP regime and how this is implemented in Kenya and 
India, this section now looks at the operational impact of IP protection on agriculture research 
i.e. how IP legislation affects the conduct of research in agricultural biotechnology and plant 
breeding in a food security PPP context. Given the dearth of research, the analysis in this 
section is limited to the implications that can be drawn using the data available.    
 
Biotechnology applications and grants in Kenya 
Since receipt of the first patent application in 1991, KIPI had received 459 local and foreign 
patent applications by September 2005. 260 of these were granted while 100 were rejected; 
the rest were either pending, withdrawn or their examination abandoned.319 KIPI had also 
received about 330 PCT applications and over 3300 applications through the African 
Regional Intellectual Property Organisation.  
 
KIPI does not use the International Patent Classification; it is therefore difficult to establish 
which of the patent applications relate to biotech generally and agricultural biotechnology 
specifically.  
 
The IPA and the IPA Regulations of 2002 set the patent application and other related fees. 
Although a distinction is made between local and foreign applications, the fees schedule does 
not discriminate between individuals and corporations or between small, medium and large 
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companies. An individual local inventor pays the same fees as a local company although in 
the context of agriculture biotechnology it is unlikely that applicants would be individuals. 
 
With regard to PBRs, the same amount of fees is payable by all applicants in respect of the 
various categories. No distinction is made regarding residence and type of applicant so that a 
local individual breeder pays the same fees as a foreign multinational corporation. It is 
interesting to note that applications for PBRs (US$200) cost more than for patents (US$ 150 
for foreigners and about US$40 for local inventors).  
 
PVP applications and grants in Kenya 
By September 2005, KEPHIS had received a total of 671 PVP applications. These are 
summarised in the table below. 
 
Table 5.6: PVP applications received by KEPHIS as at September 2005 
source of application  
crop type 
foreign 
 Kenya 
public 
Kenya 
private 
joint public 
& private 
total 
applications 
Share of 
category 
(%) 
Share of 
total (%) 
     
   
‘other’ crops        
cereals 0 41 22 48 111 39 17 
oil seeds 14 17 5 0 36 13 5 
industrials 0 54 29 0 83 29 12 
pulses 7 20 6 6 39 14 6 
root crops 0 13 0 2 15 5 2 
pasture grasses 0 11 1 0 12 4 2 
total ‘other’ 21 145 62 56 284 100 42 
share of ‘other’ (%) 7 51 22 20 100   
horticultural crops         
ornamentals 346 0 7 5 358 93 53 
vegetables 15 2 5 0 22 6 3 
fruit 5 2 0 0 7 2 1 
total hort. 366 4 12 5 387 100 58 
share of hort. (%) 95 1 3 1 100   
total  387 149 74 61 671   
share of total (%) 58 22 11 9 100   
Source: compiled by author based on information provided by KEPHIS 
 
Foreign applications make up 58% of total applications. 78% of foreign applications are from 
Netherlands and Germany who are prominent in the Kenyan horticultural industry. Most of 
the PVP applications are for horticultural crops with ornamentals comprising 95% of 
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horticultural crops. Within ornamentals there are 281 applications for roses making them the 
crop most protected by PBRs; roses make up 41% of the entire PVP applications. Domestic 
applications barely make any inroads in PVP applications for horticultural crops; foreign 
enterprises make up 95% of all horticultural PVP applications.  
 
The public sector is the most dominant sector in seeking PVP applications for crops other 
than horticultural crops. Applications in this broad category are mainly from cereals (39%), 
industrial crops (29%), pulses (14%) and oil seeds (13%). Foreign applications make up only 
7% of crops other than horticultural crops.  
 
In 2001, a decision was made to provide an amnesty to protect extant public varieties 
allowing them to be eligible for a full term of protection. This occasioned a great increase in 
PVP applications for public varieties. However, the provision was highly controversial and 
was yet to be gazetted as of September 2005; only 150 of the 671 PVP applications had been 
granted. The sharp decline in foreign applications witnessed between 1997 and 1998 was a 
result of the stabilisation of the initial rush to seek protection on the implementation of the 
Act in 1997.  
 
From the information collected during the interviews, PVP in Kenya seems to have had a 
number of impacts; firstly, KEPHIS officials recorded an increase in the number and range of 
improved varieties available to farmers after introduction of PVP. Maize was particularly 
highlighted as being of superior quality after introduction of PVP. Secondly, according to 
KEPHIS and some interviewees in the horticultural industry, there is enhanced access to 
foreign-bred materials; foreigners account for 58% of all PVP applications which indicates 
enhanced availability of foreign germplasm. However, having better access to foreign 
varieties does not mean that the exploitation opportunities improve as well. The issue of 
access of local breeders and farmers to these varieties is unclear. 
 
Thirdly, there has been increased investment in breeding and commercialisation of new 
varieties. This is mainly in physical facilities and use of advanced technology in the private 
sector which stands in contrast to investment in public institutions. It is unclear however, if 
this is a product of PVP or of the general policy and economic environment 
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Figure 5.1: Annual trend in PVP applications in Kenya (1998-2004) 
 
Source: compiled by author based on information provided by KEPHIS 
 
Fourthly, the officials noted increased collaboration between local breeders and foreign 
breeders and international institutions. This was mainly on capacity building, germplasm 
exchange and commercialisation of foreign varieties in Kenya. Local breeders were noted to 
have also extended partnerships with farmers for on-farm testing of newly bred varieties. 
Again, although KEPHIS cited this as a product of PVP, it is more likely to be due to the 
general agricultural policy and economic environment. 
 
Fifthly, 58% of PVP applications are for ornamental varieties some of which are 
commercially produced in the country for export. Export of horticultural produce is the third 
largest source of foreign exchange. The horticultural industry is also a significant source of 
local employment.  
 
Of most concern, the PVP system offers greater support to the cash crop than food crop 
sector. The PVP system seems to have benefited from the capital-intensive sectors of Kenyan 
agriculture. It is evident that the law has not had much effect on food security; over four-
fifths of all PVP applications are for cash crops. Implications of this trend with regard to 
national food security objectives are worrying. 
 
Although most of these impacts as cited by the interviewees seem positive, the issue of access 
to protected varieties by local farmers has not been factored in. No useful information was 
available regarding the cost of protected seed and the overall effect on yield compared to non 
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protected varieties. Furthermore, some of these seemingly positive impacts relate more to the 
economic and social impact of the horticultural industry as a whole rather than that of PVP; 
these impacts seem to infer that the expansion of the horticultural industry has been due to the 
introduction of PVP. Interviews with representatives of the horticultural industry however 
cited other drivers such as effective private sector entrepreneurs, favourable climatic 
conditions, relatively good infrastructure, and wide base of local labour and supportive policy 
environment. Interestingly, none of them referred to intellectual property.320  
 
Biotechnology applications and grants in India 
The First Schedule of The Patent Rules, 2003 stipulates what amounts are payable with 
respect to various aspects of a patent application. It distinguishes between natural persons and 
persons other than natural persons; interestingly, the Schedule does not make a similar 
distinction between Indian residents and non-residents as is the practice in most jurisdictions.  
 
A survey of biotechnology patents between 1972 and 1988 and again in 1991 showed that 
patenting in biotechnology was mainly foreign dominated. In agriculture, most inventions 
related to plant growth regulators, veterinary vaccines, plant cells and tissue culture.321 More 
recently, there has been a shift towards modern form of biotechnology such as genetic 
modification.  
  
Figure 5.2: Biotechnology patent applications filed in India (1995-2002) 
 
Source: TIFAC (2005) 
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The Technology Information Forecasting and Assessment Council (TIFAC), the National 
Research Development Corporation and the various patent offices are charged with the 
responsibility of managing patent data. None of these use the International Patent 
Classification. Thus, while there is data available on the overall number of patent applications 
and grants, it is difficult to establish which of those relate to biotechnology generally and 
agricultural biotechnology specifically. This notwithstanding, figures from TIFAC estimate 
that there were about 2300 biotech patent applications filed in India by 2002.322 
 
PVP applications in India 
The Second Schedule of the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Rules 2003 
outlines the fees payable in respect of plant variety protection. It distinguishes between 
amounts payable by individuals, for educational and for commercial purposes. These are 
however not defined. There is no distinction between the amounts payable by small, medium 
and large commercial enterprises.  
 
Figure 5.3: Plant variety applications in India May 2007 – February 2009 May 2007 - Feb 2009
0
200
400
600
new varieties 69 355 2
extant varieties 154 387 5
farmers' varieties 12 12 0
2007 2008 2009
 
Source: http://www.plantauthority.gov.in/download.htm 
 
The PPV&FRA was implemented in May 2007. As of February 2009, 996 applications had 
been received none of which had been granted. 75% of the applications relate to extant 
varieties; over time, extant varieties will not command the highest share of applications once 
already existing extant varieties are protected; it is expected that new varieties will command 
the greatest share of the four categories in future. Only seven applications relating to farmers’ 
varieties have been made. A number of initiatives have been launched with the aim of 
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consolidating information on varieties held by farmers and farming communities. Ramanna 
and Smale identify at least 8 such initiatives under government departments, independent 
foundations, NGOs and farmers’ groups. These engage in a range of activities from 
registering grassroot innovations, documentation and registration of traditional knowledge 
and documentation of innovative practices of farmers.323 These initiatives illustrate attempts 
by actors to make claims over varieties perhaps with the possibility of registering them under 
the Act. Whether they will follow through this ultimate action of registration is yet to be seen.  
 
In her analysis of the impact of PBRs on the flow of resources, Ramanna argues that the new 
Act would dramatically alter the existing patterns of exchange of resources.324 Analysing the 
patterns of exchange of PGRs between the public sector and the CGIAR, she proffers the 
possibility of the CGIAR centres charging for their material as a direct consequence of the 
public sector charging the CG Centres for the use of the public sector material protected 
under the Act. This, she argues, would result in a shift of the type of partners that the CG 
Centres would engage given the incentive to transfer material to actors who would pay for the 
PGRs rather than channeling the PGRs back into the public domain.  
 
Ramanna fails to consider the possibility that PVP needn’t be equated to an increase in the 
cost of PGRs. This is the crux of the argument in chapters three and four which distinguish 
between the existence and exercise of IPRs. Public institutes can register their varieties and 
still transfer them to the CG Centres and other actors on a license or royalty free. Chapter 
seven tests Ramanna’s theory by examining the factors that influence choice of collaborating 
partners under ICRISAT–Private Sector hybrid parent seed consortia.  
 
Subsection conclusion 
National IP regime is only relevant to agricultural PPPs only at the stage where a decision is 
made to seek IP protection in the specific national jurisdiction. Once that point is crossed, the 
regime then dictates the criteria for the grant of rights, the scope and nature of the rights, the 
conditions for maintaining the right, etc. Arguably, before parties decide to apply for IP 
protection, national IP law is irrelevant to their research. Agricultural PPPs’ research 
activities are governed by legislation other than IP: for example biosafety in the case of 
                                               
323
 Ramanna & Smale (2004) supra note 65 
324
 Ramanna (2003) supra note 66 
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agricultural biotechnology and seed and phytosanitary related legislation in the case of plant 
breeding.  
 
5.5 Differing perspectives on IP  
 
The previous section looked at the potential impact of IP legislation on agricultural research 
in Kenya and India; this section now addresses the impact of differing perspectives on IP on 
the conduct of agricultural research in the context of food security oriented PPPs.   
 
In his analysis of the evolution of capacity for IP management in the International Rice 
Research Institute, Egelyng325 develops a typology of IP and users which is summarized thus: 
 
Table 5.7: Typology of IP and users 
Type of users Private Public (national) Public (international) 
Examples Private biotech 
companies 
Universities, national 
agricultural research 
institutes 
IARCs e.g. ICRISAT & 
ILRI 
IP policy Objective 
 
Appropriation; preserve 
status of all inventions as 
IP 
Avail inventions into the 
public domain 
Secure inventions for the 
international public 
domain 
IP instruments used Patents, trade secrets, 
plant patent (where 
jurisdiction permits), 
plant breeders’ rights, 
copyright, trademarks, 
confidentiality 
agreements, material 
transfer agreements 
Academic publishing 
(scientific criteria), 
material transfer 
agreements and copyright 
Publishing (scientific 
criteria), defensive 
publishing, copyright, 
material transfer 
agreements, 
confidentiality 
agreements, employee 
contracts 
Nature of in-house IP 
facility 
IP clearinghouse, IP 
office/department or 
technology transfer office 
None or basic, nascent IP 
administration unit 
mainly with one or two 
individuals  
IP administration unit 
Source: Egelyng (2005) with modifications 
 
5.5.1 IP as perceived by the private sector 
 
The private sector perceives IP in the economic rationale sense, i.e. a mechanism for 
recouping costs of invention and rewarding inventive efforts. Consequently, the main aim of 
IP protection is appropriation.326 Lele et al argue that private sector investment in the 
                                               
325
 Egelyng, H., Evolution of capacity for institutionalised management of intellectual property at International 
Agricultural Research Centres: a strategic case study, AgBioForum 8/1 (2005) 7 
326
 Mugabe, J., Intellectual property protection and traditional knowledge: an exploration of international policy 
discourse, paper prepared for WIPO (1998) available at http://www.acts.or.ke/paper%20-
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agricultural sector crucially depends on the protection of IP and that appropriation of benefits 
through trade secrets and IPRs remains a main deciding factor on private sector investment in 
agriculture.327 Increasingly, companies’ worth is calculated not in the traditional bricks and 
mortar but in intangible assets including intellectual property. A ‘healthy’ IP portfolio raises 
the market value of the company and thus affords it more leverage in dealings with other 
companies including its rivals.  
 
The most common forms of IP protection in the private sector are patents, trade secrets, plant 
patent and plant breeders’ rights, copyright, trademarks, confidentiality agreements and 
material transfer agreements. A review of the negotiations and debates leading to the 
development of the international patent regime and national patent and plant variety 
protection reveals the private sector, in developed countries particularly the USA, and its 
lobbyists as the primary advocates for adoption of legislation providing for stronger IP 
protection.  
 
In terms of IP management and practice, the typical private company will carry out regular 
audits of not only its IP but other intangible assets with potential proprietary value. Egelyng 
identifies two traits characterising IP management in the private sector. Firstly, research 
reporting conforms to patent system requirements, i.e. measures that ensure strict record 
keeping and control of movement of materials and information. Secondly, mechanisms to 
guard secrecy and confidentiality are adopted. The IP office typically strips scientific 
publications of technical matter capable of patent protection. Confidentiality agreements 
typify dealings between technical departments and other companies such as manufacturers 
who need access to the scientific research in order to develop it into a final product. 
 
5.5.2 IP as perceived by national public institutions and organisations 
 
National public institutions are increasingly aware of IPRs although virtually all in 
developing countries lack adequate capacity in IP. Typically, their main IP policy objective is 
to put inventions into the public domain and traditionally this is by publication. Most of the 
representatives interviewed expressed their preference for publication over all other means of 
                                                                                                                                                  
%20intellectual%20property.htm who argues that IP is modeled on private gains and therefore more compatible 
with private sector research;  
327
 Lele, U., Lesser, W. & Horstkotte-Wesseler, G., (eds.) Intellectual property rights in agriculture, the World 
Bank’s role in assisting borrower and member countries (Washington DC: World Bank, 2000) 
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putting their research into the public domain. Most were of the view that this was the ‘safest’ 
way in the context of their overarching goal of providing public goods. 
 
A few universities in both study countries have established IP offices or technology transfer 
offices although most are only a few years old and are still in the process of developing their 
IP policies. In the US, the oft-cited Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 is credited with stimulating the 
use of patent protection by universities for the research developed through federal funds.  
 
In Kenya and India, enactment of similar legislation would be redundant as it presupposes 
that public universities and other public institutions are prohibited from seeking patent 
protection for their research. They are not; in any case, the TRIPs Agreement, adopted after 
the Bayh-Dole Act came into force, requires all member states to provide for the patent 
protection of all inventions regardless of the source of funding. 
 
Although patenting is an option for IP protection of research from national public institutions, 
most choose not to seek IP protection. The four most common reasons are (i) lack of capacity 
to draft claims and carry out searches; (ii) lack of financial resources and time for IP 
administration; (iii) lack of financial resources to file applications and (iv) lack of 
understanding of and/or the complexity of the patent system.328 
 
5.5.3 IP as perceived by public international organisations 
 
Although these are more exposed to IP than national public institutions are, there is still scope 
for improvement of institutional capacity and understanding of IP. The underlying research 
objective is not dissimilar to that of national public institutions only in the case of public 
international organisations, the outlook is more global. The main IP policy objective is 
necessarily securing inventions for the international public domain. 
 
In the past decade a few high profile cases329 have exposed international agricultural research 
centres to IP controversies. These and other events catalysed the establishment of IP 
                                               
328
 India & Kenya universities’ representatives, pers. comm. (2005) 
329
 For example the ‘Enola’ bean patent granted to a US seed company POD-NERS based on germplasm from 
the CG International Centre for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT); and Plant Breeder's Rights applications made in 
Australia by two Australian government agricultural agencies in relation to a peavine and a lentil which had 
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administration units in some CGIAR centres. At a system level, a Central Advisory Service 
on IP was created in 2000. Its mission is to serve the centres’ ‘needs regarding proprietary 
technology and facilitating expert advice and exchange of knowledge and experiences.’330 
 
IP instruments include scientific publishing, defensive publishing, copyright, material transfer 
agreements, confidentiality agreements and employee contracts. In ICRISAST, the explicit IP 
policy is to use publishing as the primary means of availing research goods to the public 
domain.  
 
“ICRISAT considers that every effort should be made to ensure that research 
knowledge and products developed by the Institute are actively disseminated, 
adopted and utilised by and for the benefit of people in the developing world, and 
for society in general… [t]herefore, as its basic policy, ICRISAT pursues 
publication and full disclosure and the open sharing of ICRISAT data, information 
and knowledge through the release of ICRISAT research findings and products 
into the public domain.”331 
 
One of the main motivations for seeking IP protection in public international organisations is 
to prevent the appropriation of their research material by third parties especially the private 
sector. While this scenario is likely, it is equally probable that the ‘appropriators’ of the 
IARCs’ material are the public itself: its national partners.  
 
Wolson argues that although IP capacity and management in public organisations is needed 
mainly in order to prevent appropriation and infringement by third parties, it is just as 
important to ensure that the public institutions themselves do not infringe on the rights of 
third parties. Avoiding this would require capacity to negotiate Freedom To Operate (FTO) 
agreements among others.332 
                                                                                                                                                  
been bred from genetic stock obtained from the CG International Centre for Agricultural Research in the Dry 
Areas (ICARDA). 
330
 International Service for National Agricultural Research, Plan of work for a central advisory service on 
proprietary technology within the CGIAR 1999-2000 (The Hague: International Service for National 
Agricultural Research, 1998) 
331
 ICRISAT policy on IP (2002) available at http://www.icrisat.org/ip_management/policy.htm  
332
 Wolson, R., Intellectual property tools, innovation and commercialisation of R&D: Options to assist 
developing countries in positioning themselves to reap the benefits of a stronger intellectual property regime, 
with special reference to the role of intellectual property management in research organisations, paper presented 
 143 
 
The differing perspectives on the concept of IP and IP protection invite different strategies for 
IP management. This provides fertile ground for conflict where partners from different 
sectors collaborate on research with potential proprietary value. This significantly influences 
how research is conducted in a PPP and how the PPP handles IP issues.  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
Save for providing the framework under which agricultural PPPs operate, international and 
national IP legislation per se have minimal impact on the execution of food security oriented 
agricultural PPPs. Among the FAO IT, the TRIPs Agreement and the UPOV Conventions, 
the FAO IT has the most impact on the conduct of research in agricultural PPPs involving the 
CG Centres. This is because it places the CG’s ex-situ germplasm collection under the 
Multilateral System and provides for the terms of its transfer and that of other plant genetic 
resources by use of MTAs. The 1994 agreement between the FAO and the CG Centres 
further reinforces this as does the ‘direct membership’ that CG Centres have to the 
International Treaty.  
 
National IP law per se has little influence on the conduct of research in agricultural PPPs save 
for the sections that require inventors to apply for patents in the host countries before they do 
so in other countries. In India, the fact that, as shown later, the ICRISAT-PS Hybrid Parent 
Seed Consortia have been operating in the absence of PVP law supports this argument. 
Biosafety and biotechnology legislation in ILRI’s ECF project and seed law in the ICRISAT-
PS consortia are more significant in the conduct of research in the two case studies.  
 
The most important legal instruments in the conduct of agricultural research in the two case 
studies, as we will see in the next chapter, are the respective partnership agreements. This 
holds true for all agricultural research PPPs. Using the vertical-horizontal distinction, the 
partnership agreements in whatever form, make up the horizontal aspect. This is more 
important than the vertical aspect (international and national IP regimes). Building IP capacity 
is vital; parties must be competent in conducting IP related negotiations, drafting IP related 
agreements and contracts as these are the essential determinants of how IPRs are ultimately 
                                                                                                                                                  
at ‘The ICTSD/UNCTAD/TIPS Regional Dialogue on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Sustainable 
Development in Eastern and Southern Africa’ South Africa, 29 June - 1July (2004) 
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exercised and concomitantly, how a PPP’s food security goals are met. The public and private 
sectors’ perspectives on IP are influenced by the parties’ IP policies and by the partnership 
contract and are more important to a PPP than domestic IP legislation per se.  
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Chapter Six  
 
Contextualising the case studies: ILRI’s ECF vaccine project & 
the ICRISAT-PS consortia 
 
6.0  Introduction  
 
One effect of privatisation of agricultural research is that International Agricultural Research 
Centres and other public research organisations are increasingly exposed to interaction with 
the private sector. In addition to this, the globalisation of the intellectual property regime 
among other factors is responsible for the rise in significance of IPRs in agricultural research 
to both public and private research organisations. The transition to a more demand led 
research agenda has increased the awareness in IARCs that commercialisation of products of 
research may be key to their sustainable delivery to users and that the private sector is an 
integral part of this delivery.  
 
Some public research institutes have formulated policies on IP and on partnership with the 
private sector in response to this inevitable exposure. For IARCs in the CGIAR such as ILRI 
and ICRISAT, these policies are influenced by their membership of the CGIAR system. This 
chapter has two main aims: firstly, to locate the case studies within (i) agricultural PPPs 
generally; (ii) PPPs in the CG Centres and (iii) PPPs in ILRI and ICRISAT. In so doing, it 
tests the typicality of the case studies and attempts to draw implications on how they are 
influenced by their specific contexts. Secondly, this chapter similarly locates ILRI’s and 
ICRISAT’s IP policies within the general CG system wide policies. Chapters three and four 
underscored the need to have creative policies that facilitate mitigating the excludability 
effect of IPRs particularly in food security and other social welfare oriented institutions. This 
chapter analyses the ILRI’s and ICRISAT’s IP policies within this context and attempts to 
draw implications relating to the formation of partnerships in the respective Centres. 
 
The first section comprises an in depth review of the ECF project at ILRI and the ICRISAT-
Private Sector hybrid seed consortia. It covers the background of the respective PPPs, the 
rationale, their organisation and design, the partners involved and their roles, the activities, 
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achievements and impacts to date. Virtually all the information for this section is based on the 
interviews conducted during fieldwork; data collection ended in December 2006 and the 
partnerships may have evolved since.  The next section locates the case studies in agricultural 
PPPs, PPPs in the CG and PPPs in the respective Centres by using various indicators 
identified in previous studies and in existing literature.  
 
The third section of the chapter analyses ILRI’s and ICRISAT’s respective IP policies. It 
looks at how the CG system wide IP policies have influenced the respective Centres’ policies. 
It also investigates whether (i) the policies are creative enough to mitigate the excludability 
effect of IPRs and (ii) the policies aid or inhibit collaboration with the private sector.  
 
6.1 A brief profile: ILRI & ICRISAT 
 
Being part of the CG system, the two Centres conduct research primarily addressing food 
security. The CGIAR’s mission is to ‘contribute to food security and poverty eradication in 
developing countries through research, partnership, capacity building and policy support.’ All 
projects conducted in the CG Centres have food security oriented goals.  
 
ILRI was established in 1994 when the International Livestock Centre for Africa based in 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and the International Laboratory for Research on Animal Disease 
based in Nairobi, Kenya merged.  While ILRI’s headquarters are in Nairobi, ILRI maintains a 
second principal campus in Addis Ababa. ILRI’s research activities are organised around four 
themes: targeting and innovation, market opportunities, biotechnology and people livestock 
and the environment.  
 
ILRI has over 700 staff from about 40 countries. About 11% of the staff are internationally 
recruited and represent over 30 disciplines. The rest of the staff is made up of Kenyan and 
Ethiopian nationals. ILRI is governed by a board of trustees made up of twelve professionals 
with experience in development and management issues.  
 
ILRI receives its funding from over 60 sources comprising private, public and government 
organisations in both developed and developing countries. Some donors support ILRI with 
core and programme funds whereas others finance individual research projects. In addition to 
this financial support, host countries i.e. Kenya and Ethiopia provide in-kind support.   
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ICRISAT is one of the oldest institutions in the CGIAR having been established before the 
CGIAR. ICRISAT has six offices in Africa; its headquarters are in Hyderabad, India. Like 
ILRI, ICRISAT’s activities are organised around four global themes. These are markets, 
policy and impacts; harnessing biotechnology for the poor; crop improvement, management 
and utilisation for food security and health; and agro ecosystems. ICRISAT’s mandate crops 
are pearl millet, sorghum, chick pea, pigeon pea and groundnut. 
 
ICRISAT has over 900 staff who make up about 14% of total CGIAR staff and is one of the 
largest CG Centres. Of these, only 6% are internationally recruited. In 2005, ICRISAT’s total 
funding amounted to US$28.4m; about 80% of this was received from CGIAR members in 
Europe, North America and international and regional organisations. The rest was from other 
CGIAR members and non members the latter of who contributed US$2.5million.  
 
Table 6.1: Share of Centres’ total expenditure, policy & partnerships, 2003-2005 (%) 
2003 2004 2005 
 ILRI ICRISAT ILRI ICRISAT ILRI ICRISAT 
Policy 6 11 6 13 10 37 
Collaboration & 
partnerships  6 6 12 6 29 12 
Source: www.cgiar.org 
 
For ILRI, the share of expenditure on collaboration and partnerships doubled between 2003 
and 2004 showing increased prioritisation of collaboration; this however does not correlate 
with the share in policy development. One may infer that the policies existing in ILRI 
between 2003 and 2004 were sufficient to support the type of partnerships that the institution 
engaged in during the same period and that the type of partnerships engaged in were 
relatively of a similar nature and thus did not require the need to invest in further 
development of policy. The share spent by ICRISAT in development of policy more than 
tripled between 2004 and 2005 showing a high prioritisation of policy. This correlates with 
an increase in the share of expenditure on collaboration and partnerships which doubled in 
the same period. This correlation is supported by 2003/2004 data where investment in both 
policy development and in collaborations did not change.    
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6.2  ILRI ECF Vaccine Project  
6.2.1 Background 
 
The ECF vaccine project is an animal health product development partnership. East Coast 
Fever (ECF) is a tick-borne disease affecting cattle in eastern, central and southern Africa; it 
is caused by a parasite known as Theileria parva (T. parva).  The Theileria livestock 
parasites cost the world US$1 billion annually.1 T. parva is one of the most serious of the 
theilerial livestock diseases and is responsible for over one million cattle deaths annually; 25 
million cattle across 11 countries of eastern, central and southern Africa are at risk.  
 
The impact of ECF is profound on the livelihoods of small holder farmers in this region. ECF 
causes high morbidity and mortality in cattle and prevents the introduction of improved 
breeds of cattle which, while highly productive, are particularly susceptible to tick-borne 
diseases. It is estimated that in Africa, a cow succumbs to ECF every 30 seconds.2 For small 
holder farmers, who are the backbone of East Africa’s rural economy, ECF has grave 
economic consequences. Most of these farmers rely on their cattle; their death directly 
undermines the farmers’ livelihoods as it represents a loss of income with direct 
consequences on their ability to feed, cloth and educate their families.3 ECF therefore 
increases the vulnerability of small holder farmers who are already on the brink of poverty.  
So important is ECF that the governments in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania rank ECF in the 
top two priorities for animal research.4  
 
6.2.2 Project’s objectives 
 
The purpose of the ECF project is to develop methods for the integrated control of ECF, 
combining improved vaccine, diagnostics and decision support systems. The short term 
scientific objective is to ‘develop an experimental multi-component subunit vaccine against 
ECF that is shown to be protective to cattle in laboratory trials’ while the long term scientific 
objective is to ‘generate a safe, highly efficacious, affordable and easily deliverable ECF 
                                               
1
 ILRI, ‘Lords of life and livelihood’ available at www.ilri.org  
2
 DfID, ‘Towards a pro-poor vaccine for East Coast Fever, Project R8042’ available at http://www.dfid-
ahp.org.uk/index.php?section=3&subsection=25  
3
 ILRI, ‘When speed matters’ available at 
http://www.ilri.org/ilripubaware/uploaded%20files/20048111010340.03BR_ISS_WhenSpeedMatters(ECF).htm  
4
 DfID, ‘Integrated control of East Coast Fever in cattle of small-holder farmers’ available at http://www.dfid-
ahp.org.uk/index.php?section=4&subsection=48  
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vaccine.’5 Although achievement of food security is not mentioned in the project objective, 
the implications of the project on this are clear. The final beneficiaries of the project are 
resource poor small holder farmers in the East African Region who rely on their cattle for 
their livelihood including providing income to feed their families. ILRI’s mission is to ‘work 
at the crossroads of livestock and poverty, bringing high-quality science and capacity-
building to bear on poverty reduction and sustainable development for poor livestock keepers 
and their communities’. Its strategy is premised on the belief that livestock have a positive 
effect on diets, health, incomes, financial security, sustainable crops yields, employment 
prospects and social status. Moreover, as a CG Centre, ILRI’s mission is inextricably linked 
to improving food security. The CG’s mission is to ‘contribute to food security and poverty 
eradication in developing countries through research, partnership, capacity building and 
policy support.’ 
 
6.2.3 Treatment of ECF 
 
ECF is currently treated by use of a strategy known as infection-and-treatment method (ITM) 
which involves inoculating live T. parva parasites into an animal and simultaneously treating 
the animal with an antibiotic. Although this method is very effective in immunising cattle, it 
is considered inconvenient and costly. It requires trained personnel to administer the live 
vaccine and monitor any reactions and secondly, the live T. parva parasites need to be 
maintained in liquid nitrogen ‘cold chain’ which adds to the cost and logistical complexity. 
Because of this, ITM is deemed to be complicated and unsuitable for pastoral production 
systems.  
 
Control of ECF by use of tick killing sprays is expensive and its continued use can lead to 
tick resistance to the acaricides. The spray can also leave toxic residues in milk and meat that 
render the products unsafe for humans. Needless to say, it is environmental unfriendly. The 
prevailing situation makes the case for research into simpler, safer and more accessible 
treatment of ECF.  
 
It was on this basis that the ECF project was conceived. The project is an ongoing, unique 
product development partnership made up of eight partners who have both distinct and 
                                               
5
 ILRI, pers. comm. 
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overlapping roles. The partners bring different areas of expertise and resources into the 
partnership. These can be represented thus: 
 
Table 6.2: The parties in the ECF project and their roles 
Partner & location Sector Main role 
ILRI, Kenya IARC Coordinating research;  
identifying genes and 
assignment of gene functions 
(gene annotation) identifying 
potential vaccine candidates;  
The Institute for Genomic 
Research (TIGR) which has 
since merged with other 
institutes to form the J. Craig 
Venter Institute, USA (TIGR is 
used in this thesis) 
Private not-for-profit  Sequencing genome of T. 
parva; gene annotation 
The University of Victoria, 
Canada 
Public  Interpreting sequence data 
The Oxford University, UK Public Provide technologies for 
vaccine delivery 
The Ludwig Institute of Cancer 
Research (LICR), Belgium 
Public Develop efficient screens of 
parasite proteins 
Merial Ltd, France Private Provide technologies for 
vaccine delivery; product 
development – manufacturing, 
licensing and marketing 
NARIs e.g. KARI and the 
Department of Veterinary 
Services (DVS) both in Kenya 
NARI Testing; clinical/field trials 
DfID, UK Public  Funded research 
 
The idea of developing an alternative treatment to ECF through partnership was conceived in 
the late 1990s by an ILRI scientist and a researcher from The Institute of Genomic Research 
(TIGR), a not-for-profit private company based in Maryland, USA. The then Director 
General of ILRI allocated US$300,000 from ILRI’s core funds to fund TIGR’s genome 
sequencing of T. parva. TIGR injected US$1.6 million, US$100,000 of which was from the 
chairman’s personal funds.6 The UK Department for International Development (DfID) 
subsequently granted US$5million over a three year period. Additional contributions came 
from Rockefeller Foundation and the U.S. Agency for International Development. 
 
 
 
                                               
6
 ILRI, ‘The power of public-private partnerships’ available at 
http://www.ilri.org/ilripubaware/uploaded%20files/2004891038450.03BR_ISS_PowerOfPublic-
PrivatePartnerships.pdf  
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Table 6.3: The ECF project contractual engagements timeline 
late 1990s Partnership conceived by ILRI scientist and TIGR researcher 
Late 1990s Seed funding provided out of ILRI’s core funds and from TIGR 
Oct 1998 Merial and ILRI discuss the possibility of undertaking joint research and sign a 
confidentiality agreement 
May 1999 research agreement between ILRI & TIGR on sequencing, analysing and annotating, 
facilitating web-based access and preliminary functional analysis 
Feb 2001 Funding proposal submitted to University of Edinburgh & DfID  
June 2001 Agreement signed with LICR 
June 2001 Agreement signed with University of Victoria 
July 2001 A sub contract with University of Edinburgh  
Oct 2001 Agreement signed with University of Oxford 
Nov 2001 Merial joins partnership through Letter of Intent   
 
Funding from DfID was via a sub-contract from the University of Edinburgh, the grant 
holder, which subsequently sub contracted the consortium to carry out the research. The 
purpose of this arrangement is unclear. To add to the complexity, the funding agreement 
required the partnership to grant DfID through the University of Edinburgh, a non-exclusive 
licence of the end product; DfID is to retain the sublicence and can grant it to any party (even 
those outside the partnership) to supply the end product.7 This seems consistent with 
mechanisms commonly employed in product development partnerships as discussed in 
chapter four. The main aim is to ensure the delivery of end products by reserving the right to 
grant licenses to third parties as a safety provision in case the stipulated commercial partner 
does not honour the terms relating to delivery.  
 
By 2006, funding from DfID had expired and therefore technically. DfID was no longer part 
of the partnership. The clause granting DfID the non-exclusive license to the end product was 
not amended. The effect of this is potentially grave: firstly, it is unusual that a former 
consortium member can dictate the terms of the consortium after the member’s departure. It 
amounts to a party outside a contract influencing the terms of the contract. This goes against 
the basic tenets of contract law. Secondly, concerns were expressed over the effect of DfID’s 
‘remote control’ of the IP on potential collaborators.8  
 
This could have been resolved by a simple amendment of the agreement or a clause 
stipulating that on exit of a partner from a consortium, its contribution to research would be 
negotiated by the parties. The fact that this was not flagged out by ILRI as the coordinator of 
                                               
7
 ILRI, pers. comm. 
8
 ILRI, pers. comm.  
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the project underscores the need for increased institutional capacity in IP as advocated for in 
chapter four.  
 
6.2.4 Project structure 
 
Initially, the staggered membership and chronological progress resulted in ILRI signing 
different agreements with each partner. It was recommended that all agreements be put under 
one master agreement which would provide for the rights, duties and obligations of all 
parties. The agreement is not static and has in built provisions allowing for its evolvement. 
The project is in two phases. Phase I is the proof-of-concept and is largely laboratory based. 
This phase involves the identification of vaccine candidates and their evaluation in cattle. 
ILRI is the lead coordinator in the proof-of-concept phase. The second phase comprises 
product development and commercialisation which involves field testing for safety and 
efficacy, licensing and distribution. Merial and the NARIs take the lead in phase II.  
 
Table 6.4: ECF project progress  
Basic research Discovery 
Proof-of-concept: 
Vaccine 
formulation & 
testing 
Product 
development trials 
& scaling-up 
production 
Product launch 
• Bovine 
immunology  
• Parasite biology 
• ECF parasite 
genome 
sequencing 
• Identification of 
suitable 
candidate 
antigens  
• Demonstration 
of induction of 
responses 
associated with 
significant 
protection 
against vaccine 
• Product 
development 
trials:  
• Dose 
• Safety 
• Duration of 
protection 
• Efficacy against 
different parasite 
strains 
• Registration and 
licensing 
• Scaling up 
production 
• On going 
production 
• Marketing 
• Distribution and 
sales 
• Product support 
• ILRI • TIGR 
• LICR 
• ILRI 
• Univ. of 
Victoria 
• ILRI 
• Merial 
• Univ. of Oxford 
• Merial 
• NARIs 
• Merial 
 
Source: ILRI, with modifications 
 
 
Year 0 Year ??? 
Stage of 
 project as at Dec 2006 
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6.2.5 Motivation for joining the partnership  
 
The incentives for joining the partnership vary across the membership. Overall, from a 
scientific point of view, research in theileria parasites provides vital insights into human 
diseases. The T. parva has an unusual biology; theileria parasites are the only parasites 
known to transform healthy cells into a cancer-like state causing uncontrolled proliferation of 
white blood cells. ‘This means that the parasite is manipulating the biochemical pathways 
that cells use to regulate their growth and suggests that scientists may be able to use T. parva 
to gain deeper insight into human cancers.’9  
 
In addition, the T. parva parasite is closely related to the organisms that cause human malaria, 
HIV/Aids and TB. The impact of these diseases especially in Africa cannot be overstated. 
The immune response engendered by the ECF vaccine candidates ‘are precisely the immune 
responses researchers working to develop vaccines for HIV/Aids, TB, malaria and cancer are 
striving to achieve.’10  Of direct commercial incentive to the private sector, other members of 
the T. parva family infect sheep, goats and deer and put 200 million cattle at risk across the 
Mediterranean Basin and Asia.11  
 
The potential for the science in the project to assist in building a clearer understanding of how 
vaccines of greater commercial interest may be developed was one of the main incentives for 
Merial to join the partnership.12 Merial had little to loose; the funds for the project were from 
DfID. The project ‘subsidised’ Merial’s research and provided it with an opportunity to test 
its vaccine delivery system. According to ILRI, the identification of partners to invite to the 
partnership was informed by ILRI’s perception of the skills and expertise required to move 
from the science to the end product and the partners most suited to provide the skills and 
expertise; comparative advantage and competency were therefore high in the list of criteria 
used in identifying potential partners.13  
 
                                               
9
 ILRI, ‘The power of public-private partnerships’ supra note 6 
10
 DfID, ‘East Coast Fever Vaccine: towards a pro poor vaccine for East Coast Fever: R8042’ supra note 2 
11
 ILRI, ‘Lords of life and livelihood’ supra note 1 
12
 Merial, pers. comm. 
13
 ILRI, pers. comm. 
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TIGR had great expertise in gene sequencing; TIGR sequenced the first complete genome of 
a living organism in 1995 and went on to sequence the human genome in 2001.14 Merial is a 
world leader in development, manufacture and distribution of animal vaccines; ILRI 
considered its involvement vital. Merial already had proprietary delivery technology which it 
brought into the partnership. A team from the University of Oxford also had expertise in 
proprietary technology for antigen delivery systems. KARI provides a wealth of knowledge 
of field sites for testing of experimental vaccines; working with local partners of which 
NARIs are the most significant, is part of ILRI’s mandate. ILRI saw itself as best suited to 
coordinate the research; it benefits from years of research in animal diseases affecting the 
poor, has expertise in bovine immunology and excellent large animal containment facilities.  
  
6.2.6 Achievements and impacts 
 
The project was at the proof-of-concept phase as at December 2006. Some of the major 
milestones are: 
• The T. parva genome was sequenced and published.15  
• Identification of eight vaccine candidate antigens was completed. These were evaluated 
and shown to be successful. The results were published.16 
• The vaccine candidates were combined with effective antigen delivery systems. A 
promising delivery system was identified; this is based on an adaptation of proprietary 
technology supplied by Merial 
• The team demonstrated that all the cattle that survived after being vaccinated with the 
candidate antigens using the delivery system and then exposed to a dose of parasites that 
would usually kill the cattle, generated the desired type of immune response 
 
As the project is still ongoing, one can only refer to the potential impact of the ECF vaccine. 
The expected cheap, effective, safe and convenient method to deliver vaccine could prevent 
one million cattle deaths and could save an estimated US$300million per annum. The ECF 
vaccine is expected to cost farmers about 20% of the current ‘live’ ITM vaccine thereby 
making it more accessible to small holder farmers.  
                                               
14
 TIGR, ‘Partners on the digital frontier’ available at www.ilri.org  
15
 Gardner, M., et al., Genome sequence of Theileria parva, a bovine pathogen that transforms lymphocytes, 
Science 309 (2005)  134 
16
 Graham, S., et al., Theileria parva candidate vaccine antigens recognised by immune bovine cytotoxic T 
lymphocytes, PNAS 103/9 (2006) 3286 
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Other potential impacts stem from the scientific breakthrough of the project. The science is 
expected to provide valuable insights into other animal and human diseases caused by close 
relatives of T. parva.  
 
A significant impact of the project to date is its contribution to capacity building. Firstly, 
African scientists and technicians have benefited from training through the project; this has 
had direct consequences on the capacity of animal health research in developing countries. 
Secondly, ILRI’s involvement at the genome sequencing and annotation stage underpinned 
the establishment of the first bioinformatics unit in eastern and central Africa; this is situated 
at ILRI. In 2003, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) endorsed the 
establishment of the Biosciences for eastern and central Africa (BecA), a network of research 
facilities from participating institutions whose aim is to facilitate and support state-of-the-art 
research in biosciences to produce technologies that help the poor. ILRI was chosen to host 
the central hub which will provide a common biosciences research platform for the region. 
The bioinformatics unit at ILRI, established under the ECF project, forms the centrepiece of 
the services offered by BecA.17  
 
Thirdly, and perhaps the most profound impact of the project, is that on organisational and 
institutional culture.  The creative collaboration pursues new ways of conducting research 
and producing results from the research. It challenges the conventional methods of 
institutional research and development. In the past, virtually all research by the public sector 
was technology led; the most common effect of this model of research was good science 
accompanied by a failure to deliver effective and affordable products downstream. The ECF 
model of partnership adopts a demand led research approach for the benefit of poor farmers. 
 
Smith writes of the project from an innovations systems perspective describing it as 
 ‘a potentially new model of institutionally disembedded research and 
development partnership that functions in a developing country context... [it] 
provides an example of a more ‘complete’ approach to innovation, understanding 
the need to both identify needs and priorities...’18 
 
                                               
17
 ILRI, ‘Genomics breakthrough made by Kenya and USA institutes on cattle-killing parasite’ available at 
www.ilri.org  
18
 Smith, J., Context-bound knowledge production, capacity building and new product networks, J. Int. Dev. 17 
(2005) 647  
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For ILRI, the resounding effect of the project was that it instilled into the scientists involved 
new ways of thinking and of learning.19 Smith continues that ‘the network has forced older 
institutionally-embedded technical knowledge bases to be re-oriented outwards, and has 
generated new knowledge bases and capacity that is institutionally dis-embedded and tacit.’20  
 
6.2.7 Lessons learnt  
 
ILRI had no experience with PPPs at the scale of the ECF project. Scientists interviewed 
referred to the project as being a ‘steep learning curve’. Although the project is a great leap 
forward in terms of organisational and institutional practice, with it comes the challenges of 
managing such a partnership. ILRI has had to learn how to balance the interests of the 
partners, manage the expectations of the parties, deal with differing institutional cultures and 
trust issues although these were more perceived rather than real.21 Issues related to 
intellectual property, agreements between the parties and staggered membership have also 
proved to be a challenge. These issues are examined in depth in the next chapter.  
 
Key lessons include keeping the overarching goal of providing a pro-poor ECF vaccine in 
mind at all times, clear communication with parties throughout the process, having clear and 
concise agreements in place which anticipate future engagements, amending agreements as 
soon as the need occurs and addressing conflicting and disconnected policies and practices.22 
 
6.3  The ICRISAT-PS consortia 
 
In the 1970s when ICRISAT was established, public agricultural research was underpinned 
by the institutional dualism prevalent at the time which made a strict distinction between 
private and public sector research. The former was seen as primarily driven by a profit motive 
and would therefore invest in areas with margins of return while the latter had no business 
investing in areas that the private sector could invest in. This rigid notion of public goods 
informed a variety of beliefs which in the case of ICRISAT included firstly, that ICRISAT’s 
research would exclusively be for the benefit of the public sector which included farmers and 
other public institutions; and secondly, that the Indian Council of Agricultural Research, 
                                               
19
 ILRI scientists, pers. comm. 
20
 Smith (2005) supra note 18 
21
 ILRI, pers. comm. 
22
 ILRI, pers. comm. 
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India’s national research organisation, would be ICRISAT’s main partner and main recipient 
of ICRISAT’s research products.23 These assumptions and beliefs are reflected in ICRISAT’s 
policy of the time.  
 
Events catalysing the formation of the ICRISAT–PS consortia can perhaps be traced back to 
India’s liberalisation policies in the late 1980s. The Seed Policy of 1988 allowed for the 
growth of the private seed industry; under the Central Seed Act of 1966, supply of seed for 
most staples in India was dominated by the public sector. Currently, private seed companies 
dominate seed production and supply in India. 
 
Three major factors can be arguably credited with the genesis of collaboration between 
ICRISAT and the private sector which eventually led to the consortia. Firstly, as the private 
sector grew, it developed significant research capacity which meant that it could conduct 
research competitively and was no longer a passive recipient of ICRISAT bred material. 
Secondly, the CGIAR Centres were experiencing funding shortages; there was increased 
pressure to demonstrate the impact of international agricultural research; as a direct 
consequence of the funding crunch, ICRISAT needed to find alternative means to supplement 
its research budget. Thirdly, being market driven, the private sector provided what the 
consumers (seed merchants and farmers) wanted. What the end users wanted was not 
necessarily what ICRISAT provided. For example, in the case of pearl millet and sorghum, 
two of ICRISAT’s mandate crops, ICRISAT’s breeding strategy was breeding for resistance 
to biotic and abiotic stresses such as resistance to grain mould.24 ICRISAT’s focus was on 
improvement of ‘small hard grained types’ of sorghum hybrids.  The private sector on the 
other hand, having direct contact with seed merchants and farmers, discerned the demand for 
not ICRISAT-type ‘small hard grained types’ but ‘large grained types’ with high grain and 
fodder yields. The private sector sought to develop the hybrids that farmers wanted.  
 
ICRISAT’s view of the private sector can be said to have changed in at least four aspects. 
Firstly, the private sector was seen as a research partner in its own right and secondly, being 
                                               
23
 Reddy, B., Hall, A. & Rai, K., ‘The long road to partnership: private support of public research on sorghum 
and pearl millet’ in Hall, A., Yoganand, B., Sulaiman, R. & Clark, N., (eds.) Sharing perspectives on public-
private sector interaction: proceedings of a workshop, 10 April 2001, ICRISAT, Patancheru, India (New Delhi 
and Patancheru: National Centre for Agricultural Economics & ICRISAT, 2001) 
24
 Sorghum is often damaged by late monsoon rains and therefore suffers grain mould 
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close to the end users, the private sector was an invaluable source of feed-back information. 
This was vital given the pressures on impact of research resounding in IARCs at the time.  
 
Table 6.5: Chronology of events leading to the development of the ICRISAT-PS consortia 
Early to mid 
1990s 
ICRISAT’s breeding strategy priorities changed from yields enhancement to resistance 
to biotic and abiotic stresses with a view to improving production sustainability in Africa 
Mid 1990s The private sector became aware that new breeding material from ICRISAT did not 
include characteristics preferred in the Indian market for sorghum and millet hybrids 
Mid 1998 ICRISAT scientists made initial contacts with seed companies with a view to developing 
a project that would produce outputs directly related to seed companies 
October 1998 Decline in unrestricted core funding necessitated seeking funds from alternative sources. 
The need to mobilise funds from the private sector was emphasised at the International 
Centres’ Week.  
Early 1999 ICRISAT scientists continued discussion with the private sector on the possibilities of 
providing financial support for ICRISAT’s research portfolio on diversifying sorghum 
and millet hybrids. 
Early 1999 The proposals for consortia for sorghum and millet were developed and submitted to the  
Mid 1999 Further discussions between the private sector and ICRISAT scientists 
September 
1999 
ICRISAT Governing Board approved the proposed partnerships with the private sector 
in principle 
End October 
1999 
ICRISAT Donor Relations Office received the consortia proposals from the Genetic 
Resources and Enhancement Programme’s programme director 
End October 
1999 
Budget estimates for the consortia proposals were cleared and approved by ICRISAT’s 
finance division 
Early 
November 
1999 
The proposals for sorghum and pearl millet were modified to make them uniform in 
terms of structure, budget, and terms and conditions. Revised versions were sent to 
Donor Relations Office 
November 
1999 
The proposals were sent to ICRISAT’s Interim Director General’s office 
November 
1999 
ICRISAT’s Interim Director General advised against pursuing the private sector for 
small grants. Detailed explanation by scientists and their intention to seek funds from the 
private sector were made to Donor Relations Office 
December 
1999 
The proposals were sent to the Officer-in-Charge for the Director General who advised 
that they should be sent to the new Director General who would take charge in January 
2000 
End January 
2000 
Donor Relations submitted proposals to the new Director General who advised that an 
assessment be made of the implications of the proposed partnerships. Discussions 
between the Director of ICRISAT’s Genetic Resources and Enhancement Programme 
and the new Director General resolved pending issues 
Late January 
2000 
The proposals were approved by the Director General and dispatched to private seed 
companies 
Source: Reddy et al. (2001) with modifications 
 
Thirdly, ICRISAT saw the private sector as a valuable conduit for delivery of its research 
products. This represented a major shift from the informal networks that ICRISAT had 
hitherto used to get their products out into the market. Fourthly, ICRISAT recognised the 
potential for obtaining funding from the private sector. The private sector was therefore seen 
as a valuable research partner and a source of funding. This shift might have been 
strengthened by the prioritisation of partnerships and collaborations in ICRISAT (table 6.1).  
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A series of meetings between ICRISAT and the private sector were held. ICRISAT facilitated 
the private sector’s participation in conferences, field days and study tours. It was during one 
such meeting that the then president of the All India Seed Association suggested funding 
through a consortium of seed companies. The initial proposal related to research in sorghum 
and pearl millet hybrids. It took almost two years from the conceptual stages to the actual 
signing of the agreements between ICRISAT and the private seed companies.  
 
6.3.1 Structure and details of the consortia 
 
Since the signing of the agreements in January 2000, the proposals have been revised and 
expanded to increase the level of funding from the private sector and to include another 
consortium on pigeon pea. Membership to the three consortia has been steadily increasing 
since their respective launching.  
 
After much debate on the models for partnership, the consortium model was recommended.25 
Other models under consideration were the licensing/royalty model, the turn-over based 
check model and a mixed model. The consortium model was preferable to the other models 
on many grounds: firstly, ‘free riding’ was cause for concern to the private sector. A seed 
company on its own would be reluctant to sponsor ICRISAT  research under the other models 
as any new material produced as a result of the partnership would be accessible to other non-
investing company and the general public. The interest, participation and commitment of 
many seed companies was therefore vital to address the issue of free-riding; if all major 
competitors were members of the consortium, there would be fewer opportunities for free 
riders. The consortium model best provided the means to which this could be achieved.  
 
Secondly, the consortium model was found to be financially the best option for ICRISAT and 
for the private sector partners. By imposing similar funding requirements from the seed 
companies, albeit in two tiers, the cost for funding research for the individual consortium 
members would be reduced. The funding support from the consortium members would be 
primarily based on their own assessment of its cost effectiveness.  
 
                                               
25
 Recommendations of the Research Committee submitted to the Management Group  (2003) 
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The main incentive for the private sector was that although ICRISAT supplies raw 
germplasm to all scientists in the public and private sectors on request, supply of value-added 
breeding lines would be made available to consortium members earlier than non-members 
who would have to wait for a minimum of three years before they got the improved breeding 
lines and value added parental lines either directly from ICRISAT or from national breeding 
programmes.  
 
The Research Committee lists five advantages of the consortium model: 
(a) The grants are provided for ICRISAT’s agreed research agenda and can be used for 
other ICRISAT research according to ICRISAT’s evolving research needs 
(b) As the funds are in the form of research grants, they are not received with respect to 
any particular materials supplied to the private sector. The effect of this is that any 
returns or output from the funds is not exclusive to the private sector; it remains in the 
public domain 
(c) Consortia members select materials at various stages of development and fine-tune 
some of these to meet their needs 
(d) There is no restriction on the number of lines that the consortium members can select. 
This leads to liberal selection and seed supply which in turn contributes to enhanced 
diversity of their programmes and to on-farm diversity 
(e) The consortium model generates a feeling of ownership which contributes to more 
congenial interaction between ICRISAT and the private sector26 
 
Under the three consortia, each seed company joins the respective consortium by entering 
into an agreement with ICRISAT to provide a research grant under the technical and 
administrative terms and conditions. Seed companies belonging to more than one consortium 
have to sign an agreement in respect of each consortium. Companies in a consortium do not 
enter into any formal agreement with each other; this leaves membership open-ended 
allowing other seed companies to join each consortium without the involvement of other 
members.  This makes entry into the consortium relatively easy. The Letters of Agreement 
are in standard form; members belonging to either tier (discussed below) sign a similar 
agreement mutatis mutandis to the crop.  
 
                                               
26
 Id 
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6.3.2 Terms of the agreement 
 
Firstly, consortia members are divided into two categories: primary and promotional. The 
primary members are large and medium sized companies with well established research, 
development and marketing infrastructure which market more than 1000 tonnes of hybrid 
seed annually, while the promotional members are small and/or start up companies marketing 
less than 1000 tonnes of hybrid seed annually. These are encouraged to join as primary 
members although they are also offered promotional membership. Should they join as 
promotional members, they are expected to ‘graduate’ to primary membership in two years.  
 
For each of the three consortia, grant contributions from the primary members is US$10,000 
per annum while that from the promotional members is US$5,000 for each consortium. 
Indian-based companies are allowed to pay the grant contribution in Indian Rupees to avoid 
the $/Rs fluctuation. The type of membership dictates the level and priority of access to 
ICRISAT material.  The material for the three consortia falls into four categories: (i) breeding 
lines; (ii) A/B under conversion; (iii) near finished A/B/R lines and (iv) parents of released/ 
commercial A/B/R lines. The four categories are supplied to the seed companies based on 
their membership and on charge basis; consortium members receive a 50% discount.  
 
Table 6.6: The level and priority of access to ICRISAT material 
Level and priority of access Category of improved breeding 
materials Primary 
members 
Promotional 
members 
Non 
members  
Charge/ 
sample 
(US$)1 
4 Released/commercial A/B/R lines2 Yes Yes* Yes* 400 
3 Finished A/B/R lines3 Yes Yes* No 350 
2 A/B pairs under conversion Yes No No 200 
 
1 Breeding lines (F4/S2 onwards) Yes No No 100 
Source: Guidelines for ICRISAT–Private sector partnership in hybrid parents research consortia (2003), with 
modification 
1A sample refers to 5 grams of seed per sample of sorghum and pearl millet and 10 grams of seed per sample 
for pigeon pea 
2
refers to lines identified as parents of hybrids tested or released by national programmes, or parents of hybrids 
developed and commercialised by seed companies or registered as potential hybrid parents at ICRISAT   
3
refers to well characterised lines (according to ICRISAT nomenclature) as promising hybrid parents 
*
see discussion below   
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6.3.3 Conditions for access 
 
Category 1 material is the basic ‘building blocks’ of commercial lines. The R&D effort 
increases from category 1 to category 4 of the materials.  Primary members have access to all 
four categories while promotional members have access to the last two. The breeding lines 
(category 1) and category 2 material are available only to primary members. Promotional 
members gain access to category 3 and 4 materials three years after they are named at 
ICRISAT. Non- consortium members do not have access to category 1 to 3 of the materials 
but have access to the last category of materials three years after they are supplied to 
consortium members. These levels and conditions for access are discussed in chapter seven.  
 
The breeding materials are to be supplied on specific request from the consortium or non 
consortium member. Transfer of breeding material from ICRISAT is via an MTA which 
stipulates that the material supplied to the public or private recipient is for their use only and 
cannot be transferred to a third party. The standard Letter of Agreement stipulates that 
ICRISAT ‘will retain the exclusive right of registration of materials and publication of 
research information pertaining to international public goods’ although funding support from 
the seed company will be acknowledged. It categorically states that the seed company will 
not have any exclusive rights to use the products of ICRISAT’s research and that use of 
ICRISAT’s name directly in the course of marketing the company’s product is prohibited. 
There is no mention of a requirement to acknowledge the material was obtained from 
ICRISAT. 
 
Progress is to be monitored annually by highlighting major research findings with details of 
breeding products developed during that year. ICRISAT undertakes to provide training to 
technical staff of the seed company at the latter’s cost; ICRISAT also undertakes to invite the 
company for meetings, seminars and field days relevant to the consortium commodity.  
 
The standard Letter of Agreement establishes an Advisory Committee consisting of three 
private sector members and two members from ICRISAT whose mandate is to monitor and 
provide guidance to the consortia. The Committee meets twice a year to resolve any issues 
and review the arrangements. ICRISAT’s Management Group is authorised to review the 
contributions and charges from time to time in consultation with the Advisory Committee.  
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Dispute settlement is firstly managed through mutual discussion between the parties failing 
which, a determination by ICRISAT’s management is final and binding. The standard Letter 
of Agreement does not contain an exit clause; the presumption is that non payment of the 
annual grant renders membership as cancelled. This however does not address those 
promotional members who fail to advance to primary members after two years and what they 
are entitled to. Fortunately, such scenarios have not presented themselves to date.  
 
Table 6.7: Consortia membership as at September 2005 
 Primary members Promotional members Total  
Sorghum consortium 12 6 18 
Pearl millet consortium 17 8 25 
Pigeon pea consortium 6 4 10 
 
6.3.4 Impact of the consortia 
 
In 2004, about 80% of the total rainy season sorghum and one million hectares of the summer 
season sorghum were planted with about 50 private sector based hybrids; 30 of these were 
based on ICRISAT derived parental lines. Similarly, 60% of the total area under pearl millet 
cultivation is from over 70 private sector based hybrids 60 of which can be traced back to 
ICRISAT through the pearl millet consortium. Gowda reports that these hybrids have made 
substantial contributions in enhancing genetic diversity, productivity, yield stability and 
improved the livelihoods of poor farmers in arid areas.27  
 
In terms of resource mobilisation, the three consortia generated more than US$400,000 in the 
first three year period. From 2004, the consortia are expected to generate US$2 million over a 
five year period.28  
 
The most profound impact of the consortia is on ICRISAT’s organisational culture.29 The 
evolving relationship between ICRISAT and the private sector is increasingly being credited 
with opening the way for a variety of relationships with partners.30 This represents a major 
organisational and operational shift from one that is highly bureaucratic and hierarchical to 
                                               
27
 Gowda, C., Reddy, B. & Rai, K., ICRISAT strengthens ties with private seed companies, Asian seed and 
planting material 10/4 (2003) 16 
28
 ICRISAT,  pers. comm. 
29
 Hall, A., Sulaiman, R., Clark, N. & Yoganand, B., From measuring impact to learning institutional lessons: an 
innovation systems perspective on improving the management of international agricultural research, 
Agricultural Systems 78 (2003) 213 
30
 Reddy et al. (2001) supra note 23 
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one that is dynamic and flexible. This organisational change is demonstrated by ICRISAT’s 
initiatives under the Agri-Science Park (ASP), the platform over which all partnership related 
work at ICRISAT is conducted. Besides the three consortia discussed above, the ASP also 
covers the Ag-biotech Innovation Centre (AIC), the Agri-Business Incubator (ABI), the SAT 
Eco-Venture and Bio products research consortium. The AIC is part of the state 
government’s Genome Valley Project, the ABI provides advice and technical assistance to 
fledgling biotech companies, whilst the third is an eco-tourism venture in partnership with the 
state government while the fourth is a consortium along similar lines as those in the consortia 
discussed above.   
 
6.4 The case studies and other agricultural PPPs 
 
This section now turns to locating the two case studies within other agricultural PPPs, 
partnerships in the CG system and in the respective Centres. The aim of this is two fold: to 
strengthen the analysis of the two case studies by using parameters and indicators used in 
previous studies and existing literature and secondly, to draw any implications, similarities 
and differences, in so far as this is possible, between the case studies and other PPPs in 
agriculture.    
 
Table 6.8: Rationales of the ICRISAT and ILRI case studies 
 ICRISAT ILRI  
Economic rationale + + 
Wider participation - - 
Complexity of modern problems + +++ 
Synergy and complementarity +++ +++ 
Accessing new resources & skills + +++ 
Saving costs + - 
 
The data collected from the fieldwork indicates that the ‘synergy and complementarity’ 
rationale ranks first across both case studies. Complexity of modern problems is more 
relevant as a rationale to the ILRI case study than to the ICRISAT consortia. Similarly, 
accessing new resources and skills is more important to the ECF project than to the ICRISAT 
consortia. Wider participation as a rationale plays no role in both case studies while saving 
costs and reacting to market failure are of limited influence in both case studies.  
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In the Spielman et al. study discussed below (Figure 6.4), the goal of accessing new scientific 
knowledge ranks higher than other goals for frontier research partnerships. This is consonant 
with the fieldwork findings: accessing new resources and skills ranked highly in the ECF 
project which is an example of a frontier research PPP. The study found that the goal of 
reducing costs was not cited in frontier research but was cited in commercialisation and 
sector development partnerships. The case studies bear this out: saving costs is not a rationale 
for the ECF project although it is a rationale, albeit a weak one, for the ICRISAT consortia 
which are examples of commercialisation PPPs under Spielman’s classification.  
 
Empirical literature on PPPs generally takes two approaches: analysis of existing data sets on 
PPPs31 and the use of case studies often based on geographic region or a commodity. Studies 
on agricultural PPPs have tended to follow the latter.32  A review of the literature on 
agricultural PPPs shows that most involve agricultural biotechnology33 and technology 
transfer.34 Analysis has been mostly from an innovation system perspective, or from other 
                                               
31
 Roa-Atkinson, A. & Velho, L. North-South partnerships in agricultural biotechnology: a pilot database, 
UNU/MERIT Technology Policy Briefs  3/1 (2004) 3; see also Velho, L., ‘North-South, public-private 
partnerships in biotechnology: Relevant issues and implications for developing countries’ UNU/MERIT 
Technology Policy Briefs  3/1 (2004) 1 who uses both analytical approaches in developing a pilot database 
against which PPPs in Kenya (Ikiara, M. & Njogu, J., ‘Agricultural biotechnology partnerships in Kenya’ 
UNU/MERIT Technology Policy Briefs  3/1 (2004)  6), Tanzania (Mello, D. & Mneney, E., ‘Agricultural 
biotechnology partnerships in Tanzania’ UNU/MERIT Technology Policy Briefs  3/1 (2004) 8 and Uganda 
(Nsubuga-Muyonjo, F., ‘Agricultural biotechnology partnerships in Uganda’ UNU/MERIT Technology Policy 
Briefs  3/1 (2004) 10) are tested; 
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 See for example Pray, C., Public-private sector linkages in research and development: biotechnology and the 
seed industry in Brazil, China and India, Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 83/3 (2001) 742 on agricultural biotechnology and 
in the seed industry in Brazil, China and India; Hartwich, F., Gonzalez, C. & Vieira, L., ‘Public-private 
partnerships for innovation-led growth in agrichains: a useful tool for development in Latin America?’ ISNAR 
Division Discussion Paper no. 1 (Washington DC: IFRPI, 2005)  and Hartwich, F., Gottret, M., Babu, S. & 
Tola, J., ‘Building public-private partnerships for agricultural innovation in Latin America: lessons from 
capacity strengthening’ IFPRI Discussion Paper no. 00699 (Washington DC: IFPRI, 2007) who examine PPPs 
in Latin America using 124 projects in one study and 7 in another; see also Ayele, S., Chataway, J. & Wield, D., 
Partnerships in African crop biotechnology, nature biotechnology 24/6 (2006) 619 who use Kenya as a case 
study in examining the contribution PPPs in food crop biotechnology make towards achievement of the UN’s 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). They conclude that biotechnology partnerships are poorly oriented to 
end users, fragmented in scope and have limited impact in achieving the UN MDGs 
33
 See for example Barry, G. & Horsch, R., ‘Evolving role of the public and private sector in agricultural 
biotechnology for developing countries’ in Persley, G. & Lantin, M., (eds.) Agricultural biotechnology and the 
poor: proceedings of an international conference, Washington DC 21-22 October 1999 (Washington DC: 
CGIAR, 2000); Graff, G., Roland-Holst, D. & Zilberman, D., Agricultural biotechnology and globalisation: the 
role of public and private sector research, paper presented at ‘The workshop on Environmental Costs and 
Benefits of Transgenic Crops in Europe’ 2-4 June (2003); and Kameri-Mbote, P., Wafula, D. & Clark, N., 
Public private partnerships for biotechnology in Africa: the future agenda (Nairobi: ACTS Press, 2001) 
34
 Rausser, G., Simon, L., & Ameden, H., Public-private alliances in biotechnology: can they narrow the 
knowledge gaps between rich and poor? Food Policy 25 (2000) 499; Spielman, D., Cohen, J. & Zambrano, P., 
Policy investment, and partnerships for agricultural biotechnology research in Africa: Emerging evidence, 
ATDF Journal 3/4 (2006) 3; Byerlee, D. & Fischer, K., Accessing modern science: policy and institutional 
options for agricultural biotechnology in developing countries, World Development 30/6 (2002) 931; and also 
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perspectives such as constraints to PPPs,35 value addition,36 regulation,37 maximising 
incentives to the private sector,38 while others provide a prescription for successful 
partnerships.39 
 
This dominance of certain areas in agricultural PPPs is reflected in the case studies. The ECF 
vaccine project is clearly on biotechnology and both projects are essentially technology 
transfer projects: the ICRISAT consortia involve the transfer of technology mainly from the 
public to the private sector although feedback loops are integrated into the structure of the 
project while the ECF vaccine project involves technology transfer to and from both the 
private and public partners: Oxford University provides the technologies for vaccine 
development as does Merial Ltd, ILRI’s long standing research on T. parva benefits other 
partners and the partnership and TIGR’s sequencing of  T. parva is transferred to the partners.  
 
6.5 The case studies and PPPs in the CGIAR  
 
The CGIAR interest in PPPs became entrenched in 1995 with the establishment of two 
partnership committees – the Non-Governmental Committee (NGOC) and the Private Sector 
Committee (PSC) whose specific aim was to act as catalysing forces in advancing the number 
and quality of CG’s development partnerships. In 2004, the CG commissioned a study to 
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examine the performance of the two committees. The study did not look at PPPs in the CG 
but recommended that the CG address this directly.40  
 
Various studies have analysed PPPs in the CG generally and specifically. Manicad inquires 
into how the CG’s public good goal is reconciled with private sector profit objectives in 
PPPs.41 Binenbaum, Pardey and Wright suggest a method of analysing inter-organisational 
relations between the CG and the private sector42 while Spielman and Grebmer conduct an 
analysis of the challenges facing the private sector and the CGIAR in agricultural research 
and argue that the ‘willingness and ability of agencies to enter into partnerships are 
constrained by fundamentally different incentive structures.’43  
 
There have been case studies conducted on specific PPPs involving the CG Centres. These 
include Gowda et al. who describe the origin, rationale and development of the ICRISAT – 
PS consortia44 and Smith’s analysis of the ILRI ECF Vaccine project.45  
 
Like studies on agricultural PPPs, studies on PPPs in the CG Centres have been fragmented 
tending to be CG Centre specific, project specific, commodity specific or region specific. 
This is probably due to the context specific nature of PPPs. There are only a handful of 
system level studies on PPPs in the CGIAR. These include a study conducted by the CGIAR 
Science Council Secretary on collaborations in 14 CG Centres with other organisations46 and 
a more recent study by Spielman, Hartwich and Grebmer on 75 projects involving all the CG 
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Centres.47 These two studies form the basis of the following brief analysis of PPPs in the 
CGIAR. The section does not claim to provide an exhaustive report on all PPPs in the CG or 
indeed all the findings from the studies; rather, it provides insights as to where the two case 
studies sit within other PPPs in the CG.  
 
6.5.1 The Science Council study  
 
The CG Science Council study assessed collaboration between 14 CG Centres and other 
organisations including the private sector. The study was conducted between November 2004 
and June 2005. The study reported 3395 organisations with which CG Centres collaborate.48 
The findings relevant to this section are summarised:  
(a) 78 percent of the organisations with which the CG Centres collaborate are located in 
developing countries; this observation is borne out by the ICRISAT Consortia where, 
with the exception of two MNCs, all participants are located in India. In contrast, only 
two (Kenya Agriculture Research Institute and the Department of Veterinary 
Services) of ILRI’s seven partners in the ECF vaccine project are located in Kenya. 
Majority of ILRI’s partners in the project are from the North. The study however did 
not disaggregate the share of local collaborators: one cannot tell what percentage of 
these is from the private sector. It may well be that the share of local private sector 
collaborators is not as high as 78% which might validate the ECF project but not the 
ICRISAT Consortia. Institutions based in developed countries are the CG’s most 
important collaborators (Figure 6.2) followed by those in developing countries. The 
private sector is the third most important collaborator for the CG Centres. This finding 
is resonates with the case studies although the respective projects reflect this 
differently.  
(b) The national agricultural research institutes in developing countries, universities and 
non-governmental organisations in developing countries comprise about 60 percent of 
the organisations with which Centres collaborate; 
(c) Contrary to the widely held view that collaboration with institutions in developed 
countries does not play an important role in the CG system, the study showed that 57 
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percent of organisations deemed to be especially relevant in collaboration with the 
Centres were universities, agricultural research institutes and non-governmental 
organisations in developed countries; 
 
Figure 6.1: Types of organisations with which the CG Centres collaborate 
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Source: CGIAR Science Council Secretariat (2006) 
 
(d) In contrast, the private sector was mentioned as a key collaborator by only 4 Centres. 
The private sector participated in only 6 percent of the collaborations; two of these 
were in the field of biotechnology and two involved plant breeding efforts mainly 
with seed companies; the main presence of the private sector in biotechnology and 
plant breeding is reflected in the two case studies. 
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Figure 6.2: Most important collaborations with CG Centres by type of organisations 
1%
4%
56% 34%
3%
2%
international agricultural research centres
private sector
universities, NGOs & national agricultural research institutes in developing countries
regional orgs
universities, NGOs, advanced research institutes in developed countries
dev't orgs
 
Source: CGIAR Science Council Secretariat (2006) 
 
(e) The reasons for collaboration as given by the Centres were (i) providing access to 
critical expertise or material resources; (ii) as a strategy for leveraging additional 
human resources; (iii) facilitating testing and dissemination of information, 
technologies or policies; (iv) taking advantage of the collaborators’ previous 
experience in the field; (v) to enhance the capacity of Centre’s staff; and (vi) 
enhancing funding prospects. An analysis of the results shows that the reasons for 
collaboration correlate with the type of collaborator e.g. additional expertise was the 
most frequently cited reason for collaboration with institutions in developed countries 
while dissemination and testing was what motivated collaboration with organisations 
in developing countries. This is resonant with the case studies: accessing new 
resources and skills was cited more in the ECF vaccine project (where partners are 
mainly from the North) than in the ICRISAT consortia (which involves mostly local 
seed companies) while dissemination of research was a motivation in the latter case 
study but not in the former.  
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6.5.2 The Spielman, Hartwich and Grebmer study (SHG study) 
 
Spielman et al.49 look specifically at PPPs in the CGIAR. The study identified 75 PPPs active 
from 2004. The relevant findings can be summarised thus:  
(a) 57 percent of the PPPs are collaborations that include foreign entities; an equal 
number and proportion of PPPs include domestic entities with the overlap between the 
two categories comprising only 5 percent of the PPPs. This finding resonates with the 
ICRISAT Consortia: it involves local seed companies and two multinationals 
although in different proportion from that in the SHG study.  
(b) PPPs in the CG are mainly exclusive (60 percent), meaning they involve the private 
sector to the exclusion of other public sector or civil society organisations. This is 
particularly true of the ICRISAT Consortia; no public sector parties or CSOs are 
involved. The same can however not be said of the ECF project which involves four 
public sector parties from the North. 
(c) Many PPPs are also ‘monogamous’ (43 percent) meaning they involve just one Centre 
and one private sector partner. Most of the ‘monogamous’ PPPs (21 of the 32) involve 
foreign entities 9 of which involve multinational firms.  
(d) Reasons for the existence of the PPPs were grouped as (i) sectoral or value chain 
development (ii) resourcing (iii) contracting (iv) commercialisation; and (v) frontier 
research;  
(e) The goals of the PPPs were identified as (i) bring the Centre into closer contact with 
the poor (9 PPPs) (ii) translate research outputs into products for the poor (47) (iii) 
reduce costs by partnering with the private sector (21); and (iv) access new scientific 
knowledge from the private sector (24)50 
 
                                               
49
 Spielman, Hartwich & Grebmer (2007) supra note 47 
50
 A note on the study states that the data includes reports of multiple goals  
 172 
Figure 6.3: Private sector partners in the CG system by type 
domestic firms, 22%
private research 
organisations, 6%
local industry 
associations, 2%
foreign firms, 14%
multinational firms, 
25%
international/regional 
charitable 
foundations, 3%
local charitable 
foundations, 7%
regional firms, 2% international/regional 
industry associations, 
6%
producer 
associations, 13%
 
Source: Spielman, Hartwich, & Grebmer (2007) 
 
(f) Superimposing the goals onto the purposes shows that PPPs in the CG are relatively 
concentrated in 3 areas: (i) commercialisation to develop pro-poor products (ii) 
frontier research to access new scientific knowledge and (iii) sectoral or value-chain 
development of pro-poor products. Juxtaposing the case studies against this, the 
ICRISAT-PS consortia matches the concentration areas (i) and (iii) while the ECF 
project seeks to access new scientific knowledge through frontier research (Figure 
6.4) 
(g) Notably, the goal of reducing research costs was not cited in frontier research PPPs. 
The Science Council study found that funding considerations rarely motivated 
Centres’ key collaborations even with institutions in developed countries. This is true 
of the ECF project; cost reduction was not cited as a motivation for collaboration.  
 
 173 
Figure 6.4: Goals and purposes of surveyed PPPs in the CG 
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Source: Spielman, Hartwich, & Grebmer (2007) 
 
6.6  PPPs in ILRI and ICRISAT 
 
Both Centres have a long history of collaboration with other partners. In the Science Council 
study, ILRI was found to have 268 collaborators during the study period, 27 of whom were 
with the private sector. ICRISAT had 103 and 4 respectively. 
 
The study found that CG Centres have minimal collaboration with the private sector relative 
to collaborations with other actors such as national agricultural research institutes; private 
sector organisations at 4% represented only a small share of the Centres’ highly relevant 
collaborations. ICRISAT was one of only four Centres that referred to the private sector as a 
highly relevant collaborator.   
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Figure 6.5: ILRI’s & ICRISAT’s collaborators 
 
Source: CGIAR Science Council Secretariat (2006) with modifications 
 
Although the private sector constituted only 4% of ICRISAT’s collaborations, this however 
does not equate to the number of PPPs involving ICRISAT. The fact that the private sector 
was cited as a highly relevant partner suggests that the quality of ICRISAT – private sector 
engagement is more important than the number of private sector collaborators involved. 
Funding and aims of PPPs has a large bearing on ICRISAT’s perception of the importance of 
collaborating with the private sector. Collaborators from the private sector constitute 10% of 
all collaborations with ILRI; this suggests that ILRI has considerable experience in engaging 
with a large number of private sector partners although the fact that the private sector is not 
considered one of ILRI’s highly important collaborators reinforces the argument that the 
quality of partnership contributes more to the institution’s perception of a collaboration’s 
importance; the number of private sector collaborators an institution engages with matter less.  
 
The findings suggest that ILRI-private sector collaborations are of lesser quality than those 
between ICRISAT and the private sector. It might also be that relative to other collaborations 
involving the respective Centres, ILRI’s collaborations with the private sector matter less 
while ICRISAT places more importance on collaborations with the private sector. Table 6.1 
shows the Centres’ respective share of investment in policy and in collaborations and 
partnerships. More research would increase understanding on the link between the Science 
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Council findings and the investments made by the respective Centres with regard to 
collaborations and partnerships.    
 
The SHG study identified 75 PPPs active in 2004 or later; eleven of these involved ICRISAT 
and represented 15% of all CG PPPs while ILRI was involved in only 4 PPPs. The 
discrepancy between the two studies may be due to a number of factors: the method of data 
collection, the time period covered and the different definitions of collaboration and 
partnerships employed. It may also be the case that ILRI’s 4 PPPs (according to SHG) have a 
high concentration of private sector organisations while ICRISAT’s few private sector 
collaborators (according to the Science Council study) were involved in multiple PPPs. The 
distribution of the private sector organisations is difficult to establish as the studies do not 
give a breakdown of the constituents of the PPPs. The author’s field work established at least 
53 private sector companies involved in three consortia in ICRISAT in 2005. This is way 
above the 4 identified in the Science Council study.   
  
A number of inferences can be drawn from the above mapping exercise. Firstly, the case 
studies differ from each other in terms of the number, constitution, roles and level of 
engagement of the partners involved, the organisational structure and design of the PPPs, 
rationale, the activities, achievements and impacts to date. Secondly, the case studies reflect 
the agricultural areas in which the private sector typically engages: agricultural biotech and 
plant breeding. In this regard, the case studies can be said to be typical agricultural PPPs. 
Thirdly, the rationale for the case studies matches that of most PPPs in the CG. Convergence 
of synergies is the predominant rationale for the two case studies. There are differences in the 
ranking of rationales across the two case studies; this resonates with findings from other 
studies on PPPs in the CG. Partnerships in different areas will be influenced by different 
rationales: for example, accessing new resources and skills is more influential as a rationale 
to frontier research partnerships such as ECF than to commercialisation PPPs like the 
ICRISAT consortia.  
 
6.7 IP policies 
 
The following section conducts a similar exercise albeit regarding IP related policies. It seeks 
to establish firstly, how the respective Centres’ IP related policies are influenced by the 
Centres’ membership to the CGIAR system. Secondly, it analyses the policies to determine 
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whether they are creative enough to mitigate the excludability effect of IPRs and thirdly, it 
examines how the respective policies affect collaboration between the Centres and the private 
sector.  
 
6.7.1 ILRI’s IP policy 
 
ILRI has a broad policy covering IPRs, biosafety and bioethics. Its provisions are premised 
on the international public goods nature of research that ILRI conducts. ILRI’s outlook seems 
to be relatively progressive:  
 
“ILRI’s scientific work, while respecting the general scientific principles of 
good faith and the search for truth, is guided by its particular humanitarian and 
equity-based concerns, and not by a morally neutral pursuit of knowledge for 
its own sake.” (Emphasis added) 
 
This represents a shift from the traditional concept of public scientific research as knowledge 
creation or basic research to an applied research, needs-driven approach. This pragmatism is 
also reflected in the recognition that IP protection on ILRI’s products and technologies may 
be necessary. The policy lists such instances as when IP protection is required to  
(i) ensure  continued availability of germplasm, information, inventions, publications and 
databases to ILRI’s clients 
(ii) prevent misappropriation of ILRI’s material by others for profit making 
(iii)ensure the delivery of improved products and technologies in developing countries 
(iv) negotiate access to other proprietary rights and technologies required for product 
development 
 
The spirit embodied in these conditions clearly resonates with that in the policies at the CG 
system level. Chapter four looked at the conditions applied by the system level policies; for 
example, according to the CG Guiding Principles, one instance when Centres can seek IP 
protection is in order to ‘assure ready access by others to research products developed or 
funded by the Centre’; this is clearly reflected in ILRI’s policy ((i) and (iii) above). Similarly, 
the CG Guiding Principle condition that IP protection may be sought to ‘facilitate the 
negotiation and conclusion of agreements for access to proprietary technologies’ and to 
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‘ensure the Centre’s ability to pursue its research, together with its partners, without undue 
hindrance’ is similar to (iv) above.  
 
The Guiding Principles emphasise that IP protection should not be seen as a means for 
securing financial returns; ILRI’s IP policy similarly states that ‘its research will continue to 
be supported with public funds and that it should not look to profit from any of its products or 
genetic materials.’ It can be clearly seen that the international public goods nature of ILRI’s 
research as influenced by its membership to the CGIAR is reflected in its IP policy.  
 
International public goods and food security is mentioned three times in a relatively short 
policy. ILRI’s vision for a ‘world made better for poor people in developing countries by 
improving food security and agricultural systems in which livestock are important’ is 
reiterated. Elsewhere, the policy states that ‘ILRI’s research produces international public 
goods aimed at alleviating poverty, increasing food security and protecting the 
environment… and working through collaborative partnerships.’  
 
The policy is yet to be updated in light of the agreement between the Centre and the 
International Treaty’s Governing Board. It still refers to the situation pertaining before ILRI 
joined the FAO International Treaty on PGRFAs. The policy therefore employs the traditional 
division of genetic resources into pre and post CBD ex situ collections. The distribution of the 
former is to be consonant with the provisions of the 1994 FAO/ILRI agreement which 
requires the use of a Material Transfer Agreement (MTA) for germplasm exchange. The IP 
policy provisions under this head are therefore necessarily similar to those in the FAO/ILRI 
MTA. Both stipulate that a recipient of ILRI’s ex situ pre-CBD germplasm collection are 
prohibited from claiming ownership over the material received, or seek IPRs over the 
germplasm, its genetic parts or components or related information. ILRI’s IP policy omits 
‘genetic parts’ implying that these may be protectable; however, it may be argued that the use 
of the term ‘components’ includes genetic and other parts of the germplasm and therefore 
adding ‘genetic parts’ is redundant.   
 
Both the FAO/ILRI MTA and ILRI’s IP policy require of recipients to ensure that any 
subsequent person or institution to whom/which they pass on samples of the germplasm is 
bound by the same provisions. The IP policy goes further by requiring the recipient to inform 
ILRI of such transfer of germplasm. The IP policy contains a disclaimer on safety, quality, 
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viability, genetic and mechanical purity and accuracy of passport or other data of the 
germplasm and passes on the responsibility to comply with national biosafety and import 
regulations to the recipient. This is almost a verbatim repetition of the FAO/ILRI MTA.  
 
On post-CBD ex situ germplasm collections, ILRI’s policy is guided by principles of the 
CBD such as respect for national sovereignty and prior informed consent. The policy states 
that clear MTAs ‘setting out the terms and conditions of acquisition, benefit sharing and any 
future transfer and use of the material’ will be signed between ILRI and the national 
government. This is a departure from the standard MTA used for transfer of pre-CBD ex situ 
germplasm and would presumably be on a case by case basis.  
 
The IP policy covers biological resources from ILRI’s research activities. These are to be 
made available under an MTA and in accordance with the CBD. The policy states that the 
centre-bred materials or components of the material are to be used for research or academic 
purposes only; use for commercial purposes must be authorised by ILRI and where 
applicable, its partners. Publication of any results obtained through the use of ILRI bred 
material likewise requires ILRI’s authorisation and must include appropriate 
acknowledgements to ILRI. Similar to the requirement regarding designated material, the 
recipient is likewise prohibited from claiming ownership over the material or components of 
the materials received from ILRI or to seek IPRs over those materials, components and 
derivatives of the materials or related information.  
 
On products developed through advanced technologies including biotechnology, any kind of 
information, invention or biological material developed by ILRI is to be made freely available 
in the public domain provided it does not include proprietary technology. However, this 
unfettered availability may be limited for confidentiality reasons ‘to ensure continued 
availability to developing nations.’  
 
Collaborative partnerships are a main theme in ILRI’s IP policy. Relations with the private 
sector are to be governed by memoranda of agreements signed between ILRI and the 
respective institution. The policy stipulates that confidentiality agreements and MTAs are to 
be used in such cases to ‘clearly define access to and use of information and materials 
between ILRI and the private sector.’  ILRI’s policy considers IP conditions attached to donor 
funds and provides that ‘ILRI will instruct staff on the limitations to use of any proprietary 
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materials in the research and conditions set by donors on applying intellectual property 
protection to products resulting from research funded by these donors.’  
 
With regard to other proprietary matter of a non-PGR nature, the policy is straightforward. 
This is expected given the non contentious nature of other subjects of IPRs such as copyright, 
trademarks and service marks. The policy addresses this as succinctly as it does scientific and 
agricultural equipment designs; it however provides that for these, ILRI will strive to ensure 
that the scientific and agricultural designs are available to developing nation partners and 
farmers at a minimal reasonable cost.  
 
The policy pays significant attention to confidentiality agreements. All dealings with other 
institutions are to be governed by a confidentiality agreement (CA). Visitors need to sign a 
CA before access to any information or technology developed by ILRI is permitted. However, 
this is not necessary if the information or technology is already in the public domain.  
 
Employees are bound by the ILRI personnel policy manual which covers IP and 
confidentiality. Conditions required of employees include:  
(i) Obtaining prior informed consent before disclosure of any information on ILRI research 
or establishment of formal collaboration outside ILRI especially with the private sector. 
It is not clear whose consent should be sought; the presumption is the Director General 
or a member of senior management authorised to give consent  
(ii) maintaining accurate and detailed records at all steps of research especially where 
proprietary materials are used 
(iii) maintaining laboratory books in a manner ensuring that research is confidential and that 
claims for any IP protection can be supported; laboratory books are not to be removed 
from ILRI’s premises 
 
All discoveries, products and technologies developed or made at ILRI remain the property of 
ILRI and may not be removed, exploited or sold without authorisation from the Director 
General. The IP policy requires all publication pertaining to such materials ‘to be cleared’ by 
the Director General or his nominee before publication.  
 
Read as a whole, the following observations can be made of ILRI’s IP policy. Firstly, it is 
clearly premised on the international public goods nature of ILRI’s research in which 
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achievement of food security is paramount. This is a direct influence of policies at the CG 
system level. Secondly, the policy is at pains to articulate the situations where IP protection 
may be allowed and even required even if ILRI conducts public goods research. Again, these 
situations reflect those stipulated by the system level guiding principles. However, the policy 
is somewhat pro active; it states one situation where IP protection is necessary as ‘to prevent 
misappropriation of ILRI’s material by others for profit making.’ This does not appear 
anywhere in the system wide Guiding Principles. ILRI appears to recognise that it holds 
intellectual assets eligible for protection and is prepared to seek IPRs defensively to prevent 
third parties from taking advantage of its public goods oriented research. This is clearly 
progressive. Thirdly, the policy pronounces that ILRI’s work is guided by ‘particular 
humanitarian and equity-based concerns, and not by a morally neutral pursuit of knowledge 
for its own sake’. This seems to be, as well as the public goods nature of ILRI’s research, the 
ration d’être for the type of IP policy ILRI has. The appreciation of the need for applied, user-
defined and resource-poor driven research is implicit in the policy’s attempt to balance its 
public goods mandate and the protection of IP.  
 
Fourthly, ILRI’s IP policy clearly envisages collaboration with the private sector. 
Collaborative partnerships and stakeholder participation generally are a main theme of the 
policy. The policy is capable of mitigating the excludability effect introduced by IPRs. This is 
explicit in statements such as ‘to make advanced technologies and techniques available to 
developing countries, ILRI may apply intellectual property protection or limitations on the 
publication and distribution of the derived and associated materials.’ 
 
All in all, ILRI’s IP policy seems comprehensive enough to address the usual IP issues that a 
typical IARC is likely to face. There is due recognition of the fact that the policy on IP is a 
working document likely to be revised as and when needs arise. It is flexible enough to allow 
ILRI to engage in collaborative research with the private sector without compromising its 
mandate. The policy’s implementation is another case altogether. Like all other policies and 
guidelines, the proof of its efficacy is in its implementation. It is to be expected that with such 
a policy, ILRI would be more likely to seek IPRs and more amenable to IPRs generally than 
other Centres, such as ICRISAT discussed below, would.  However, proving this is beyond 
the scope of this thesis.  
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6.7.2 ICRISAT’s IP Policy 
 
In comparison to ILRI, ICRISAT’s IP policies are spread across various documents. The main 
policy has seven annexes including the CG Guidelines. In addition, there are five other IP 
policy related documents 3 of which are standard material transfer agreements for materials 
ranging from ICRISAT material ‘under development’, software and genetic material 
developed by ICRISAT. Table 6.1 showed an increase in ICRISAT’s investment in policy 
from 2004; it could be possible that the numerous policy documents are an outcome of the 
increased prioritisation of policy in ICRISAT. There are inconsistencies and even 
contradictions in these policy documents.  
 
As do all CG Centres, ICRISAT generates international public goods and its policy is 
necessarily premised on this. Quoting the belief that access to ICRISAT’s outputs should be 
fair and equitable, the policy states that ‘as its basic policy, ICRISAT pursues publication and 
full disclosure and the open sharing of ICRISAT data, information and knowledge through 
the release of ICRISAT research findings and products into the public domain.’ This is clearly 
different from ILRI’s ‘non pursuit of knowledge for its own sake’ mantra.  
 
The policy recognises the rights of third parties when using their material in research. The 
policy does not require recipients and users of technology, knowledge, data and any 
information originating from ICRISAT to publicly acknowledge the Institute as the source of 
such knowledge, technology, data and information. When it comes to using technology, 
knowledge, data and information from third parties, the policy states that ICRISAT ‘will 
acknowledge and obtain appropriate permission for the use of others’ data, knowledge and 
technology.’ The policy also states that ICRISAT does not condone wilful infringement of 
any legitimate and legally established rights held by third parties. It appears that the policy is 
pre occupied with not infringing the rights of third parties and does not seem to recognise the 
value of ICRISAT’s own intellectual assets in the same way that ILRI’s policy does.   
 
On the management of IP, ICRISAT’s policy is dated in that it still refers to FAO’s 
International Undertaking rather than the International Treaty. The policy was effective from 
March 2002 before the International Treaty entered into force and is possibly why reference is 
to the International Undertaking.  
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The policy states that ICRISAT uses MTAs and Germplasm Acquisition Agreements to 
facilitate access and ensure ‘continued free exchange’ of genetic material. The policy 
reiterates that this is to ensure that materials are maintained in the public domain. The policy 
does not seem to appreciate the difference between the existence and the exercise of IPRs. For 
example, it states that “ICRISAT has traditionally adhered to a policy of unrestricted 
availability of germplasm… in the interest of keeping this material available for future 
research and utilisation, ICRISAT has undertaken… not to claim legal ownership … or to 
seek any intellectual property rights over that germplasm or related information.” The policy 
presumes that seeking IPRs and ensuring access are at odds and does not seem to consider 
how this may be resolved. 
 
The instances in which ICRISAT may protect the products of its research are listed as: 
(i) to support public and private partnerships which pursue mission-based research and/ 
or which develop and apply research results; 
(ii) to ensure ready access by others to research products developed by ICRISAT and its 
partners; 
(iii) to avoid restrictions arising from protection by others and to facilitate pursuance of its 
mission; 
(iv) to facilitate the uptake of research products and their impact on the poor including, 
where appropriate, through commercialisation; 
(v) To facilitate the negotiation and conclusion of agreements for access to proprietary 
technologies of use to ICRISAT and in the furtherance of its mission.  
 
ICRISAT reserves all rights to its research including all data, laboratory, field notebooks, 
formal and informal reports and products. Employees are not allowed to claim IPRs arising 
out of their work at ICRISAT. All inventions and innovations made while at ICRISAT are to 
be assigned to the Institute by employees, visiting scientists, research fellows and other 
partners. These parties are required to sign agreements to that effect as a condition of their 
association with ICRISAT.  
 
The policy portrays ICRISAT as actively intervening where access to IP held by third parties 
is restricted but required for the benefit of developing countries. In such cases, the policy 
states that ICRISAT will engage the private sector, universities, advanced research institutes, 
national agricultural research systems and other organisations to access resource products for 
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the benefit of the poor. The policy states that ‘any arrangements with third parties associated 
with access, joint creation, use of and exploitation of intellectual property protected materials 
or technologies will be properly researched.’ There is no indication of what this would entail 
and what parameters would be used to ‘research’ such an arrangement. Another instance 
where ICRISAT is cast in an intervening role is in the effort to secure freedom to operate for 
innovators. It is not clear how ICRISAT is to achieve this and who the ‘innovators’ are. There 
is no mention of ICRISAT’s own freedom to operate with regard to proprietary technology 
owned by third parties.  
 
The policy addresses other issues such as trademarks and copyright. With regard to the latter, 
the policy permits the reproduction of ICRISAT materials ‘in a manner consistent with fair 
use.’ 
 
The policy refers to the use of a MTA for transfer of ICRISAT bred material. The MTA is 
standard in nature and governs the transfer of all ICRISAT bred material. The MTA states 
that transfer of the material is not exclusive to the recipient i.e. ICRISAT can transfer it to 
other entities. The transferred material is however for the exclusive use of the recipient who is 
not permitted to claim ownership over the material nor seek IPRs, over the material or its 
genetic parts or components ‘in the form received’. It is not clear what this means. 
Presumably, if the recipient further develops the material, he may seek IP on the final product 
as it will no longer be ‘in the form received’. A footnote to the condition reads that if the 
recipient commercialises this material or a product that is a plant genetic resource for food 
and agriculture which incorporates this material, the recipient is obliged to pay into the 
mechanism established under article 19(3)(f) of the International Treaty. Where the product is 
available for further research and breeding to others without restriction, the recipient who 
commercialises it is encouraged rather than obliged to make such payment.  
 
Recipients are not permitted to transfer the material to third parties. The MTA requires the 
material obtained from ICRISAT to be used for research, breeding and training purposes only. 
National apex gene banks are however allowed to transfer material to third parties without 
ICRISAT’s authorisation. The MTA includes a disclaimer as to the safety or title of the 
material, its quality, viability or purity of the material transferred. Additional passport data is 
available on request. Recipients of ICRISAT bred material are obliged to provide ICRISAT 
with related data and information collected during evaluation and utilisation of the material. 
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On reading all the IP policy documents, it appears that the policy employs different standards 
for different categories of materials. Looking at the six different classes covered in the 
policies and MTAs (designated germplasm; centre bred germplasm; breeding materials under 
development; ICRISAT developed micro organisms and antibodies; DNA, RNA and 
sequence data; and software) IP protection is weakest for designated germplasm, stronger for 
centre bred material and materials under development and strictest for DNA and sequence 
data. ICRISAT and third parties are not allowed to seek IPRs for designated material at all. 
IPRs may be sought by third parties for software, micro organisms and antibodies, and 
material under development provided the material is not ‘in the form received’. Similarly, 
third parties can seek IPRs for centre bred material and DNA, RNA and sequence data but 
only on written permission from ICRISAT.  
 
The same disparity in standards applies with regard to exclusivity; for designated material, 
software and centre bred material, recipients are allowed to transfer the material to other third 
parties provided the terms in the transfer agreements are passed on to the third parties. For 
breeding materials under development, micro organisms and antibodies and RNA, DNA and 
sequence data, recipients cannot transfer the material to other third parties.  
 
The provisions in the policy and MTAs are inconsistent and even contradictory. For example, 
the MTA for ICRISAT developed microorganisms and antibodies requires third parties to 
request and receive material directly from ICRISAT while the MTA for ICRISAT developed 
Genetic Material, which presumably includes microorganisms and antibodies allows 
recipients to transfer the material to third parties.  
 
At some level, ICRISAT’s IP policy is progressive in so far as attempts are made to address 
areas such as DNA, RNA and sequence data which are not covered by the International 
Treaty. The fact that this occurs in the absence of an un updated IP policy (which still refers to 
the International Undertaking) buttresses the suggestion that ICRISAT’s approach to IP policy 
making is piece meal and reactionary rather than comprehensive and focussed. This is also 
reflected in the different levels of ‘strength’ accorded to the various categories of material. 
For example, the relatively new DNA, RNA and sequence data is subject to stricter control as 
is the material under development. It could be said that this is a direct influence of the SMTA 
under the International Treaty.  
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On the whole, ICRISAT’s IP policy seems to take a defensive approach; it is arguably more 
preoccupied with an awareness of IP not to protect its technology but rather to avoid 
infringing the rights of third parties. That the involvement of the private sector in agricultural 
research has heightened the IARCs’ awareness of IP and related issues is evident from 
ICRISAT’s policy. References to IP protection are made (i) to prevent misappropriation of 
ICRISAT’s material by the private sector; (ii) to enable partnerships with the private sector; 
and (iii) as tools of leverage with third parties including the private sector. The different 
standards apparent in the various categories of materials makes ICRISAT’s overall IP policy 
read as lacking focus. 
 
ILRI’s IP policy substantially differs from that of ICRISAT. Both are influenced by their 
membership to the CG system. The differences in the policies might be attributed to these 
factors: firstly, the CG system is an alliance of IARCs. As discussed earlier, it has no legal 
status and Centres are not legally obliged to adopt system wide policies although all Centres 
generally adopt these out of goodwill. Secondly, the CG Guidelines on IP are themselves 
broad enough to accommodate various perspectives that may be taken by respective Centres. 
This has resulted in ICRISAT adopting a somewhat left leaning IP policy while ILRI’s is 
more appreciative of the IP motivations of potential partners including the private sector. 
There are currently efforts to amend, update and streamline the Guiding Principles in a more 
focused manner and to develop an unambiguous common CG IP policy that will translate to 
similar IP policies across the Centres. CG Centres are divided on this move as some consider 
themselves more ‘progressive’ IP-wise and argue for IP polices that will allow the Centres to 
take a more pro-active approach in protecting their intellectual assets. 51   
 
Both policies display an appreciation of the excludability effect introduced by applying IPRs 
in the provision of public goods. The ICRISAT policy appears to mitigate this fiercely by 
adopting a rather left leaning defensive approach. It makes the assumption that IP protection 
equates to limiting access of products to its end users. ILRI’s policy on the other hand seems 
more appreciative of the distinction between the existence and exercise of IPRs. It appears to 
take into account private sector motivations while being supportive of its own mission. Like 
ICRISAT, it provides for mitigation of the excludability effect although less fiercely.    
 
                                               
51
 The International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) is one such centre; Science Council, pers. comm. 
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6.8  Centres’ policies on partnerships with private sector 
 
At a system level, the CGIAR does not have consolidated guidelines on the Centres’ 
engagement with the private sector. Guidance for this is contained in various documents 
some of which include: 
1. CGIAR Mid Term Meeting (May 1998) 
2. Principles involving Centre interaction with the private sector and others (revised July 
2003 version) 
3. The Guiding Principles under the Scientific and Know-How Exchange Programme 
(SKEP) Between the CGIAR Centres and the private sector (Feb 2005)   
4. Guidelines for Centre models of collaboration with the PS (May 2005) 
A brief analysis of each follows: 
 
6.8.1 The CGIAR MTM  
 
This contains various references on PS engagement although these are within the context of 
genetic resources, proprietary technology and biotechnology rather than PS engagement 
generally. The MTM also clarifies the policy making structure so that the guidelines and 
policies adopted are collective Centre policies rather than CGIAR policies. As such, it 
appears that there is no clear CG policy on PS engagement; what exist are guidelines adopted 
by the collective Centres.  
 
The MTM in proposition 5 recognises the role of PS engagement particularly with regard to 
biotechnology and addresses the issue of proprietary technology resolving that material 
developed jointly or otherwise should not be encumbered by proprietary claims so as to 
hinder release to NARS.  
 
The System Review in developing its long-term vision and strategic perspective suggested 
that the CG should consider forming essential partnerships in applied research ‘focusing on 
needs and what is realistically possible.’ The MTM recognised the importance of 
collaborating with partners stating that the CG’s ‘future actions will have to be elaborated in 
alliance with many partners.’ It is presumed that partners here include those from the PS.  
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The Report of the Panel on General Issues in Biotechnology underscored the need to balance 
CG’s activities in dealing with the PS in the field of biotechnology while that of the Panel on 
Proprietary Science and Technology considered whether owners of proprietary agricultural 
biotech which includes the PS, would make their proprietary science available.  
 
6.8.2 Principles involving Centre Interaction with the Private Sector and Others  
 
The Guidelines and Statements on Genetic Resources, Biotechnology and Intellectual 
Property Rights were adopted by the MTM in 1998 and revised in July 2003. These are 
collective Centre policies rather than CGIAR policies.  
 
The book of policies makes various references to PS engagement the most relevant of which 
is the ‘Principles Involving Centre Interaction with the Private Sector and Others.’ These 
principles recognise the increasing importance of the PS in ‘the invention and development of 
materials and advanced technologies that could be applied to the CGIAR goals’. It lists the 
mutual benefits of such collaboration are. It also suggests various forms the collaborations 
may take. 
 
The Principles state that collaboration with the PS should be in accordance with the CGIAR 
Ethical Principles Relating to Genetic Resources and the Guiding Principles on IP and 
Genetic Resources. The former has as the main principles Equity, Trusteeship, Social 
Benefits and Respect, Responsibility and Integrity; while the latter addresses issues such as 
IP protection, farmer’s rights, defensive protection and Centres’ access to materials protected 
by others. The Centres are allowed to secure finances from commercialisation of proprietary 
technology by its partners with the requirement that such funds shall be ploughed back into 
research. 
 
These attempt to keep collaboration with the private sector in check in order to avoid 
situations where a ‘foreseeable reduction of local communities’ access to and benefits from 
genetic resources might occur’. The Principles reiterate that all research and partnerships 
should be for the public good.  
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6.8.3 The Guiding Principles under the Scientific and Know-How Exchange 
Programme (SKEP) Between the CGIAR Centres and the PS  
 
SKEP’s main objective is stated as promoting technology and knowledge transfer in 
designing, managing and controlling R&D processes and projects through the exchange of 
staff between the CG Centres and the private sector and is therefore an example of a form of 
PS engagement. The Programme recognises the importance of public-private partnerships 
and states the mutual benefits.  
 
The SKEP Guiding Principles cover organisation, financing, bilateral cooperation, 
confidentiality and non-disclosure, inventions, indemnifications, assignment, termination and 
resolution of disputes. They seem more like an agreement rather than a statement of guiding 
principles. They make no reference to other guiding principles such as the CG ethical 
principles relating to Genetic Resources, CG Guiding Principles on IP and Genetic Resources 
or Principles involving Centre Interaction with the private sector yet these are of direct 
relevance. It appears there are multiple guiding principles, which, while not conflicting, are 
not linked to each other. This emphasises the need to have a comprehensive general policy on 
collaboration with the private sector from which all other guiding principles should stem.   
 
6.8.4 Guidelines for Centre models of collaboration with the PS  
 
Perhaps these are an attempt to integrate the various policies and guidelines into one set of 
guidelines; although they fail to state their relationship with other guidelines. They state that 
collaborations should be entered into in order to ‘enhance the capability of a Centre to deliver 
to its stakeholders and collaborators the best quality science aimed at meeting the Centre and 
CGIAR objectives and goals’ and that fund raising should not be the focus for collaboration 
with the private sector.  
 
The Guidelines underscore the importance of informing ‘major research partners’; these are 
presumed to mean donors or governments and not the private sector.52 The Guidelines are 
categorical that Centres should engage the PS only if it complements and enhances a Centre’s 
                                               
52
 Stating that ‘…best efforts should be exercised to ensure that the major partners are well informed of the 
arrangements with the private sector.’ and ‘where other major research partners have been directly involved in 
research and related activities of relevance to the private sector partnership, best efforts should be exercised to 
obtain agreement of these partners before entering into arrangements with the private sector.’ (emphasis added) 
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ability to achieve its mandate more quickly and efficiently; they require that the terms of 
collaboration should be consistent with the delivery of global public goods.   
 
The Guidelines require collaborations to be governed by binding legal contacts clearly 
defining the parties’ rights and obligations. They also state that good business practices 
should be followed. The Guidelines state that Centres ‘will not accept funding from private 
companies that could reasonably create a conflict of interest’ but fall short of defining what 
would be a reasonable conflict of interest.  
 
The Guidelines are tailored to allow for ‘flexibility of approach, creativity in interaction, and 
a clear commitment to the overall goals and nature of the CGIAR system’ although as a 
whole, they do not explicitly acknowledge the importance of the PS as other previously 
discussed guidelines do.  
 
6.8.5 Centres’ policies on engagement with the private sector  
 
Neither ILRI nor ICRISAT has a general policy on collaboration with the private sector. Both 
Centres’ IP policies anticipate collaboration with the private sector especially in 
biotechnology research in the case of ILRI whose IP policy states that  
‘ILRI recognises that it may need to form partnerships with the private sector 
to ensure continued availability and delivery of information and inventions. In 
order to promote delivery of product, where necessary ILRI will establish 
linkages with the private sector in the early stages of development of products.’ 
 
The policy falls short of providing guidelines on such collaboration save to state that the 
partnerships are to be governed by memoranda of agreement, confidentiality agreements and 
MTAs ‘to clearly define access to and use of information and materials between ILRI and the 
private sector.’  
 
ICRISAT’s IP policy mentions partnership with the private sector and has a brief Code of 
Conduct for Interaction with the Private Sector as an annex. The Code of Conduct begins 
with an acknowledgement that  
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‘ICRISAT recognises the increasing importance of the private sector in the 
invention and development of materials and advanced technologies that could 
contribute to ICRISAT’s mission.’ 
 
The Code of Conduct lists the instances where ICRISAT may work with the private sector as 
licensing of products and technologies and developing and delivering new technologies to the 
poor in developing countries. It states that ICRISAT will adhere to policies and procedures 
for the conservation and use of genetic resources and biodiversity as defined under the terms 
of the CBD, the FAO-ICRISAT Agreement and the FAO International Undertaking. 
 
The Guidelines under the ICRISAT-PS consortia address issues such as financial 
contributions, the rights and obligations of parties and operational aspects. In addressing the 
detail of the consortia, they - like the SKEP Guiding Principles - are more like an agreement 
rather than a statement of principles.  
 
There does not seem to be an integrated concise policy document on engagement with the 
private sector both at the CG system level and at ILRI and ICRISAT level. However, the 
various guidelines and policy statements are consonant with the CG goals and contain the 
resounding theme of complementarity of synergies for mutual benefit and particularly for 
more efficient delivery of Centres’ technology to the poor in developing countries. The 
various guidelines and policies seem to appreciate the mutual benefits of collaboration, some 
more explicitly than others.  
 
A reading of the provisions on private sector engagement shows complementarity of 
synergies as the basis for collaboration between the Centres and the private sector. This is 
clearly borne out in the findings from the case studies and in other studies conducted on PPPs 
in the CG system.  
 
There perhaps should be a general policy at the CG level and at the centre level enunciating 
the main principles to be considered in all partnerships with the private sector. From these 
principles, the Centres can subsequently formulate individual agreements tailored for each 
partnership. Currently, at least in the case of ICRISAT, there appears to be the latter but not 
the former.  
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6.9  Conclusion 
 
The CGIAR Centres are legally independent each with its charter, constitution, research 
responsibilities and mandates. They are however linked by their membership to the CGIAR. 
Although having individual programmes, projects, themes and mandate crops, the Centres’ 
research falls under the general CGIAR focus areas and is based on the CG’s mission of 
which the attainment of food security is paramount.    
 
The adoption of ILRI’s and ICRISAT’s policies on IP was as a result of a system wide 
recognition of the increasing significance of IPRs to the CG Centres. Although the policies 
differ in attitude and scope, they are both influenced by and conform to the CGIAR Guiding 
Principles on IP. The respective policies envisage partnership with the private sector and 
provide for the occasions where IP protection by the Centres is necessary. They also provide 
for mitigation of the excludability effect of IPRs; the policies in both Centres are premised on 
the public goods nature of their research.   
 
There is no consolidated policy on partnership with the private sector both at a CG system 
level and at centre level; ICRISAT however has a brief Code of Conduct for Interaction with 
the Private Sector. PPPs involving the CG Centres are therefore occurring in a policy 
vacuum. However, this does not seem to have had a negative impact on the case studies: the 
two PPPs are governed by tailor made agreements between ICRISAT, ILRI and their 
respective partners.  
 
Both ICRISAT and ILRI have previous experience with PPPs although not to the scale of the 
respective case studies. The two PPPs are ongoing and have already had considerable positive 
impact mostly on the Centres’ organisational culture and practice. Both projects are demand 
led and represent a shift from the erstwhile technology led research prevalent in most public 
research institutes. The parties in the ECF PPP are confident that the project is on track to 
deliver a vaccine while improved hybrids are already under commercialisation under the 
ICRISAT-PS consortia.  
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Chapter Seven 
 
The role of IP in the case studies 
 
7.0  Introduction 
 
Although the two case studies differ in many aspects, the lessons learnt in both are invaluable 
to understanding the challenges facing food security oriented PPPs. This chapter aims at 
elucidating these challenges, how they come about and how parties in the PPPs deal with 
them. Its ultimate objective is to investigate the significance of intellectual property to the 
partnerships. 
 
This chapter uses a thematic approach in analysing the case studies. It looks at the nature and 
characteristics of the PPPs, the factors motivating the respective partners into joining the 
PPPs and the differing perspectives on IP and how these affect the partnerships.  
 
It uses the process of partnership building – the formation stage, the negotiation of the 
partnership arrangement, and the execution of the partnership – to assess the significance of 
IP in the case studies. The chapter also considers the impact of Kenyan and Indian IP law on 
the ECF project and on the ICRISAT-PS consortia respectively and outlines other IP related 
issues and challenges faced by the two case studies and how they are dealt with. Data 
obtained from interviews with key informants during the fieldwork forms the bulk of the 
information in this chapter. 
 
7.1 The problem with agricultural research in the development context 
 
Chapter one identified six overlapping theories on the formation of PPPs (Table 1.1). The 
dominant rationale behind the formation of food security oriented PPPs was found to be 
exploiting synergies among the partners. Other rationales include gaining access to valuable 
partner-held resources, and minimising costs and risk. The overlapping rationales stem from 
the classic problem plaguing agricultural research in the development context: the public 
sector produces excellent research but most of it ends up on the ‘technology shelf’ as it is not 
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applied; the private sector possesses plenty of applied skills but use these solely for 
commercial gain; funding is available from donors but the donor community is increasingly 
wary of funding research out of which there is no return or impact. Modern complex 
agricultural development problems suffer as a result of this ‘tension’ pulling the sectors away 
from each other. The two case studies are examples of how the respective partners attempt to 
address this.  
 
7.2  Nature and characteristics of the partnerships  
 
Several classifications have been proposed to conceptualise and categorise PPPs. 
Classification of PPPs is a difficult task given their context specificity. There exists no 
blueprint for PPPs; various taxonomies have been employed in attempts at classifying PPPs. 
Taxonomic properties include the nature of knowledge or technology involved, the flow of 
that knowledge or technology, the form and extent of collaboration, the distribution of risk 
between the partners, the specific roles played by respective partners, the institutional 
organisation of the partnership, the objectives of and reasons for the PPP, the ownership of 
the PPP, the source of funding and the nature of the PPP’s activities. Whilst not an exhaustive 
list, this illustrates the various diverse ways used for classifying PPPs. This section analyses 
the case studies based on the ownership and flow of knowledge and technology and the 
extent of collaboration. Technology in this case includes both tangible technology such as 
seeds and final products as well as intangible technology such as knowledge and intellectual 
assets including intellectual property.  
 
In the ICRISAT–PS consortia, private seed companies make grants to ICRISAT and in 
exchange, they obtain access to ICRISAT developed and improved germplasm subject to the 
conditions in the MTA and other relevant agreements. The flow of tangible (seeds) and 
intangible (IP) knowledge and technology flows from ICRISAT to the private seed 
companies. This has been termed by some as commercialisation partnerships: the public 
sector transfer research findings and materials to the private sector which multiplies, markets 
and distributes the transferred technology.1  However, the ICRISAT-PS consortia relationship 
is not as simplistic as the linear flow of technology and information implies.  
                                               
1
 Hall, A., Sulaiman, R., Clark, N., Sivamohan, M. & Yoganand, B., ‘Public-private sector interaction in the 
Indian agricultural research system: an innovation systems perspective on institutional reform’ in Byerlee, D. & 
Echeverría, R., (eds.) Agricultural research policy in an era of privatisation (Oxon: CABI Publishing, 2002); 
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Differentiating between the public and private sectors’ organising principles, Hall et al.2 posit 
that the former’s research organisation is linear moving from public research to the 
technology shelf to the private sector to the farmers. Hall et al. contrast this linear 
organisation with the private sectors’ technology system which, they argue, comprises a 
diverse set of competencies and resources. These relate to the product itself (in the case of the 
consortia, hybrid seed) and a profit and market orientation which together define the elements 
required to produce the end product profitably. The elements may be technical and include 
managerial capabilities and processes as well as physical inputs and infrastructure; all these 
features make up the ‘technology system.’ 
 
To the private sector therefore, the consortia do not only transfer the technology but 
ICRISAT’s expertise as well as strategic resources and infrastructure. Hall et al. write 
“While superficially it may appear that the private sector actually seeks a physical 
input of technology from ICRISAT in the form of advanced breeding lines, this is 
an oversimplification. The private sector views this as an issue of accessing the 
expertise of ICRISAT – in combination with its genetic resources and research 
infrastructure – and directing this expertise so that it contributes to the technology 
systems of individual private companies. In other words, the consortium 
mechanism is a way of ensuring that the private-sector company can include the 
capabilities and resources of a public-sector organisation like ICRISAT as part of 
its own technology system.”3 
 
While not expressing the partnership as holistically, private sector consortia members 
interviewed identified the close working relationship with ICRISAT as an integral part of the 
consortia; some even suggested that it was just as important as the improved seed that they 
received.4 The flow of technology and information relates not just to the tangible technology 
(improved germplasm) but also to the expertise which is intangible and is part of ICRISAT’s 
                                                                                                                                                  
see also Spielman, D., Hartwich, F. & Grebmer, K., ‘Sharing science, building bridges, and enhancing impact’ 
IFPRI Discussion Paper 00708 (2007) 
2
 Hall, A., Sulaiman, V., Clark, N. & Yoganand, B., ‘Shared perspectives: a synthesis of obstacles and 
opportunities’ in Hall, A., Yoganand, B., Sulaiman, R. & Clark, N., (eds.) Sharing perspectives on public-
private sector interaction: proceedings of a workshop, 10 April, 2001, ICRISAT, Patancheru, India (New Delhi 
& Patancheru: NCAP & ICRISAT, 2001)  
3
 Id. at p38 
4
 Private sector consortium members, pers. comm. 
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intellectual assets. However, the private seed companies have some input on the improved 
germplasm. Being closer to the market, the companies provide valuable feedback to 
ICRISAT which informs the traits that ICRISAT focuses on in its plant breeding efforts. The 
flow of information in this regard is from the private sector to ICRISAT. This illustrates that 
the ICRISAT-consortia relationship is more than the mere private distribution of public 
goods. 
 
ILRI’s ECF project is more clearly a collaborative partnership with multi-directional flow of 
information, knowledge and technology. Both sectors in the ECF project pool resources to 
take advantage of complementary skills, infrastructure and proprietary science. The research 
carried out although linear (in the way that gene sequencing and annotation follows gene 
discovery and so on) involves multiple input from both sectors. These are involved in all 
stages of research and development perhaps with the exception of the initial ‘basic research’ 
stage. The difference in the parties’ complimentary skills is demonstrated by the role that the 
parties play at each stage of research. For example, TIGR, LICR & ILRI were the main 
participants at the gene discovery stage, ILRI took the lead in the proof-of-concept stage 
while Merial and KARI take the lead at the product development and trials stage. The flow of 
knowledge and technology in this partnership has been to and from both sectors at all stages 
of the collaboration. This type of partnership has been termed by some as frontier research 
partnership where partners jointly undertake research activities characterised by some 
unknown probability of success.5  
 
The ECF project is a multilevel, multifaceted and multilayered collaborative PPP. This is 
contrasted with the ICRISAT-PS consortia. In the latter, the consortia members do not have 
any contractual agreement with each other although the intangible networks between and 
among the members as a result of belonging to the same consortium should not be 
overlooked. The consortia members join the consortium by entering into an agreement with 
                                               
5
 Spielman, Hartwich & Grebmer (2007) supra note 1 classify PPPs in their CG study according to the role 
played by the sectors, the objective of the collaboration and the distribution of risk among the partners. They 
arrive at five categories of PPPs: (i) resourcing partnerships where the CG Centres receive funding from 
philanthropic organisations associated with private firms or they receive scientific expertise from private firms; 
(ii) contracting partnerships where the CG Centres facilities or expertise are contracted to private firms or vice 
versa; (iii) commercialising partnerships where CG Centres transfer research findings and materials to private 
firms for commercialisation, marketing and distribution; (iv) frontier research partnerships where the CG 
Centres jointly undertake research activities characterised by some unknown probability of success; and (iv) 
Sector or value chain development partnerships where the CG Centres collaborate with networks of public, 
private and civil society partners to develop a commodity subsector or its associated value chain. 
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ICRISAT only. This makes membership to the consortia and its organisation and execution 
flexible. This is crucial to the functioning of the consortia.  
‘The decision to have this design and flexibility was conscious. We wanted 
to make the consortia accessible to everyone who was interested in joining 
it. If we made it more rigid, it would increase the costs of running the 
consortia and might have deterred potential companies from joining us.’ 6 
 
One can see how this loose design was probably the best arrangement to achieve the 
consortia aims. Requiring consortia members to enter into legal agreements with each other 
might have been problematic. The private seed companies are in competition with each other 
and might have been reluctant to be in direct partnership with each other under the terms of 
the consortia. Being in partnership with ICRISAT only allows each of the companies to 
maintain the confidentiality of the materials that they access from ICRISAT; this might not 
have been possible if the seed companies were in direct partnership with each other as direct 
partnership implies the open exchange of knowledge and information.   
 
Figure 7.1: Representative diagram of an ICRISAT-PS consortium 
 
 
In contrast, the ECF project is governed by a master agreement which incorporates all 
partners and states their roles, rights and obligations. The nature of the collaborative research 
further strengthens the bond between the partners.  
                                               
6
 ICRISAT, pers. comm. 
 197 
The ECF project can be seen as a combination of a variety of multilevel, crisscrossing 
partnerships with multiple, multi-directional flow of technology. On deconstruction, the 
individual relationships between the partners are examples of different types of 
collaborations. For example, to the extent that ILRI received scientific expertise from TIGR 
in the form of the T. parva genome sequence, the ILRI-TIGR relationship could be said to be 
a resourcing partnership where the public sector receives scientific expertise from private 
firms.7 This relationship could also be termed as a contracting partnership as ILRI ‘contracts’ 
TIGR’s expertise. However, ILRI and TIGR jointly undertook the annotation of the genome 
– the identification genes and the assignment of gene functions, although most of the 
annotation was performed by ILRI’s bioinformatics specialists.8 In this regard, this 
relationship is a frontier research partnership.  
 
Figure 7.2: The ILRI ECF project 
 
 
The ILRI-Merial relationship likewise qualifies under different forms of partnerships. To 
begin with, Merial brought into the partnership a vaccine delivery system which was already 
patented. In this regard, this relationship is a resourcing partnership as ILRI received 
technology from Merial. Secondly, the ILRI-Merial relationship could also be considered as 
‘contractual’ as Merial’s expertise in vaccine delivery is used in the PPP. Thirdly, Merial has 
                                               
7
 Spielman, Hartwich & Grebmer (2007) supra note 1 
8
 TIGR & ILRI, ‘U.S. /African project deciphers deadly parasite genome’ available at 
http://www.ilri.org/ilripubaware/uploaded%20files/TIGR_ILRI_ECF_Press_Release.pdf  
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a wealth of knowledge in vaccine development and production; this is evinced by the 
Merial’s assignment to the lead role in the product development stage; Merial undertakes to 
commercialise market and distribute the final vaccine.  
 
Merial and ILRI undertook joint research at the proof-of-concept stage – Merial’s delivery 
system was modified and used to demonstrate the induction of the candidate antigens. This 
part of the relationship qualifies for a frontier research partnership. At the clinical trials stage, 
Merial will be collaborating with ILRI and other local networks notably KARI to determine 
among other things, the dose, safety and efficacy. In this regard, the relationship could be 
seen as a sector or value chain development partnership.  
 
From the deconstruction exercise, it is clear that the ECF project is more complex than the 
ICRISAT-PS consortia. The multi-directional flow of technology is not limited to ILRI and 
the respective partners; the partners also have a relationship with each other although ILRI is 
the coordinator. It is possible to replicate the deconstruction in the context of the other 
partners. Having a master agreement that would link all the parties was essential to the 
functioning of the partnership. The alternative would mean each partner having as many 
agreements as the membership of the project which would not make any sense as any 
research agreement between two parties would impact on other project members and on the 
partnership’s goal and outcomes.   
 
7.3  The role of IP in the case studies  
 
The stages of a generic partnership provide a useful starting point in analysing the role that IP 
plays in food security oriented PPPs. The following analysis looks at the first three stages in a 
partnership and is based on data obtained from interviews during the field work. The 
partnership formation stage includes the identification of common interest and the factors 
motivating parties to enter into a partnership. Relating to these, the interviews with the parties 
in the respective case studies sought to determine firstly, what motivated the interviewee 
institution or firm to collaborate with the partners in the respective projects; secondly, the 
criteria used in choosing partners for collaboration and finally, what part, if any, IP played in 
influencing the decision to be part of a partnership and the choice of partners.  
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Figure 7.3: The cycle of partnership 
 
Hartwich et al. (2007) 
 
The role that IP plays in negotiating the respective partnerships governing documents is the 
main focus in the second stage of the partnership. In the third stage of the partnership, the 
section looks at the role that national IP legislation has on the execution of the case studies. 
Also relevant to this stage, the interviews with the key informants sought to establish if IP 
was among the key factors important in execution of the respective case studies.  
 
7.3.1 IP in stage 1: IP in the creation of the PPPs 
7.3.1.1  General motivational factors 
 
Understanding the profit objective of the private sector is key in exploring the factors 
influencing the formation of partnerships with the public sector. In agricultural research and 
development, the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR or CG) 
is an obvious potential partner for the private sector. To begin with the exception of one 
centre, all CG centres have their headquarters and main operations in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America. For the private sector, partnering offers access to these markets some of which 
would probably be harder to penetrate. 
 
Stage 1: Identification of common 
interest (formation/creation stage) 
 
Stage 2: Negotiation of partnership 
arrangement 
 
Stage 3: Implementation/execution 
of the partnership  
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In addition to taking advantage of the CG’s global presence, the private sector would benefit 
from the goodwill enjoyed by the CG Centres and the Centres’ broad understanding of local 
agricultural knowledge systems. The CG provides an attractive international network for field 
testing plant varieties including transgenic crops. In this regard, the private sector could 
potentially gain access to the global network of non-profit and development related 
agricultural research that the CG is part of.  
 
Although the CG’s collection of ex situ germplasm comprises only 15% of the estimated 
3.8million samples held worldwide, this collection represents close to 40% of the unique food 
germplasm.9 Cooperation with the CG would therefore potentially enhance the private 
sector’s access to unique germplasm.  
 
Dryden confirms that one of the private sector’s interests in cooperating with the CG is that 
this could potentially lead to the development of a new market: those small scale farmers in 
transition to fuller participation in the market economy.10 The CG could assist the private 
sector in further expanding their businesses in economies that are undergoing liberalisation 
such as India.  
 
For small domestic private firms, partnership with the CG could help reduce costs and 
maximise profits. A recent study examining the role of PPPs in international agricultural 
research found that PPPs with the CG provide small domestic firms with opportunities to 
‘access new technologies that can significantly enhance their product lines…’11  
 
Binenbaum, Pardey and Wright12 suggest that private firms ‘donate’ proprietary inputs to the 
public sector or to a PPP for two primary reasons: to gain access to the public sector’s 
connections with networks of public and non-profit organisations (or indeed other private 
firms) and secondly, the potential of the research leading to valuable information for example 
the crossing and testing of crop varieties in different agroecological environments leading to 
information of value to subsequent crop improvement efforts.  
 
                                               
9
 Manicad, G., CGIAR and the private sector: public good versus proprietary technology in agricultural 
research, Biotechnology and Development Monitor 41 (1999) 8 
10
 Sam Dryden, the then chair of US Emergent Genetics Inc. as quoted in Id. at p2  
11
 Spielman, Hartwich & Grebmer (2007) supra note 1 at p40 
12
 Binenbaum, E., Pardey, P. & Wright, B., Public-private research relationships: the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research, Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 83/3 (2001) 748 
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Philanthropy and or altruism are sometimes quoted as reasons why the private sector ‘helps’ 
the public sector by entering into partnership with the latter. The more accurate argument is 
that the private sector does so for positive publicity i.e. to increase their public profile. Most 
private sector representatives interviewed were not coy about this.  
 
According to Jacques Barman, the president of the Swiss Novartis Foundation, ‘where people 
grow, profits grow…’13 This shows that what are sometimes termed as humanitarian efforts 
are actually linked with a good business sense on the part of the private sector. Such PR 
strategies are premised on the understanding that a good public profile has positive 
commercial implications. 
 
Bovaird posits that companies are increasingly paying more attention to their corporate social 
responsibility: ‘there is now evidence… that many companies, while continuing to be profit-
oriented, are interested in, and even committed to, taking more seriously the ‘corporate social 
responsibility’ aspects of their activities.’14  
 
Kettler and Towse15 add influencing policy making as a reason why the private sector may 
choose to enter into a PPP. This echoes the summary offered by Buse and Walt: increased 
corporate influence in global and national level policy making; direct financial returns in the 
form of cash and tax breaks and market penetration; indirect financial benefits through brand 
and image promotion; and enhanced corporate authority and legitimacy through association 
with public bodies.16 
 
In agricultural R&D, major investments by private companies in research including 
biotechnology make them obvious partners for the public sector. Cooperating with the private 
sector enables the public sector build capacity in research particularly in biotechnology in 
developing countries. Mugabe and Clark argue that it is not so much the ‘privately biased’ 
nature of R&D that is responsible for the failure of developing countries to uptake technology 
                                               
13
 Quoted in Manicad, G., CGIAR and the private sector: Public good versus proprietary technology in 
agricultural research, Biotechnology and Development Monitor 37 (1999) 8 at p2 
14
 Bovaird, T., Public-private partnerships: from contested concepts to prevalent practice, International Review 
of Administrative Sciences 70/2 (2004)119 at p213 
15
 Kettler, H. & Towse, A., Public-Private Partnerships for Research and Development: Medicines and 
Vaccines for Diseases of Poverty (London: Office of Health Economics, 2002) 
16
 Buse, K. & Walt, G., Global Public-private partnerships: part II- What are the health issues for global 
governance? Bulletin of the World Health Organisation (2000) 78/5 699 
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and build capacity. They in fact point out that alliance with the private sector is vital to 
gaining access to biotechnology capacity.17 
 
Table 7.1: Motivational factors influencing decision to be involved in a partnership 
Incentive/motivational factors which 
mostly apply to the private sector 
Incentive/motivational factors 
which mostly apply to the public 
sector 
 
Incentive/motivational which 
apply to both sectors 
• Gain access to markets where the public 
sector already has activities (in the case 
of the CG, take advantage of its global 
presence) 
• Tap into potential markets e.g. those 
small scale farmers in transition to 
fuller participation in the market 
economy 
• Benefit from the good will enjoyed by 
the public sector 
• Take advantage of the public sector’s 
knowledge and expertise e.g. 
understanding of local agricultural 
knowledge systems 
• gain access to the public sector’s 
connections with networks of public, 
non-profit & private organisations 
• Gain access to public sector’s 
technology e.g. the unique germplasm 
held by CG Centres; and basic research 
which has the potential to lead to 
valuable information e.g. the crossing 
and testing of crop varieties in different 
agro ecological environments leading to 
information of value to subsequent crop 
improvement  
• reduce costs and maximise profits 
especially for small domestic private 
companies 
• PR (indirect financial benefits through 
brand and image promotion) 
• enhanced corporate authority and 
legitimacy through association with the 
public sector 
• corporate social responsibility 
• direct financial returns in the form of 
cash and tax breaks 
• Influence policy making at national & 
global levels 
• Save public funds 
• Build capacity in research 
• Tap into private sector’s skills 
and expertise 
• Gain access to private sector’s 
technology whether protected 
or not 
• Gains access to the private 
sector’s management principle 
of organisational efficiency 
• Acquire more business 
credibility and authority 
• Benefit from each other’s 
comparative advantage 
• take advantage of existing 
synergies 
• Benefit from each other’s 
skills and expertise 
• Gain access to each other’s 
technology 
• Save costs 
 
 
By collaborating with the private sector a public research organisation is able to tap into the 
former’s skills and expertise. This in turn enhances the latter’s capacity to deliver public 
                                               
17
 Mugabe, J. & Clark, N., Technology transfer and the Convention on Biological Diversity: issues of 
conservation and sustainable use, Science, Technology and Development (1996) 14/3  
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goods and services.18 The public sector also gains access to the private sector’s management 
principle of organisational efficiency. This may help in improving efficiency in the delivery 
of public goods and services. Partnership with the private sector also bestows on the public 
sector more business credibility and authority.19 
 
For both sectors, engaging in partnership may save respective costs. For the public sector this 
is particularly relevant given the declining or stagnant levels of public research funding 
particularly in developing countries. Through PPPs, private funding is mobilised to provide 
public services: ‘governments are keen to shift more welfare provision into private hands to 
keep public spending under control and to avoid having to raise taxes or cut benefits.’20 By 
forming a PPP, the private sector absorbs a greater share of the costs than it would if the 
project was run solely by the public sector. The converse is also probable particularly in food 
security agricultural PPPs which are often funded by donors. In this case, the private sector 
benefits from subsidised research costs.   
 
7.3.1.2  Motivational factors in the case studies 
 
ILRI ECF project 
Public sector’s perspective 
The Third System Review of the CGIAR carried out in 1998 called for greater partnership 
with the private sector. Although this might partly explain why ILRI decided to form a PPP, 
it falls short of elucidating why it chose to form a PPP to execute the ECF project. The 
scientists interviewed at ILRI identified overlapping synergies and complementary skills and 
knowledge as the main reason for collaborating with the current partners. In deciding who to 
invite into the partnership, ILRI identified the skills and expertise needed throughout the 
various stages of vaccine research and development. This formed the criteria for choosing 
partners; those that ILRI felt matched the requirements of the R&D process were chosen.  
 
The previous chapter provided a chronological account of the PPP; before the start of the 
partnership, an ILRI scientist and a TIGR researcher had made an acquaintance. Building on 
                                               
18
 Van der Meer, K., ‘Public-private cooperation in agriculture research: examples from the Netherlands’ in 
Byerlee, D. & Echeverria, R., (eds.) Agricultural research policy in an era of privatisation (Oxon: CABI 
Publishing, 2002) 
19
 Buse & Walt (2000) supra note 16 
20 Economist, A survey of social insurance: privatising peace of mind, The Economist 24 October 349/8029 
(1998) at p3 
 204 
this informal network had as much a part to play in ILRI seeking collaboration with TIGR as 
did TIGR’s obvious technical expertise and experience in genome sequencing. This makes a 
case for the importance of informal networks especially where they lead to further 
collaboration.  
 
Merial had vast experience in vaccine formulation, production and commercialisation. It was 
mainly for these reasons that ILRI was led to collaborate with Merial. Through the 
partnership, ILRI scientists are able to access not only the private sector partner’s technical 
expertise but also benefit from the proprietary technology brought into the partnership by the 
private sector. Although Merial had novel technologies relevant to the partnership some of 
which - like the vaccine delivery platform – were already patented, Merial’s knowledge and 
expertise in vaccine R&D was a greater motivation factor than its technology. This merits 
further comment: the ILRI scientists interviewed said that they would have still been drawn 
to Merial even where the latter had no patented technology. It was Merial’s  
‘comparative knowledge and experience in animal vaccine development 
that attracted us most. Of course it helped that they already had a delivery 
system which we could use as this saved the partnership time and cost. At 
first, we were not even aware that they already had a patent on the 
delivery system, only that it existed.’21  
 
Merial had experience and understanding of the development and registration processes for 
veterinary vaccines as well as considerable manufacturing skills and assets. ILRI saw these in 
addition to Merial’s experience in project management and commercialisation as factors 
influencing their decision to invite Merial into the partnership.    
 
Private sector’s perspective 
On invitation to join the partnership, Merial responded positively mainly for two reasons: it 
considered itself as having a long history of involvement in animal diseases in the developing 
world and would therefore add value to the partnership while increasing its knowledge of the 
science involved; this was an opportunity to gain access to knowledge held by ILRI and the 
other partners. Secondly, and most importantly, Merial was attracted to the partnership as the 
science had great potential to lead to a clearer understanding of how protozoal vaccines of 
                                               
21
 ILRI, pers. comm. 
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greater commercial interest may be developed; in other words, the potential spin offs from 
the research and the concomitant commercial value were of great interest to Merial.22  
Understanding the ECF causing parasite provides insights significant to research into 
treatment of diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS and some forms of cancer. 
These were influential factors in motivating Merial and the other partners to collaborate.  
 
Figure 7.4: Trade offs in the ECF project  
 
 
The representatives interviewed cited the previous connections that Merial had with ILRI as 
persuasive aspects in their decision to join the project. Merial had previously marketed a sub 
unit vaccine partly developed by ILRI. Participating in the project allows Merial to build on 
this relationship. Merial also recognised ILRI’s expertise in bovine research. Although Merial 
had vast experience in animal vaccine research, most of its activities related to pets and 
horses, participation in the PPP would expose it to the science and knowledge on bovine 
vaccines. By the time Merial joined the project in November 2001, all the other partners were 
already members of the PPP, Merial therefore had the advantage of knowing before-hand 
who the other partners were and their comparative strengths.  
                                               
22
 Merial, pers. comm.  
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It was on the basis of TIGR’s relationship with ILRI that the PPP was first conceived. TIGR 
recognised the importance of basic research conducted by ILRI. By participating in the PPP, 
TIGR gains access to this knowledge while exploiting the synergies existing between and 
among the project partners.  
 
ICRISAT-PS consortia 
Public sector’s perspective 
In the ICRISAT-PS consortia, ICRISAT sent invitations indiscriminately to private seed 
companies who bred and/or marketed sorghum, pearl millet or pigeon pea; those who 
responded favourably and agreed to the terms and conditions joined the consortia.  
 
For ICRISAT, the main motivation for forming the consortia with the private sector was the 
recognition that the latter had comparative advantage at seed commercialisation. The private 
seed sector as a whole was perceived as vital in completing the R&D chain. ICRISAT 
recognised that engaging with the private sector was crucial to the fulfilment of the its food 
security premised mandate as it did not have the expertise and capacity to distribute its own 
technologies.  
 
ICRISAT breeders saw the private sector as a vital link with the end users given its close 
relationship with the farmers. ICRISAT would therefore tap into the knowledge held by the 
private sector in order to make its research more relevant to farmers and hence improve its 
mandate. In addition, ICRISAT was attracted to the private sector due to its efficiency in 
delivering relevant results. It was hoped that ICRISAT would benefit from this organisational 
and management principle which could be applied in other areas of ICRISAT operations.  
 
Of the three lead scientists interviewed (one for each consortium), only one identified 
supplementing funding as a motivating factor for engaging the private sector. The rest alluded 
to this by demonstrating how financially successful the respective consortia were in 
supporting ICRISAT’s core research priorities. The grant funds almost fully covered breeding 
activities for the three crops. Their view however was the funding was a ‘spin off’ of the 
consortia rather than a factor influencing their decision to enter into partnership with the 
private sector. Finally, ICRISAT was naturally attracted to the private sector given that the 
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private sector uses more of ICRISAT germplasm than India’s public sector does.23 ICRISAT 
was therefore building on its existing network with the private sector. 
 
Private sector’s perspective 
The incentives for the private sector consortia members to join the partnership were many. 
Firstly, they recognised ICRISAT as a leader in plant breeding in the state of Hyderabad. It is 
a source of high quality seed. Joining the consortia gave them access to the wide range of 
ICRISAT improved germplasm and access to ICRISAT’s expertise in breeding. 
 
In so far as ICRISAT had done a significant amount of selective breeding and the individual 
seed companies had access to the germplasm (subject to terms and conditions) whose traits 
were desired, the seed companies firstly benefited from ICRISAT’s technology and secondly, 
they saved costs in research as the germplasm was already bred for the characteristics they 
wanted. Even where this was not the case (as in the case of parental lines), costs were still 
saved as it would take seasons of research and breeding for the private sector to arrive at the 
lines ICRISAT provided. Obtaining the seed parents was of direct importance particularly to 
those seed companies with plant breeding programs.  
 
To the extent that the consortia private seed companies have access to ICRISAT improved 
germplasm before other seed companies who are not part of the consortia, they have a head 
start which may be crucial in capturing new markets. 24 The consortia private seed 
companies interviewed cited the favourable terms and conditions (which were sent along with 
the invitations) as a factor in their decision to join the consortia. The ‘head start’ condition 
proved to be a major incentive. Other favourable terms included ICRISAT’s undertaking to 
arrange for staff training through field days, workshops and invitation of the consortia 
members to relevant conferences. In this way, the private seed companies would benefit from 
knowledge transfer and increased capacity. This is of more importance to small seed 
companies with limited training programs.  
 
                                               
23
 ICRISAT scientists, pers. comm. 
24
 Under the partnership terms of the ICRISAT-PS hybrid parents research consortia, non-members have access 
to only the first category of improved material (as opposed to members who have full access or partial access 
depending on membership)  and only three years after members are supplied. This gives the consortia members 
a lead in the market. 
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The goodwill and trust enjoyed by ICRISAT was cited by all private seed companies 
interviewed as a main motivating factor for joining the consortia. Previous interaction 
between individual seed companies and ICRISAT further strengthened this incentive.  
 
Figure 7.5: Trade offs in the ICRISAT-PS Consortia  
 
Information from key informants in the two PPPs suggests that IP had a role in the creation 
stage of the partnerships. This covers a diverse range of IP related considerations such as the 
design of the PPP, the decision to join the PPP and the choice of partner.   
 
In the case of the consortia, IP was a definite consideration in the design of the PPP. As 
earlier seen, ICRISAT’s MTA prohibits recipients of ICRISAT germplasm from claiming 
ownership of the material or seeking IPRs over the material.  To ensure the germplasm is 
maintained in the public domain, the MTA is designed in such a way as to allow multiple 
recipients to receive the same material from ICRISAT. If there were no need to maintain the 
germplasm in the public domain, ICRISAT would be able to enter into exclusive bilateral 
contracts with third parties. Aware of this, ICRISAT opted to adopt a model that would allow 
multiple partners into the partnership without compromising the ‘non-exclusivity’ nature of 
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its policy. Referring to the multiple small grants from private seed companies, Reddy et al. 
write: 
“…for IPR reasons the small grants proposal had to be structured and 
administered as private research grants to ICRISAT, rather than contract research 
agreements.”25   
 
With regard to the private sector, some seed companies had IP considerations before they 
joined the consortia. Indeed, some declined joining the consortia for IPR reasons: 
“After much deliberation and scrutiny of the agreement…Monsanto posed a 
simple question to ICRISAT, ‘If Monsanto [was] to develop further products from 
material developed under its agreement with ICRISAT, who would have 
ownership of these subsequent developments? The answer came back from 
ICRISAT that Monsanto would have ownership of subsequently developed 
products. Monsanto joined the consortium immediately. However, a few major 
Indian companies did decline to join the consortium. The reasons differ for each 
of them. Apprehensions on IPR issues, budget limitations, and their internal 
strengths/weaknesses are among reasons explaining their reluctance.”26 
 
The IP considerations at the ‘creation stage’ in the ICRISAT-PS consortia were significant 
enough to deter some seed companies from joining the consortia. Monsanto only joined after 
assurances that it would own subsequently developed material. 
 
In ILRI’s case, IP considerations did not feature in the design of the partnership or in 
influencing the choice of partners to involve. ILRI’s utmost concern at the time was choosing 
partners with the right experience, knowledge and skills who appreciated and shared the 
project’s goal. ILRI’s choice of partners was influenced by the potential partner’s 
comparative advantage and research knowledge and competence. In so far as these contribute 
to intellectual assets, it may be argued that ILRI’s considerations stopped at the intellectual 
assets necessary for the execution of the project; whether or not these intellectual assets were 
protected (and hence intellectual property) did not matter to ILRI.27 
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Typically, the private sector will carefully look at the IP involved in the project and the IP 
clauses in the partnership agreement. It will then assess the risk versus the benefits for joining 
the partnership. In the ECF project, Merial joined the partnership after all the initial partners 
had joined. It was thus aware of all the IP involved in the partnership and the IP related 
clauses in the agreement. Interestingly, the ILRI-DfID funding agreement requires the 
partnership to grant DfID through the University of Edinburgh, a non-exclusive licence of the 
end product; DfID is to retain the sublicence and can grant it to any party (even those outside 
the partnership) to supply the end product. This was done as a safety measure to ensure that 
the end product would be delivered to the end users. 28    
 
To the extent that Merial was aware of this when joining the partnership, it can be argued that 
IP was a consideration in joining the partnership but not significant enough to deter Merial’s 
membership. The project’s membership however harbours concerns that the DfID IP clause 
may deter potential partners from joining the project.29 As at December 2006, there were no 
plans to expand the membership; it is therefore not possible to assess the effect of the DfID 
clause in this regard.  
 
7.3.2 IP in stage 2: negotiation of partnership arrangement 
7.3.2.1  IP policies 
 
The public sector 
The parties’ differing perspectives on IP are reflected in their respective IP policy documents. 
Chapter six examined ILRI’s and ICRISAT’s IP policies in detail. ILRI’s was found to be 
flexible enough to allow for IP protection as and when the need arises. There is nothing in the 
policy to suggest that ILRI is averse to patenting or prefers one mode of IP protection over 
another. With regard to covering IPRs on jointly developed products, ILRI’s policy seems to 
recognise that there may be a need for ILRI to protect research results although it does not go 
into details of ownership; this is left for the parties to negotiate and to be expressed in 
subsequent agreements. 
 
ICRISAT’s policy on the other hand clearly states that ‘as its basic policy, ICRISAT pursues 
publication and full disclosure and the open sharing of ICRISAT data, information and 
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knowledge through the release of ICRISAT research findings and products into the public 
domain.’ This clearly demonstrates that ICRISAT’s first port of call in IP protection is 
publication. It is presumed that this is publication of scientific criteria as well as defensive 
(enabling) publication.  
 
ICRISAT’s policy refers to joint ownership of research products and provides that ‘where 
collaborative research products are to be owned jointly, ownership and/or use of the product 
will be negotiated by the partners. Securing such research products in the public domain will 
be a priority for ICRISAT in such collaborative work.’ 
 
ICRISAT signed a Memorandum of Agreement with the European Patent Office (EPO) 
enabling the former to disseminate its research products in the latter’s Non-Patent Literature 
(NPL); by doing so, ICRISAT places its IP in the public domain where it acquires the status 
of prior art. Efforts are underway to identify internal publications such as technical reports, 
annual reports and monographs in order to add them to the EPO’s NPL database.  
 
The private sector 
Virtually all the consortia Indian seed companies interviewed did not have IP policies. Most 
were concerned with seed certification requirements. The private seed companies mostly deal 
in hybrid crop varieties. By their nature, hybrids cannot be protected by PBRs as they do not 
meet the universal stability requirement. In this regard, the seed companies have no exposure 
in obtaining PBRs. In any case, India’s PVP law is yet to be implemented and therefore, none 
of the seed companies have applied for PBRs even for other crops that meet the NDUS 
criteria. Two companies however expressed the desire to formulate an IP policy to guide their 
plant breeding efforts in the future.  
 
The private sector partners in the ECF project have extensive IP policies. Merial is a leading 
company in animal vaccine research and has already patented some of its technology 
including the delivery system used in the project. Typically, Merial’s policy objective is to 
protect inventions by patents and other instruments normally in use in the private sector e.g. 
trade secrets and confidentiality agreements.  
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7.3.2.2  Governing documents and their negotiation 
 
The ECF project is governed by a master partnership agreement: the collaborative research 
agreement. In addition to this, MTAs are used for transfer of material from one partner to 
another. Confidentiality agreements are also used. The ICRISAT-PS consortia are governed 
by the respective Letters of Agreement. Just like the ECF project, MTAs are used to transfer 
material from ICRISAT to the consortia members; the FAO MTA is used for designated 
germplasm while the standard MTA is used for non designated germplasm. Confidentiality 
agreements are also used.  
 
The preparation leading to the main governing documents in the two PPPs differ greatly. 
Although ICRISAT sought the input of potential consortia members through three rounds of 
discussions, the drafting of the guidelines and the partnership agreements was ICRISAT-led. 
The Governing Board in 2003 approved the revised guidelines for the consortia. Letters 
inviting the private sector to join the consortia were subsequently sent to seed companies. 
ICRISAT received feedback on the guidelines from some seed companies which formed the 
basis for subsequent amendment of the guidelines and Letters of Agreement; these were sent 
to those seed companies who had confirmed their willingness to join the consortia. Once the 
consortia were up and running, seed companies wishing to join the consortia sign up to it on a 
‘take it or leave it’ basis. They are not free to negotiate the terms on the standard form.  
 
The experience with ILRI was very different. All parties were involved in negotiating the 
terms of the agreement. Although ideal, this model of consensus building has its drawbacks. 
The scientists interviewed decried the costs of this in terms of time and administration. 
Should other organisations or companies wish to join the partnership, past experience 
suggests that all parties would be involved in re-negotiating the terms on the master 
agreement.  
 
The involvement of parties in formulating the partnership agreement has a direct bearing on 
their perception of its terms. Asked what would take precedence if there was a conflict 
between a party’s IP policy and the terms and conditions of the partnership, ICRISAT 
responded that its policy would override the partnership agreement although it was unlikely 
that such a situation would occur. Any potential conflict would be resolved on a ‘case by case 
basis.’  
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Table 7.2: Respective parties’ differing perspectives on IP 
Perspectives ECF vaccine project ICRISAT-PS consortia 
 ILRI Private sector ICRISAT Private sector 
(a) Is there an IP 
policy? 
Yes Yes Yes No* 
(b) IP policy objective Flexible enough 
to cover 
patenting  
Seek 
appropriation 
through 
patenting, trade 
secrets 
Publication and 
full disclosure 
Not applicable* 
(c) IP instruments 
used in the PPP 
collaborative research agreement, 
MTAs, confidentiality agreements  
Letters of Agreement, MTA, 
confidentiality agreements 
(d) How were IP 
instruments 
negotiated? 
Joint negotiation among all parties# Standard form Letters of Agreement 
drafted by ICRISAT incorporating 
feed back from private sector# 
(e) Should there be a 
conflict between 
(a) and (c), what 
takes precedence? 
Policy flexible 
enough to allow 
for incorporation 
of IP terms; 
negotiate 
negotiate IP policy takes 
precedence 
Not applicable as 
IP policy not 
existing* 
*Although the MNCs had IP policies, all local consortia seed companies interviewed did not have IP policies, 
#the MTAs in use are CG standardised and are similar across all CG Centres; partners dealing with CG Centres 
have no input in MTAs’ provisions 
 
ILRI’s response was that because the project partners have different IP policies, the 
partnership agreement tries to reflect this in its terms on IP. As ILRI’s policy is flexible 
enough to address the issues in the partnership agreement, the incidences for conflict between 
the two are minimal. Any potential conflict is to be resolved by negotiation among the project 
partners.  
 
7.3.3  IP in stage 3: execution of the partnership   
7.3.3.1  Role of national IP legislation in the PPPs   
 
All parties interviewed were aware of the existence of the respective host countries’ IP 
legislation. As the nature of the research dictates the type of intellectual property applicable, 
partners in the consortia were aware of the provisions of India’s Protection of Plant Varieties 
and Farmers’ Rights Act but not of the provisions in India’s Patent Act. The partners in the 
ECF project were similarly more familiar with the provisions in Kenya’s Industrial Property 
Act rather than the Seeds and Plant Varieties Act.  
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When asked about the influence of the relevant domestic IP legislation on the PPPs, all 
parties were of the opinion that the respective legislations had minimal to no influence on the 
PPP’s activities. ICRISAT’s IP policy states that  
“ICRISAT will strive to comply with national laws that are relevant for the use of 
protected intellectual property in all locations where it operates. In this regard, 
ICRISAT recognises that international trade has significant implications on the 
use of intellectual property, particularly in protected market jurisdictions. 
ICRISAT will inform and educate … its beneficiaries and partners on these 
issues.”  
 
By extension of its policy to the partnership agreements, ICRISAT infers that the consortia 
will ‘strive to comply’ with Indian PVP law. Under the Protection of Plant Varieties and 
Farmers’ Rights Act, a PVP applicant has to provide the background information pertaining to 
the variety under application. This is however not relevant in the case of the consortia: The 
MTA for transfer of ICRISAT bred material prohibits recipients from claiming ownership or 
seeking IP over material received, ‘or its genetic parts or components in the form received.’ 
The recipient is also bound by the provision not to seek IP over information related to the 
material received. A note to the clause states that  
“This does not prevent the recipient from releasing the material (or its products) to 
farmers for cultivation… Materials released should be acknowledged and ICRISAT 
should be informed of the details.”  
 
In the host countries, IP legislation provides the framework for protection of intellectual 
property. The legislation’s utility to an innovation partnership is demonstrated inter alia 
through firstly, facilitating registration of research products; secondly, addressing 
enforcement of IP and thirdly, for settling disputes.   
 
The ECF partnership agreement addresses the protection of IP as do ILRI’s and ICRISAT’s 
policies. To the extent that the institutions envisage securing IP protection as necessary to 
further their mandates in certain cases, the national IP framework is crucial in ensuring this. 
In the case of the consortia, India’s IP Act and PVP Act are of no consequence to the 
partnership as seeking IP protection is prohibited.  
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The ECF vaccine project involves two delivery systems which are protected by patents. 
These are owned by Merial and the University of Oxford. The candidate sequences are also 
patented and are jointly owned by the project partners. The PPP has produced candidate 
antigens formulated using the delivery systems. These have formed the basis of two patent 
applications filed through the PCT designating 11 African countries of which Kenya is one. 
To this extent, Kenyan IP system is relevant to the partnership.   
 
With regard to enforcement and dispute settlement, neither PPP have use for the national IP 
framework. Under the ECF project, partners are expected to honour the terms and conditions 
set out in the agreements. There has not been a situation to date where a matter has had to be 
referred to the courts. Even if this were to occur, it would probably be brought before the 
commercial courts rather than the Tribunal established under the Industrial Property Act. The 
partnership agreement provides for arbitration. This provision has not been invoked to date.  
 
The ICRISAT-PS consortia are likewise self-enforcing. The PPP is based on goodwill 
between ICRISAT and the respective members. The Letters of Agreement provide for 
dispute settlement by mutual discussion between the parties. Should this fail, or where there 
is any other dispute regarding interpretation and implementation of the agreement, ‘any 
controversy, claim or dispute … concerning questions of fact or law, or breach thereof, will 
be settled or determined by the Management of ICRISAT, which shall be binding and final.’ 
As at December 2006, there were four instances of breach: one relating to the pearl millet 
consortium, two in the sorghum consortium and one in the pigeon pea consortium. These 
were dealt with using the dispute settlement provisions in the respective agreements. These 
provisions dispense with the need to seek redress through not only the mechanism provided 
under IP law but also that under the entire Indian legal system.  
 
From the foregoing, it is evident that domestic IP law plays a minimal role in the two PPPs. 
The bulk of the PPPs’ activities are rather determined by the agreements between and among 
the partners. Contract law is therefore more relevant than IP law. This underscores the 
findings in previous chapters which advocate for capacity building in IP contract negotiation 
and execution. 
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7.3.3.2  Value placed on IP  
 
In their analysis of factors necessary for developing effective and sustainable partnerships, 
Saad et al.30 identify at least seven factors: availability of resources, prior relationship 
between organisations, trust, complementary skills between partners, communication, mutual 
understanding or partners’ needs and objectives and the equality of partners.  
 
As the focus of their analysis was neither on development related PPPs nor technology based 
PPPs, their results are cited with caution. IP did not feature in their identification of the vital 
factors. Nevertheless, their study is instructive in demonstrating the general important factors 
in a PPP.  
 
Saad et al. see trust as central to partnerships; communication between the parties is a close 
second while mutual understanding of partners’ needs and objectives and the availability of 
resources are also important. Of the seven factors, prior relationship between organisations is 
ranked last and surprisingly, complementary skills between partners is ranked sixth. Equality 
of partners is ranked higher than complementary skills; perhaps like Brinkerhoff,31 Saad et al. 
opine that power imbalance inhibits the mutuality required for a partnership to work.  
 
In his analysis of partnerships between the public and not for profit private sector, Lovrich 
argues that social capital is central to PPPs. In so far as mutual and social trust are integral to 
social capital, these are vital to PPPs. The concept of social trust, as created by James 
Coleman holds that  
 “Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the 
achievement of certain ends that would not be attainable in its absence… for 
example, a group whose members manifest trustworthiness and place extensive 
trust in one another will be able to accomplish much more than a comparable 
group lacking that trustworthiness and trust.”32 
 
                                               
30
 Saad, M., Rowe, K. & James, P., ‘Developing and sustaining effective partnerships through a high level of 
trust’ in Montanheiro, L., et al. (eds.) Public and private sector partnerships: furthering development (Sheffield: 
SHU Press, 1999) 
31
 Brinkerhoff, D. & Brinkerhoff, M., Partnerships between international donors and non-governmental 
development organisations: opportunities and constraints, International Review of Administrative Sciences 70/2 
(2004) 253 
32
 Coleman, J., Foundations of social theory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990) at p304 
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Figure 7.6: Important factors in execution of PPPs 
 
Source: Saad et al. (1999) with modifications 
 
Putnam33 and Fukuyama,34 argue that social capital is built on trust, norms and networks and 
serves to facilitate collective action. Interpersonal trust lies at the core of social capital. 
Bezanson et al. report on an independent evaluation of the partnership committees in the 
CGIAR.35  
 
In considering the characteristics of PPPs sought by the CGIAR, the authors observe that the 
‘intensity of requirements for a successful partnership varies with the purpose and type of 
partnership being sought.’ They develop a rough typology based on the depth and intensity of 
arrangements required for five different types of CGIAR partnerships: consultative, 
coordinative, complementary, collaborative and critical partnerships.  
 
To Bezanson et al., openness and participation of parties are common attributes in the five 
categories of partnerships. As the intensity of partnership arrangements increases, other 
                                               
33
 Putnam, R., Bowling alone: America’s declining social capital, Journal of Democracy 6 (1995) 65 
34
 Fukuyama, F., Trust: the social virtues and the creation of prosperity (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995) 
35
 Bezanson, K., Narain, S. & Prante, G., Independent evaluation of the partnership committees of the CGIAR : 
Final report (Washington DC.: CGIAR, 2004) 
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factors are added to the two basic requirements. Mutual trust is common to complementary, 
collaborative and critical partnerships. Under this schema, one would expect the ECF to 
contain more key elements than the ICRISAT consortia as the former is a more ‘intense 
partnership’ than the latter.  
 
Table 7.3: Types of CGIAR partnerships and their key requirements 
Nature of 
partnership 
Description Objective Possible areas for 
partnership 
Key requirements 
Consultative 
partnership 
Sharing of 
knowledge, 
information, 
technologies 
through agreement 
on lines/forms of 
communication 
Information 
exchange; 
Awareness 
building 
 
Seminars, 
workshops, 
consultations, 
newsletters, 
electronic 
connectivity  
Openness; 
Participatory 
Coordinative 
partnership 
Separate initiatives 
not necessarily 
supportive of each 
other yet aspiring to 
complementarity to 
achieve efficiency 
and effectiveness  
Avoidance of 
duplication; 
Synchronisation of 
activities 
Awareness 
Campaigns; Ad 
hoc committees on 
country, sectoral or 
scientific concerns 
Openness, Regular 
and sustained efforts; 
Representative 
arrangements 
Complementary 
partnership 
Separate initiatives 
but guided by a 
common framework 
characterised by 
purposive efforts to 
support each other 
Integrated program 
approaches; 
Resource sharing 
Public-private 
MOUs on 
technology 
production and 
distribution 
Mutual trust; 
Established 
complementarity of 
interests; Leadership 
support; Participatory 
Collaborative 
partnership 
Joint efforts with a 
common vision and 
objectives 
Joint programmes; 
Policymaking 
Long-term joint 
programmes; 
Institutionalised 
mechanisms 
Mutual trust; Shared 
vision; Congruence in 
strategy; Leadership; 
Participatory; Clear 
delineation of tasks/ 
responsibilities 
Critical 
partnership 
Interdependence; 
Recognition of each 
other as 
indispensable 
partners in the 
development 
process 
Joint strategic 
planning; shared 
decision making & 
implementation 
Long-term and 
Institutionalised 
working relations 
All of the above 
plus:-longer-term, 
codified 'voting' or 
decision making 
regime 
Source: Bezanson et al. (2004), with modifications 
 
In their analysis of constraints in international agricultural research PPPs, Spielman & 
Grebmer hypothesise that formation of PPPs is limited by five factors: parties’ fundamentally 
different incentive structures, insufficient minimisation of the costs and risks of collaboration, 
an inability to overcome mutually negative perceptions, limited use of creative organisational 
mechanisms to reduce competition and insufficient access to information on successful 
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partnership models.36 By inference, these five constraints point to the important factors in a 
successful PPP. In so far as incentive structures constitute IP and related arrangements, IP is 
potentially an important factor in the execution of a PPP.    
 
A recent study on 75 PPPs in the CGIAR showed that 51 percent of all the partnerships 
involve the use or exchange of proprietary knowledge. This suggests that IP is an important 
issue in considering the design and implementation of PPPs.37 
 
ILRI opine that IP’s role was more significant after the formation of a PPP rather than before 
its creation.  But even then, other factors are more vital to the success of the PPP. Different 
informants from ILRI cited various factors as being more important than IP. First of these 
was mutual trust. Others included transparency, confidentiality, good-will and mutual 
understanding of expectations. IP was seen as a tool to help in achieving the project objective 
rather than an end in itself.  
‘IP is important, but not the most important. It is a tool. The decision [to enter 
into] a project, to jointly own, to publish, to commercialise… should be 
informed by the goal or objective of the research, not the presence of IP.’38   
 
This view was echoed by the private sector partner who listed factors such as realistic 
expectations, quality of the team, technical input and expertise as more important than IP. 
Merial however stated that while IP does not make a partnership successful, it may in some 
cases be significant in determining the course of the PPP; it has in the past, fallen out of 
partnership due to IP reasons.39 Merial applied for protection of new technology developed 
under the ECF project. It bore the costs of drafting and of the application; the project 
collaborators were named as inventors.  
 
None of the parties interviewed in the ICRISAT-PS consortia cited IP as even marginally 
important to the implementation of the project. Summarised, the most important factors to the 
consortia according to key informants are mutual trust, good-will, confidentiality, efficiency 
and mutual benefit. One informant from ICRISAT mentioned IP but stated that IP was not 
                                               
36
 Spielman, D. & Grebmer, K., Public-private partnerships in international agricultural research: an analysis of 
constraints, Journal of Technology Transfer 31 (2006) 291 
37
 Spielman, Hartwich & Grebmer (2007) supra note 1  
38
 ILRI, pers. comm. 
39
 Merial, pers. comm. 
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vital to the implementation of the consortia. This would appear to be the case given the 
unambiguous provisions relating to ownership of designated and ICRISAT improved 
germplasm. This indicates that the nature of research influences the role that IP plays in a 
partnership. Reddy et al. argue that ‘it is the resources and skills of the company rather than 
an exclusive IPR agreement that… gives a competitive edge over other private seed 
companies.’40 In other words, it is the company’s research capability and its ability to use 
material from the consortia to make and market hybrids that are most in demand that enable it 
to have an advantage over the market. An exclusive IPR agreement on its own would not 
guarantee this.  
  
7.4  IP related issues and challenges  
 
IP in the context of public agricultural research has been the subject of much comment in the 
last decade. The significance of IPRs to public agricultural research was catalysed by various 
factors. These include the increasing protection of technology in agricultural biotechnology 
especially by the private sector; public research institutes are currently more likely to be 
dealing with technology protected by third parties than ever before so that research depends 
on securing permission to use third parties’ IPRs. Secondly, to maintain research products in 
the public domain as per their mandate, public research institutes are more aware of the IP 
measures needed to avoid appropriation of their technology by third parties. Thirdly, 
collaboration with the private sector may expose public research institutes to IP issues 
especially if the subject of collaboration requires or yields proprietary technology. This is 
more likely to occur in agricultural biotechnology.  
 
If issues related to IP and its management generally present a challenge to public agricultural 
research institutes including IARCs, IP issues in the context of PPPs further compound these 
challenges. IP issues specific to PPPs relate mainly to two concerns: one, IP capacity and 
two, IP management. The examination below assumes that the first is more lacking in the 
public sector partners of a PPP than their private sector counterparts. IP management is 
needed in all parties and in the project itself. As mentioned earlier, the nature of research 
conducted in a PPP determines or at least influences the role that IP plays in the partnership. 
To this end, the ECF project is more exposed to IP issues than the ICRISAT-PS consortia are.  
                                               
40
 Reddy et al. (2001) supra note 25 at p31 
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With regard to IP capacity generally, the CGIAR Panel on Proprietary Science and 
Technology reviewed the CG’s guiding principles on IP in 1998 and highlighted the need for 
strengthening CG Centres’ capacity in IP management.41  This led to the establishment of the 
Central Advisory Service for Intellectual Proprietary to assist all CG Centres on IP matters. 
Some CG Centres have IP management units, a few undertake IP audits but none have 
technology transfer offices.    
 
ILRI and ICRISAT each have a full time IP manager; in addition to this, ILRI outsources a 
local IP attorney and one based abroad; both are on a retainer. The CGIAR Central Advisory 
Service on IP assists both centres on IP matters as it does all CG Centres. ILRI has 
considerable experience in dealing with IP issues in a PPP context having had at least 5 PPPs 
all of which involve IP to various extents. However, IP issues were still identified as a 
challenge in the ECF project given its unique design and the IP conditions in the funding 
agreement.  
 
At the start of the ECF project, background and future IP and other IP issues were not 
negotiated; ILRI was of the view that IP should be negotiated on knowledge of the nature of 
the final product. This perspective clashed with that of its private sector partner which 
preferred to make concrete definitions relating to roles and ownership of IP at the onset. 
These differing perspectives present a challenge to IP management. Moreover, the ECF 
project has potential IP challenges given its unique staggered membership design; it is not 
clear how parties who have left the partnership e.g. DfID would share in the IP should 
negotiations be conducted when the end product is produced.   
 
Capacity in IP issues including IP negotiation is vital in PPPs that involve proprietary 
technology. In their review of four PPPs in health R&D for diseases of poverty, Kettler and 
Towse contend that in proprietary PPPs, the most important strategic tool is the partnership 
research contract particularly the conditions on IP.  
“Critical negotiation is needed on the ownership of both background IP and IP 
created with PPP resources. PPPs must be as aggressive in the way they use IP as 
any commercial unit but for a different purpose – namely to pursue their social 
objective…This involves the negotiation of creative IP arrangements that do not 
                                               
41
 TAC., Report of the CGIAR Panel on Proprietary Science and Technology, Document No. SDR/TA:IAR/98/7 
(1998) 
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scare off companies but also allow the PPP enough control to ensure their ultimate 
objective, a difficult challenge.”42  
 
This view is in part shared by Spielman et al. who argue that IPR exchanges between partners 
in a PPP are a function of the CG Centre’s ability to successfully negotiate with the private 
sector. They posit that the ‘centres’ requests for proprietary assets are often marginalised by 
the private sector’ which is partly due to centres’ lack of capacity in identifying and 
evaluating their own proprietary assets and thereby negotiating more successfully with the 
private sector.43 
 
A centre’s lack of an IP management system may inhibit its ability to access information on a 
partner’s proprietary assets as well as those held by its partner’s competitors.44  In other 
cases, IP clauses may have the same effect. In the ECF project, the agreement between ILRI 
and Merial prohibits the former from obtaining information from the latter’s competitors.  
 
Generally, management of IP invariably increases the costs of research. This is regardless of 
whether a centre chooses to outsource or to manage IP in house. In a PPP, confidentiality 
agreements may increase the coordination costs generally and the cost of IP management 
specifically. In the agreement between ILRI and Merial, the former can only contact other 
firms conducting vaccine research after prior discussion with the latter.  
“Given that the animal health sector comprises far more players than the crop-
science sector, the agreement terms generate prohibitively high search costs for 
ILRI to identify new research partners with potentially useful technologies.”45 
 
Conditions such as this and the inhibition to obtain information from Merial’s competitors 
may lead public research institutes to reconsider the stage at which to involve the private 
sector. Some informants at ILRI were of the opinion that involving Merial after the proof of 
concept stage would have been desirable in terms of saving the project’s coordination costs.   
 
From the private sector perspective, companies may fear that entering into a PPP that 
combines its IP with that of the company’s background IP may limit the company’s ability to 
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use its background IP for other uses especially if early tests fail.46 Although this is a risk 
generally taken by private companies in their collaborative ventures with other companies, 
the IP challenges in a PPP are perceived to be somewhat different and more risky. Private 
sector partners’ insistence on confidentiality clauses in spite of their impact on coordination 
costs is borne out of the fear that the PPP will transfer the knowledge learnt in the PPP to 
parties outside the partnership. ‘If the PPP knows it, everyone else will.’47 To the private 
sector, the potential ‘damage’ this may cause is worth the coordination costs. This again 
illustrates the difference in perspectives on the utility of knowledge: the public sector 
typically does not view knowledge or information shared in ‘potential damage’ terms, if 
anything it aims at putting knowledge in the public domain. This underscores the need for 
mutual trust.   
 
A PPP’s design may have IP implications. Although ICRISAT is committed to facilitating 
access of its research products to the public, the design of the PPP including the terms of the 
Letters of Agreement in the ICRISAT-PS consortia in effect offer limited exclusivity to 
firstly primary consortia members and secondly, promotional consortia members. The 
consortia allow access of the former to all categories of material (see table 6.6 in chapter six) 
three years before the latter who have access to some categories of the material three years 
before the public. To this extent therefore, the consortia can be said to offer some exclusivity. 
Further, it has been argued that the consortia membership fees are an entry barrier for smaller 
seed companies.48 
 
7.5  Conclusion 
 
It is submitted that IP has a role to play in food security oriented PPPs; it has the potential to 
either support or constrain a partnership’s objectives. Its significance, as demonstrated by the 
case studies in the discussion above, is determined by two factors: the nature of the 
technology used in the partnership and the stage of the partnership. Projects involving 
proprietary technology are more likely to find IP more significant than those whose research 
products have no potential proprietary value. This however varies according to the stage of 
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the partnership. Taken together, the two determinants (nature of technology and stage of 
partnership) suggest the following:  
(a) for PPPs whose research is potentially proprietary (e.g. ECF project), IP is mostly 
significant at the negotiation and execution stages and less so at the PPP creation stage; 
(b) for PPPs with non-proprietary research products (e.g. ICRISAT-PS consortia), IP is 
mostly significant at the formation stage and hardly plays a role in the negotiation and 
execution of the partnership.   
In the case of both determinants, the case studies further suggest that other factors such as 
mutual trust, communication and research competence are crucial.  
 
Parties’ attitudes to IP are influenced by their respective IP policies and their institutional and 
research cultures. ILRI and its private sector partners in the ECF project have institutional 
policies on IP. On the other hand, most of the local seed companies in the ICRISAT-PS 
consortia do not have IP policies. The PPPs demonstrate a willingness to address the 
differences between the respective sectors and to learn from each other. This is particularly 
true of the ECF vaccine project although this has little impact on strengthening ILRI’s IP 
capacity.    
 
The IP policy objectives differ across the institutions identified as having IP policies. By the 
end of the data collection period, there had not been any conflict between any of the parties’ 
policies and the agreements governing the respective PPPs. Findings suggest that if a conflict 
was to occur, the various parties would handle it differently; negotiation would be used in the 
ECF project while ICRISAT’s IP policy would take precedence in the consortia.  
 
The negotiation of the agreements governing IP in the respective PPPs studied was conducted 
differently. The consortia’s standard form agreement is easy to administer; conversely, the 
ECF project agreement requires negotiation by all partners. While commendable for its 
democratic inclusion, the downside of the ECF model is that it increases the costs of IP 
management and of the partnership.  
 
Domestic IP law per se has had minimal impact on the formation, negotiation and execution 
of the PPPs: the parties’ IP policies (as well as the documents governing the respective PPPs) 
have had no input from national legislation whose only utility is to provide the framework 
under which proprietary technology, as was demonstrated in the ECF project is protected. 
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The enforcement and the dispute settlement function of the IP system in both host countries 
have not been and are unlikely to be invoked by the respective PPPs.  
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Chapter Eight 
 
Summary and conclusions 
 
8.0  Introduction 
 
Chapters two to five addressed at least four research questions. To recap, these are as follows: 
(i) What effect have IPRs had on private sector presence in agriculture in Kenya and India? 
(ii) What is the effect of IPRs on the provision of public goods? (iii) How can IPRs be used in 
the provision of public goods in order to mitigate the theoretical tension between private 
rights and public goods? (iv) How does national domestic IP legislation affect the conduct of 
research in agriculture PPPs in Kenya and India? 
 
Chapter one introduced the problem: that agriculture research and the attainment of food 
security is constrained by the tension between public sector research that is often not applied 
and private sector research that is applied but primarily for commercial purposes. It 
highlighted the increase in use of IPRs in food security oriented research and introduced PPPs 
as institutional mechanisms that attempt to resolve the tension in agriculture research through 
the exploitation of existing synergies between the two sectors.   
 
Chapter two explored the trends and developments in agricultural R&D in Kenya and India. 
The main query was the effect that growing privatisation has had on food security in 
developing countries. The chapter provided evidence of increasing privatisation in Kenya and 
India; it examined the link between IPRs and increased private sector presence in agriculture 
and asked whether IPRs have influenced the changes witnessed in agricultural research in the 
development context.  
 
Chapter three theoretically considered the effect of IPRs on the provision of public goods. 
The main question addressed was whether the use of IPRs to protect products developed by 
public research institutions - particularly IARCs - conflicts with the IARCs’ mandates to 
provide public goods. It distinguished between the existence and exercise of IPRs. The 
chapter introduced the CGIAR as the largest public investor in agricultural research in 
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developing countries. Chapter three also looked at the potential impact of IPRs on food 
security.  
 
Chapter four asked whether IARCs, other public research institutions and PPPs can use IPRs 
in ways that facilitate the fulfilment of social welfare objectives such as contributing to the 
attainment of food security. It investigated the current practices in place and explored the role 
of IP related policies in the creative exercise of IPRs to balance competing interests.  
 
The main issue confronted in chapter five was whether domestic IP law has any effect on the 
conduct of research in agricultural PPPs, or indeed generally. The chapter analysed IP 
legislation in Kenya and India relevant to agricultural research. The enquiry was part of the 
larger issue of the impact of IPRs on domestic innovation. 
 
The case studies were reviewed in chapter six while chapter seven consisted of their analysis. 
The chapters assumed that the public and private sectors have different perspectives on the 
concept and application of IP. They assessed whether and how the differing perspectives on 
IP influence the partnerships. The chapters also investigated the value the respective partners 
placed on intellectual property in the context of the two case studies.  The aim of this was to 
map the significance and role of intellectual property on the respective partnerships.  
 
This final chapter consists of a recap of the main research questions in the preceding chapters. 
It juxtaposes the research questions with the experiences and findings from the two case 
studies. The aim of this task is two fold: firstly, to close any gaps between the theoretical 
aspects of the research questions and the practical experience provided by the two PPPs.  
Secondly, it exposes the discrepancies between what is assumed following a theoretical 
analysis of the research questions and the evidence apparent from the case studies.  
 
The ultimate objective of this exercise is to highlight issues for further research and action. A 
summary of the overall findings is provided, followed by an attempt at suggestions as to the 
way forward.  
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8.1  The role of IP in the changing agricultural R&D environment  
 
Setting the scene for the thesis, chapter two explored the trends and developments in 
agricultural research in Kenya and India. It traced the developments in agricultural research 
in the two countries. The aim of this was to firstly lay the foundation for the thesis by an 
exposition of the agricultural research environment in the two countries and, secondly, to 
investigate the changes that have occurred in agricultural research in both countries and their 
impact on the attainment of food security.  
 
The chapter found that although agricultural research is still predominantly funded by the 
public sector in India and Kenya there is increasing private sector presence in both countries. 
Investment from the private sector is growing at a faster rate than that from the public sector; 
the number of private sector companies engaging in agriculture is also on the increase in both 
countries. There are also indications of increasing collaborations between the public and 
private sectors.  
 
The private sector was found to be drawn to the agricultural sector by a variety of factors. 
The removal of barriers to private sector participation generally in India though the 
implementation of the seed policy in the 1980s was a main factor influencing growth of the 
private sector. Other factors include the appropriation of research benefits, the size of the 
potential market for new products, the cost of developing new technology and the role played 
by the public sector.   
 
The possible link between IPRs and private sector presence in agriculture was examined on 
two levels: firstly, whether IPRs have helped increase the private sector’s presence in 
agriculture in developing countries and secondly, whether an increase in private sector 
presence in agriculture has popularised IPRs. On the first account, IPRs as an incentive to the 
private sector in developing country agriculture was found to be tenuous. There is evidence 
that the private sector applies strategies other than IPRs for appropriation of benefits from 
agricultural research (such as hybridisation in plant breeding instead of seeking PBRs). This 
is however not to say that they consider IPRs unimportant. On the second account, private 
sector engagement in agriculture was found to increase the likelihood of using IPRs; 
agricultural public research institutions in part attribute their exposure to IPRs to increasing 
engagement with the private sector.  
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8.2  IPRs and the provision of public goods  
 
Chapter three considered the effect of IPRs on the provision of public goods and whether this 
compromises the mandates of IARCs. Being non-rivalrous and non-excludable, public goods 
are unsuitable for private entrepreneurship due to the wide dispersion of benefits whereas the 
rivalrous and excludable nature of private goods renders them suitable for private provision.  
 
Using the classical Samuelson-Musgrave criteria for public and private goods, the chapter 
found that most goods move along the public good-private good continuum. There are hardly 
any examples of pure public goods; agricultural research does not produce pure public goods 
but rather impure public goods as some users can be excluded or charged for some uses of the 
goods produced. The products of agricultural research contain both public and private goods 
characteristics and are therefore ‘mixed goods’. The interests of both the public and the 
private sectors converge on these types of goods making them good candidates for PPPs. In 
theory, the application of IPRs on hybrid or impure public goods introduces excludability but 
not rivalry. IPRs may help improve the use of scarce resources when applied to rival goods. 
However, their application to vital welfare goods such as drugs and food crops may lead to 
under-consumption with dire consequences for food security for example.   
 
IPRs impact on the provision and utilization of mixed goods in two ways: firstly, where the 
provision of the good had public characteristics in that it was equally available and accessible 
to all, IPRs restricts the accessibility element: the good protected is still available but only 
accessible on payment of royalties. Secondly, where utilization of a public good had private 
good characteristics such that one person’s consumption reduces the amount available for 
others (as is the case even with most ready examples of impure public goods such as the 
justice system, education and health), IPRs render the utilization of the good non-rivalrous so 
that one person’s consumption does not subtract from others’ consumption.  
 
The overriding objective of public agricultural research particularly that of IARCs, is to 
provide global public goods accessible to all - especially the poor in developing countries. 
Theoretically, in so far as IPRs introduce excludability when applied to goods, the use of 
IPRs is at odds with global agricultural research. This presents a major challenge to IARCs 
who increasingly find they have to deal with or apply IPRs in their research. Situations where 
this may occur include but are not limited to: protection of research products to restrain 
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appropriation by third parties; protection of products to facilitate access to farmers; protection 
where it is deemed necessary to ensure collaboration with the private sector in order to fulfil 
mandate and, though unlikely, protection of research products for income generation.  
 
The challenge to IARCs therefore is how to apply IPRs where needs dictate without 
compromising their mandate to provide global public goods. In effect, the question is one of 
applying IPRs whilst mitigating its ‘excludability’ element. Chapter three argued that there is 
a distinction between the existence and the exercise of IPRs and that it is the latter rather than 
the former that influences the delivery of public goods.  
 
Building on this distinction, chapter four looked at ways in which IARCs and PPPs with food 
security oriented goals can apply IPRs while still maintaining their public goods objectives. 
The creation and implementation of creative IP policies and partnership agreements was 
found to be key in maintaining this balance. IP strategies which can achieve this balance 
include the use of non-assert agreements and creative licenses which may for example 
segment markets according to price and technology use and may result in royalty free 
technologies for the benefit of the poor in developing countries. PPPs and public research 
institutions are already experimenting with some of these strategies although their full effect 
is yet to be seen.  
 
The creative exercise of IPRs to balance competing interests is predicated on the parties’ 
capacity in IP management and strategy. The chapter made the case for increased investment 
in IP capacity particularly in public research institutions like the CG Centres and especially 
when food security oriented partnerships are formed with the private sector.  
 
Chapter four examined the CG system wide IP guidelines and related policy documents. 
These were found to be mostly influenced by the FAO International Treaty. The guiding 
principles and other IP related documents acknowledge the need for the CG Centres to form 
partnerships with the private sector; they were found to allow for the mitigation of the 
excludability effect introduced by the use of IPRs. 
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8.3  The potential role of IP in food security  
 
Sen’s focus on entitlements of individuals and households to food, i.e. their access to the food 
available, is perhaps the most vulnerable to the effect of IPRs on food security. Chapter three 
looked at the potential impacts of IPRs on food security. IPRs were found to have the 
potential to undermine food security efforts although their effect is found to be dependent on 
how the IPRs are exercised; this underscores the difference between the existence and 
exercise of IPRs.  
 
PBRs could potentially raise the cost of protected seed as the breeder asserts his right to 
recoup his plant breeding expenses through the imposition of royalties. Where the seed 
protected relates to food crops, the farmers’ limited access to the protected seed has a direct 
impact on his food security. Although sound in theory, this argument may be critiqued in 
three ways. Firstly, it is more probable that private plant breeding efforts are directed to 
commercial crops and that therefore subsistence farmers’ access to seed is not affected – 
evidence from Kenya illustrates that PBRs have benefitted cash crops more than they have 
food crops. Secondly, in most developing countries - and certainly in Kenya and India - 
farmers’ rights are protected (covertly in the former and overtly in the latter): farmers can 
reuse and exchange seed with other farmers. Thirdly, seed whose access is paramount to 
farmers and which is also of interest to the private sector e.g. cereals such as maize and rice is 
likely to be technology protected i.e. hybrid; farmers’ access therefore is curtailed not by 
IPRs but by the science involved. While it is widely accepted that on-farm experimentation 
and conservation are important bedrocks for food security in developing countries, there is no 
empirical evidence suggesting that these are curtailed by IPRs. This may however be due to 
‘weak’ implementation of IPRs especially in developing countries. Stakeholders must 
therefore remain vigilant on developments in IPRs and their likely impact on control over and 
access to plant genetic resources. 
 
The current agricultural environment is characterised by increasing privatization of research. 
One concern about private sector influenced research is the possibility of distortion of 
research priorities. If this were to occur, orphan crops mostly relevant to subsistence farmers 
and of no interest to the private sector would be neglected. In this way, IPRs could be said to 
indirectly influence food security. One observation on PBRs in Kenya is that over four fifths 
of all PBR applications are for cash crops; the ensuing assumption would be that there would 
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be increased investment in the cash crops because of the appropriation potential and that this 
would undermine investment in food crops. This is however not always the case: firstly, the 
presence of an IP system does not imply its usage by breeders. Secondly, appropriation of 
benefits is often through non-IPR mechanisms such as hybridisation and thirdly, there is no 
evidence that the presence of a PBR system has led to a decline in public investment in food 
crops in Kenya and India.    
 
Concerns have been raised over the DUS criteria used for PBR protection and its impact on 
genetic diversity of crops. Arguments are proffered that commercial plant varieties protected 
by PBRs will replace landraces and diverse seed varieties adapted by farmers for local 
conditions resulting in homogeneity of crops. These homogenous crops have been blamed for 
a decline in crops’ resistance to pests and diseases. Databases maintained by farmers’ groups 
in India on varieties developed and cultivated by farmers in addition to inclusion of 
traditional knowledge as a category of IPRs may help mitigate the potential effects of PBRs 
on food security in this regard.   
 
One other potential effect of IP on food security relates to the restriction of protected 
technology for research. Although most jurisdictions allow for ‘research use’ exemption, 
research organisations nevertheless often have to negotiate Freedom to Operate (FTO) 
agreements with right holders. This increases the costs of research; public research 
organisations with limited financial resources such as those in developing countries would 
particularly be vulnerable to increases in research costs.   
 
8.4  Domestic IP legislation and the conduct of agricultural research  
 
Since the inception of IPRs on a global scale, scholars, economists, policy makers and 
various stakeholders have debated whether strengthened IPRs lead to an increase in 
innovation. The primary rationales for IPRs are to reward the inventor for his efforts, enable 
him to recover the costs of his research, and to act as an incentive encouraging further 
invention. There is ample evidence that IPRs reward inventors and enable them to recover the 
cost of their research. The jury is out, however, on whether IPRs encourage innovation. The 
problem is compounded by conflicting and often inconclusive empirical evidence from 
different countries. Nonetheless, it is apparent that countries at different levels of 
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development require different levels of IP protection to ensure continued domestic 
innovation. 
 
At a lower level, chapter five sought to find out if and how national IP legislation in Kenya 
and India influences food security oriented PPPs within their jurisdictions. The chapter 
argued that the existence of international and national IP regimes are not nearly as important 
in the conduct of research in food security oriented PPPs as the parties’ institutional policies 
and the partnership agreements adopted by the parties. It reinforced the case for investment in 
capacity in negotiating IP and contract drafting and execution.  
 
In terms of increasing agricultural innovation, the chapter found no correlation between the 
volume of applications for agricultural biotechnology patents and PBRs on one hand and the 
inception of IPRs on the other. Indeed, there is a dearth of data relating to patents in 
agriculture in the two countries; moreover, it is difficult to establish the number of 
applications relating to agricultural biotechnology. In the case of PBRs, India is yet to grant 
any although it has received about a thousand applications since the implementation of the 
PBR Act in May 2007. In Kenya, over two thirds of PBR applications are for cash crops: 
mostly horticultural crops and ornamentals. Foreign applications make up 58% of all PVP 
applications in Kenya; these however are not indicative of increased innovation. Save for 
1997 when there was a surge in applications when the PBR system was implemented, 
applications by foreign entities has been largely constant. Local applications peaked in 2001 
but only as a result of a decision to protect extant varieties held by the public sector. As there 
is no data available on innovation before and after the inception of IPRs, evidence from 
Kenya and India does not shed any significant light on whether IPRs have promoted 
agricultural innovation. 
 
With regard to the impact of IP law on the conduct of research in agricultural PPPs involving 
the CG Centres, the chapter found that domestic IP law seems to play only a minor role at 
best. Except for providing a framework for IP protection where this is sought by a PPP, 
domestic legislation does not seem to feature in the documents relevant to the conduct of 
research in the PPPs. For partnerships involving the CG Centres, the FAO International 
Treaty is the most relevant international agreement to the PPP’s research operations. Capacity 
in IP management and in negotiation of partnership agreements is vital and is a prerequisite 
to a food security PPPs particularly those that are potentially proprietary.   
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8.5  The role of IP in the formation, negotiation and execution of agricultural PPPs 
 
Chapters six reviewed the two case studies while chapter seven analysed them using the 
various themes laid out by the preceding chapters.  Chapter six conducted a review of the 
studies on PPPs in the CGIAR. The private sector constitutes 4% of the CG Centres’ key 
collaborators. The private sector’s main presence is in the field of agricultural biotechnology 
and in plant breeding. These two fields are the focus of the ILRI ECF project and the 
ICRISAT-PS consortia respectively. The two case studies therefore represent the typical 
areas where private sector involvement in agriculture is most likely. The studies on PPPs in 
the CGIAR do not explicitly consider whether IPRs are a factor motivating collaboration; 
nothing in the findings suggests that IPRs have aided the formation of PPPs in agricultural 
research.  
 
Various studies reveal that PPPs are a growing strategy in addressing issues in agricultural 
R&D. Efforts to characterise PPPs focus on the near-impossible task of capturing all facets of 
a PPP into a rigid category. The chapter advocated for bespoke analyses of PPPs as the 
preferred approach yielding qualitative results; chapters six and seven are examples of this 
analytical approach.  
 
Chapter six consisted of an in-depth analysis of ICRISAT’s and ILRI’s IP policies and found 
these to be influenced by the CG system wide IP guidelines and by the FAO International 
Treaty.  Both the institutions’ IP policies attempt to address the tension between IPRs and the 
provision of public goods. Evidence from both Centres shows that it is possible to apply IPRs 
to the Centres’ research products without compromising their global public goods mandate. 
 
Regarding the partnership formation stage, the literature on PPPs does not seem to place IPRs 
high on the factors motivating parties from different sectors to collaborate with each other. 
Chapter seven looked at factors motivating parties in the study PPPs to form the respective 
partnerships; the ultimate objective was to locate IP among these factors. The chapter found 
that the two most influential motivating factors were complementary synergies and parties’ 
comparative advantage in the relevant field. In so far as IP is a product of intellectual assets – 
which comprise inter alia information, knowledge, experience, technology and technical 
skills – IP can be said to be a factor motivating collaboration but only to this extent. More 
accurately, it is the potential to exploit or take advantage of a partner’s intellectual assets that 
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is more important as a motivating factor to join a partnership; whether or not those 
intellectual assets are protected by IPRs is by and large immaterial as a motivating factor. It is 
the availability of intellectual assets rather than their protection that draws a party to another 
in partnership. 
 
In the analysis of the two food security oriented PPPs, other issues related to IP become 
evident. One such issue is that of differing perspectives held by either sector on the concept 
of IP and its application within the context of the respective PPPs. It has been argued that 
IPRs are modelled on private gains and therefore more compatible with private sector 
research. The motive behind the application of IPRs by the IARCs is to secure inventions for 
the public domain.  
 
Chapter seven looked at the role of IP at the partnership negotiation stage. The IP policy 
objectives of the two sectors are at odds. Although there is no definitive evidence that private 
sector investment in agricultural research crucially depends on the protection of IP, there are 
suggestions that appropriation of benefits (including through IPRs) is one of the factors 
influencing private sector investment in agriculture. The private sector’s IP policy objective 
is to preserve the status of inventions as IP from which benefits, financial and otherwise, can 
be extracted. The CG’s IP policy objective on the other hand is to mitigate the ‘excludability’ 
element introduced by IPRs so as to ensure that protected products are still available and 
accessible to the public, particularly poor farmers.   
 
Underscoring the finding in chapter five that IP law per se has minimal impact on the 
implementation and execution of a PPP, the findings from the two case studies introduce the 
dimension that contract law is more important in the execution of a partnership and that 
capacity to negotiate fair IP terms as well as other contractual elements is crucial in balancing 
the different and often conflicting IP policy objectives. PPPs are premised on the presence of 
a common and mutual objective; studies on PPPs demonstrate that there is sufficient space 
for collaboration between the public and private sectors. By focusing on this space, 
collaborating parties are able to formulate minimum terms that are flexible enough to 
accommodate all parties.  
 
Where IP interests are not sufficiently accommodated in the partnership agreement, 
consequences differ across partnerships and across parties. The ICRISAT-PS consortia 
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showed that some private seed companies opted not to join the consortia because of IP 
reasons while in the ILRI ECF project, Merial had IP considerations before joining the 
partnership, although these were not significant enough to deter its membership of the PPP. 
IP reasons also determined the design of the ICRISAT-PS consortia: a consortium approach 
based on grants from private seed companies was adopted rather than a contract research 
model as the latter was perceived as compromising ICRISAT’s IP policy.  
 
The primacy of the partnership agreement including the terms relating to IP makes a solid 
case for investment of sufficient capacity to negotiate contract terms in both sectors. Just as 
IP capacity is needed in the public sector to fashion IP policies in a manner that balances 
IPRs with the public sector’s public goods mandate, capacity in IP management is likewise 
needed to ensure that IP clauses in partnership agreements are executed in a fair manner.  
 
Findings from the ICRISAT-PS consortia challenge the commonly held belief that the private 
sector has ample capacity in IP and its management: a significant number of the local seed 
companies did not have IP policies; only a few considered them necessary and were in the 
process of formulating them; the MNCs however had IP policies and sufficient IP capacity.  
 
Previous studies on PPPs in the CGIAR have suggested that IPRs are an important issue for 
consideration in the design and implementation of PPPs. The influence of IPRs on the design 
of PPPs was discussed in chapter seven in the ICRISAT-PS consortia. The PPP goes further 
to show that just as IP can affect a PPP’s design, the latter may have IP implications: the 
consortia’s design and the terms of the Letters of Agreement in effect offer exclusivity to 
some members for a limited period.  
 
Findings from both case studies demonstrated the role of IP in the execution of the respective 
PPPs as subjugated by other factors. A previous study on PPPs in the CGIAR suggested that 
exchange of IP protected technology between the public and private sectors is not in and of 
itself a barrier to successful PPPs. The two case studies bear this out and go further to show 
that while IPRs may be important to a PPP, there are other factors more crucial to the success 
of a PPP. Both PPPs identified mutual trust as the most important factor; others such as 
communication, confidentiality and competency were ranked higher than IPRs. The private 
sector in the ECF project qualified the ranking by suggesting that although IP is not the most 
important factor in a PPP’s success, it plays a significant role in determining the course of the 
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PPP - particularly if the nature of the research conducted involves products with proprietary 
potential.   
 
8.6  Summary of findings  
 
This thesis advocates for, among other things, a bespoke qualitative analysis of PPPs as the 
preferred method that ensures the influence of factors such as IPRs on food security oriented 
PPPs in the context of development are sufficiently captured and analysed. Given the nature 
of such qualitative research, the findings are not universal for all agricultural PPPs working in 
a development context or indeed for all PPPs involving CG Centres. The case studies 
however highlight various issues and themes that can be used in analysing other agricultural 
PPPs.   
 
Chapter one presented the main hypothesis for this study: that IP is relevant to food 
security oriented PPPs in developing countries and that it affects their formation and 
execution. The thesis sought to answer whether, how and in what ways IP is relevant to food 
security PPPs in developing countries. The thesis finds that the relevance of IP to food 
security oriented PPPs in developing countries is determined by two factors: the nature 
of the technology used in the partnership and the stage of the partnership.   
Summarised, other main findings of the thesis are: 
 
1. IP and increasing privatisation of agricultural research  
• There is insufficient evidence to suggest that IPRs have helped increase private sector 
presence in agriculture in Kenya and India. However, there are indications that private 
sector presence may be responsible in part for the increasing use of IPRs in 
agricultural food security oriented research.  
• IARCs’ exposure to IPRs can partly be attributed to the IARCs’ interaction with the 
private sector. 
2. IPRs and the provision of public goods 
• Theoretically, IPRs and the provision of public goods are at odds: IPRs make goods 
excludable while the underlying theory behind the provision of public goods is that 
these should be equally accessible to all. Theoretically, the use of IPRs by public 
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research institutions like the IARCs compromises the institutions’ public goods 
mandate. This relates to the existence of IPRs. 
• There is a distinction between the existence and the exercise of IPRs. It is the latter 
rather than the former that determines the delivery of protected public goods. 
3. Mitigation of excludability 
• Through the creative exercise of IPRs, public research institutions like the CG Centres 
can mitigate the excludability effect introduced by IPRs thereby ensuring that their 
public goods mandate are not compromised. The CG system wide policies achieve 
this balance and acknowledge the need for the CG Centres to form partnerships with 
the private sector. 
• Sufficient IP capacity is prefatory to the creative exercise of IPRs. Public agricultural 
research institutions must invest in building IP capacity particularly where partnership 
with the private sector is foreseen or where the institution’s research involves 
proprietary technology.   
4. IP and food security 
• IPRs have the potential to influence food security in developing countries in various 
ways. These include limiting control over and access to PGRs by poor farmers; 
promoting private sector led research and the concomitant distortion of research 
priorities; promoting the homogeneity of plant varieties through the mandatory DUS 
criteria and the attendant loss of biodiversity and increasing the costs of public 
agricultural research by necessitating the negotiation of FTO agreements for protected 
technologies. This however relates to the potential impact of IPRs; it is how IPRs are 
exercised that ultimately determines the outcome of their application and the effects 
of this on food security. 
5. Domestic IP law and the conduct of agricultural research  
• Domestic IP legislation in Kenya and India does not have any bearing on the 
execution of the two case studies but rather the IP policies of the respective 
institutions and the agreements governing the PPPs.  
• For Kenya and India, there is insufficient evidence that IPRs have promoted 
agricultural innovation. There is no correlation between the volume of applications for 
agricultural biotechnology patents and PBRs on the one hand and the inception of 
IPRs on the other. 
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• Of the five main international conventions and treaties relevant to IP in agriculture 
(the TRIPs Agreement, the CBD, the FAO International Treaty and the UPOV 
Conventions), the FAO International Treaty is the most relevant to the research 
conducted by CG Centres. Further, the Treaty is more relevant to the conduct of 
research in both case studies than Kenyan and Indian IP legislation. 
6. Role of IP in the creation, negotiation and execution of the case studies 
• The impact and influence of IPRs is unique to each PPP; only a qualitative analysis of 
a PPP can reveal the significance of IP to the individual partnership. 
• It is the potential to exploit or take advantage of a prospective partner’s intellectual 
assets rather than the assets’ IP status that draws a party to another in partnership. 
Whether or not a prospective partner’s intellectual assets are protected by IPRs is 
largely immaterial as a factor motivating collaboration except to the extent IPRs 
demonstrate the presence of intellectual assets. 
• The public sector’s perspective on the concept and application of IPRs in the PPPs 
differs from that of the private sector. This difference is reflected in the parties’ 
respective IP policy objectives. The differing perspectives have the effect, inter alia, 
of raising the costs of IP management in the PPP. Creative and flexible partnership 
agreements can mitigate this potential conflict by finding and capitalising on the 
parties’ common objective.  
• IP negotiation and management capacity is vital to all parties; the two case studies 
reveal that although this capacity exists in the two CG Centres, there is room for 
improvement. The findings indicate that some private sector firms such as local seed 
companies are lacking in IP capacity.  
• IP law per se has minimal impact on the implementation and execution of a PPP; 
contract law, in so far as it governs the partnership agreement, is more relevant to the 
execution of a PPP than IP legislation is. 
• IP related issues can influence the design of a partnership; the PPP’s design, in turn, 
can have IP implications by for example, offering exclusivity of the end products to 
some members as in the ICRISAT-PS consortia. 
• IP has a role in the creation, negotiation and execution of food security oriented PPPs 
in developing countries. Its role is determined by the nature of research and by the 
stage of the partnership. These two determinants suggest that for food security 
oriented PPPs whose research is potentially proprietary, IP is mostly significant at the 
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negotiation and execution stages and less so at the creation stage while for PPPs with 
non-proprietary research products, IP is mostly significant at the formation stage and 
hardly plays a role in the negotiation and execution  stages.   
• While IP is relevant to food security oriented PPPs, both case studies show that there 
are other factors more crucial to a PPP’s success. The most important of these is 
mutual trust. Others are research competence, communication and good will.  
 
8.7  Suggestions and the way forward  
 
There have been no conclusive studies conducted on the role of IPRs in agricultural 
innovation in developing countries; indeed, there is a dearth of information on the role of 
IPRs in domestic innovation generally. A comprehensive study focusing on this, especially in 
the development context, would be invaluable in developing national and institutional 
policies relevant to a country’s level of agricultural R&D and reflective of an institute’s 
capacity.  
 
Various studies show that IP is increasingly in use in public institutions including IARCs yet 
capacity is generally lacking. These institutions need to develop IP policies and capacity 
especially where collaboration with the private sector is anticipated. This would ensure that 
their public goods mandate is not compromised and that the terms relating to ownership of IP 
are fair. Periodic intellectual asset audits in a public research institute would enable it to 
identify and evaluate its own proprietary assets thereby enhancing its awareness of the 
potential leverage that it can wield in negotiations with the private sector.   
 
The need for IP management in public research organisations must however be weighed 
against the costs. For scholars, this is a minefield for further research on economic, legal, 
institutional and organisational mechanisms that ensure the costs of IP protection and 
administration in public research organisations - particularly those working in a development 
context - do not outweigh the benefits. Perhaps a manual or handbook of different practices 
could be developed to help IP practitioners and managers in public research organisations 
decide whether, when and how to seek IP protection for its technology, to use technology 
protected by third parties and to negotiate IP terms with the private sector in the context of 
agricultural PPPs in developing countries.  
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The analysis in this thesis is limited to two case studies. Further research on the role of IP on 
other PPPs in agricultural R&D is required. This would help address the unique role of IP in 
individual PPPs and perhaps aid in improving the understanding of IP’s influence in various 
models of collaboration between the public and private sectors.  
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